RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The nationwide survey was commissioned by Detector Media NGO and carried out by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the Razumkov Center's sociological service from December 17 to 22, 2021.
The study was conducted due to the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (DANIDA)
The sample consists of 2018 respondents and covers the adult population of Ukraine, except for the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as parts of the Donetsk and the Luhansk regions.
The survey was conducted using the method of face-to-face interviews on a stratified multi-stage sample using random sampling at the first stages of sampling (sample stratified by regions and types of settlements) and quota method of respondents, by sex and age quotas at the final stage. The results are representative of the main socio-demographic indicators: sex, age, macro-region and type of settlement.
The maximum theoretical error of the survey (excluding the design effect) does not exceed 2.3%.
Macro-region composition:
- West - Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil and Chernivtsi regions;
- Center - Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions and the city of Kyiv;
- South - Mykolayiv, Odesa and Kherson regions;
- East - Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions.
For comparison, the study used the results of All-Ukrainian polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February 2018 and February 2019 and the sociological service of the Razumkov Center in August 2020 on behalf of the Detector Media NGO.
The most common source of information for Ukrainians about events in Ukraine and the world remains the traditional media, namely national television channels. The share of Ukrainian television viewers among respondents is 67%. Other traditional media - newspapers and radio - are far behind in the coverage of audience: social networks account for 44% of consumers, Ukrainian online media for 29%, messengers for 16%, while Ukrainian newspapers only for 6%, and radio for 7%. Personal connections are a very popular source of information among Ukrainians. 28% of respondents said that they learn about current news from relatives, friends and acquaintances. Among Russian media, Russian television channels have the largest share of viewers (5%), which is less than the audience of any all-Ukrainian type of media.
Most often, Ukrainians watch TV channels whose program combines newscasts with entertainment content. The most popular of them are 1+1 (43%), channel Ukraine (34%), STB (32%) and ICTV (31%). Less than 10% of respondents watch television channels, which mostly broadcast news and political talk shows.
There are twice as many respondents who watch certain TV channels as there are respondents who trust these TV channels. However, the list of leading TV channels by trust largely coincides with the list of the most popular ones: 21% trust 1+1, 17% trust channel Ukraine, 15% trust STB and 13% trust ICTV. Despite the status of a public broadcaster, trust in UA: Pershyi ranges around 5%.
The vast majority of Ukrainians (56%) choose Facebook among social networks for information. Instagram (25%) and Viber (24%) close the top three. At the same time, Telegram is far behind Viber in the amount audience. It is used by only 13% of respondents mainly for local news (20%), information about community life (19%), political events (20%), economic situation (16%), health care (15%) and topical areas of interest of respondents (18%).
When choosing the media as a source of information, most respondents said that they pay attention to the interestingness of materials (57%), impartiality of information (38%), promptness of coverage (38%), convenience of presentation (33%) and closeness of views (29%). Markers of media transparency, such as information about the owner and sources of funding, significantly influence the choice of less than 5% of respondents.
Information about media owners is not very relevant for Ukrainians; only if the choice of media should be based on a limited range of characteristics. To a direct question, 36% of respondents answered that it is important for them to know the owners of the media. In addition, 46% believe that they know some of the owners of the media where they regularly receive information. Petro Poroshenko's ownership of Channel 5 (53%) and Ihor Kolomoiskyi's ownership of 1+1 (55%) are the most noticeable, while less than 20% of respondents know that Viktor Pinchuk owns TV channels of the StarLightMedia media group. The relative majority of Ukrainians attribute the Rada TV channel (33%), Dom TV channel (12%) and UA: Pershyi (19%) to the state ownership. Only 9% consider society as the owner of UA:Pershyi.
According to 34% of Ukrainians, the state should not regulate the work of bloggers. The other 30% have the opposite view. The main arguments against state regulation are the respondents' support for the image of the Internet as a free space for expression (65%). A quarter of citizens who oppose government regulation of bloggers do not believe in the effectiveness of government regulation policy at all. Among those who support government regulation, the vast majority (61%) believe that it should apply to all bloggers without exception.
As of the end of 2021, the vast majority of Ukrainians (68%) believe that the conflict in Donbas is the result of Russian aggression with use of local militants, while 65% of respondents believe that Russia was the first to start the war in Donbas. Ukrainians are also unanimous in their assessment of the events of the Revolution of Dignity: 59% consider the events of 2013-2014 to be a rightful uprising of the people against the authoritarian government.
More ambiguous is the issue of the presence of Russian cultural actors in Ukraine and Ukraine's cooperation with the International Monetary Fund. 44% of respondents support the ban on certain artists and Russian films, as they consider it to be a necessary step. 37% disagree with this and consider such ban as a restriction of citizens' rights. Similarly, opinions were divided in the assessment of cooperation with the IMF. 38% believe that such cooperation will provide Ukraine with the necessary economic assistance, 40% believe that it could pose a threat to Ukraine to be governed externally.
68% of Ukrainians periodically have doubts about the veracity of the information they receive from the media or social networks. The most popular fact-checking strategies in such cases are the search for information in alternative sources (40%); thinking about who benefits from this way of interpreting events (32%); perception of such information as one of the possible versions of events (24%). Only 6% reported that in such cases they turn to fact-checking organizations.
As of today, Ukrainians experience an acute shortage of information in the information space to expose corruption activity (46%), analyze and explain the economic situation in Ukraine and the world (41%) and highlight positive changes in the state and society (37%). The least relevant, according to people, is the increase in the amount of materials about culture (12%), materials for children (12%) and materials about life in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea, the Donetsk and the Luhansk regions (7%).
There is no unanimity among citizens about what is more important: the freedom of speech or the protection of the state from disinformation: 41% believe that it is freedom of speech, 42% that it is protection of the state, while 17% are undecided. As for disinformation, a quarter is in favor of the state legislating the work of those who may spread disinformation. 23% believe it is necessary for the state to prosecute disinformers by law. 21% of respondents are ready to support the state in the fight against disinformation if the state focuses its efforts on recording disinformation and debunking it. It is worth noting that when respondents were asked only about methods of combating disinformation, only 9% said that the state should not take any targeted action, as this could impair freedom of speech.
Evaluating the communication of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, 60% of citizens believe that the President now has no obstacles to communicate his position to the population. Those who think that the President cannot fully express his position believe that Volodymyr Zelenskyi needs to work harder on the quality of his arguments for greater persuasiveness (38%). About 25% of respondents are also in favor of the President creating a state TV channel and nationalizing TV channels owned by the oligarchs.
1. Which sources do you most often use to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad? (not more than three answers)
Ukrainian television (national TV channels) | 66.6 |
Russian television | 4.6 |
Ukrainian online media | 28.5 |
Social networks | 44.4 |
Ukrainian newspapers (national periodicals) | 5.8 |
Ukrainian radio (national stations) | 7.0 |
Local television | 8.5 |
Local radio | 2.3 |
Local online media | 7.4 |
Local print media | 3.4 |
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances | 28.1 |
Russian print media | 0.1 |
Russian websites | 0.6 |
"LNR-DNR" media (including websites) | 0.2 |
Messengers (Viber, Telegram, WhatsApp, TikTok, Instagram, etc) | 16.4 |
Other | 1.1 |
It's hard to answer | 2.4 |
2. What Ukrainian TV channels do you watch most often? (not more than five answers)
STB | 32.3 |
1+1 | 43.0 |
UA: Pershyi | 8.6 |
ICTV | 30.9 |
Ukraine | 33.9 |
Inter | 27.3 |
Novyi Kanal | 12.3 |
Ukraine 24 | 16.3 |
Nash | 8.1 |
Pryamyi channel | 9.3 |
Channel 5 | 8.2 |
Espresso TV | 7.4 |
Channel 24 | 4.0 |
ATR | 0.4 |
Hromadske TV | 2.3 |
Other | 2.2 |
I do not watch TV | 25.1 |
It's hard to answer | 2.0 |
3. Which of the following Ukrainian TV channels do you trust most? (not more than five answers)
STB | 15.4 |
1+1 | 21.3 |
UA: Pershyi | 4.7 |
ICTV | 12.6 |
Ukraine | 16.6 |
Inter | 11.4 |
Novyi Kanal | 5.0 |
Ukraine 24 | 9.7 |
Nash | 6.4 |
Pryamyi channel | 5.9 |
Channel 5 | 5.4 |
Espresso TV | 4.3 |
Channel 24 | 1.2 |
ATR | 0.1 |
Hromadske TV | 1.1 |
Other | 1.2 |
I do not watch TV | 25.1 |
It's hard to answer | 15.8 |
4. Which social networks do you use to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad? (several options are possible)
56.1 | |
VKontakte | 2.5 |
Odnoklassniki | 3.3 |
5.7 | |
24.9 | |
1.0 | |
Telegram-channels | 13.3 |
TikTok | 8.7 |
Viber | 23.6 |
Communities or pages in other messengers | 3.9 |
Other | 1.3 |
I do not use social networks | 28.0 |
It's hard to answer | 2.9 |
Ukrainian Ministry of Health | 0.1 |
Life hack | 0.1 |
Varta | 0.1 |
Political events | 0.1 |
Acquainted people | 0.1 |
Representatives of culture and arts | 0.1 |
Ukr.net | 0.1 |
Segidnia.ua | 0.1 |
Typical Ukraine | 0.1 |
t.me | 0.1 |
Travel | 0.1 |
RBC.ru | 0.1 |
SARNYNEWS.CITY | 0.1 |
Novyny.ua | 0.1 |
Naukraine | 0.0 |
Hudymenko | 0.0 |
Motivation | 0.0 |
It's hard to answer | 93.5 |
Telegram channels named by respondents:
Insider | 0.9 |
Ukraine 24 / 7 | 0.6 |
Ukraine now | 0.5 |
Ukraine | 0.5 |
Sania in Florida | 0.4 |
Informator | 0.4 |
Laughter and humor | 0.3 |
Unian | 0.3 |
TSN | 0.3 |
Shariy;s channel | 0.3 |
Sport.ua | 0.2 |
Trukha | 0.2 |
Kharkiv life | 0.2 |
Kyiv Operatyvnyi | 0.1 |
Strana | 0.1 |
Zhytel Bilotserkivtsi | 0.1 |
Lehitymnyi | 0.1 |
Coronavirus Info | 0.1 |
5. Information of what field do you usually receive from Telegram channels? (several options are possible)
The life of the community to which I belong | 18.9 |
News of community where I live | 20.4 |
Thematic field in which I am interested (hobby or profession) | 18.3 |
Political events | 19.5 |
Economic situation | 16.0 |
Health care (including coronavirus epidemic) | 15.3 |
Tourism and travel | 9.2 |
Culture and art | 5.9 |
Education and self-development | 6.6 |
Volunteer and community initiatives | 3.3 |
Humor and satire | 11.6 |
Other | 0.9 |
I do not read Telegram channels | 50.1 |
It's hard to answer | 3.9 |
6. What is important for you when choosing the media as a source of information about events in Ukraine and the world? (several options are possible)
The materials of this media should be interesting to me | 57.2 |
Quick reaction of this media to the most current events and their prompt coverage | 37.6 |
Similarity of views expressed by the media to own views | 28.6 |
Convenience and clarity of information presentation. | 33.2 |
Quality of sound, visualization or design in the materials published by the media | 9.0 |
Media owner | 2.3 |
Ease of access to the media | 12.8 |
Neutral and unbiased presentation of information, coverage of different points of view | 37.8 |
The media has a good reputation among people I trust | 16.9 |
Patriotic position of this media | 13.8 |
Personality of journalists, TV presenters | 7.9 |
Openness of information on financing the media | 4.6 |
Argumentation of the views expressed in this media | 22.5 |
Other | 1.0 |
It's hard to answer | 5.6 |
7. How important is it for you to know owners of the media you watch / listen to / read?
Very important | 6.0 |
It is important to some extent | 30.2 |
Rather not important | 26.4 |
It doesn't matter at all | 28.0 |
It's hard to answer | 9.5 |
8. Do you know who owns the media that you regularly read / watch / listen to?
Yes, I know the owners or almost all of the owners | 3.2 |
I know some | 45.9 |
No, I do not know. | 40.0 |
It's hard to answer | 10.9 |
9. Do you know who owns such TV channels?
| P. Poroshenko | І. Kolomoiskyi | R. Akhmetov | V. Pinchuk | D. Firtash | V. Medvedchuck | State | Society | Russian owner | Other | It's hard to answer |
1+1 | 1.3 | 54.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 39.0 |
Channel 5 | 53.1 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 39.8 |
Inter | 0.5 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 5.6 | 17.8 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 60.2 |
UA: Pershyi | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 18.8 | 8.9 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 64.3 |
STB | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 13.5 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 75.1 |
ICTV | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 19.9 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 69.9 |
Ukraine | 0.4 | 0.4 | 44.3 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 3.0 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 47.8 |
Channel 24 | 1.8 | 0.2 | 8.2 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 5.7 | 77.0 |
Nash | 0.9 | 0.4 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 6.6 | 2.2 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 10.4 | 72.7 |
Ukraine 24 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 24.4 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 1.5 | 66.9 |
Pryamyi | 30.7 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 4.5 | 1.5 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 59.7 |
Dom | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 11.7 | 3.0 | 5.2 | 1.8 | 77.0 |
Rada | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 32.7 | 3.5 | 0.5 | 1.8 | 60.6 |
10. In your opinion, should the state regulate the information activities of bloggers in the same way as it currently regulates TV channels and radio stations?
Yes | 29.6 |
No | 34.1 |
It's hard to answer | 36.2 |
11. If you think the state should not regulate bloggers, then why? (multiple choice answers;% among those who believe that the state should not regulate the activities of bloggers)
The Internet and social networks must be free from any regulation | 65.3 |
The state does not have the capacity to regulate the activity of citizens, including bloggers, on social networks | 18.3 |
I do not believe in the effectiveness of state regulation at all | 25.4 |
Bloggers earn much less than traditional media | 5.4 |
Other | 0.7 |
It's hard to answer | 1.9 |
12. If you think the state should regulate bloggers, then who exactly should be regulated? (multiple choice answers;% among those who believe that the state should regulate the activities of bloggers)
The state should regulate all bloggers, regardless of the number of their subscribers, cooperation with advertisers, etc. | 60.6 |
Only certain bloggers should be subject to regulation according to clearly established state criteria | 35.3 |
Other | 0.9 |
It's hard to answer | 3.2 |
13-17. Please choose the one of the interpretation of events or actions by the state from the opossite two that best reflects your personal opinion:
13.
Russia was the first to start the war in Donbas | 65.0 |
Ukrainian government and oligarchs started the war | 17.2 |
It's difficult to answer / I disagree with both options | 17.8 |
14.
The events on the Maidan in late 2013 - early 2014 are the Revolution of Dignity, a rightful uprising of the people against authoritarian rule | 58.6 |
The events on the Maidan in late 2013 - early 2014 are an illegal coup d'etat, seizure of power by a group of armed people | 24.8 |
It's difficult to answer / I disagree with both options | 16.5 |
15.
Ukraine's cooperation with the International Monetary Fund provides Ukraine with the necessary economic assistance | 38.2 |
Through cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, Ukraine has come under external rule | 39.9 |
It's difficult to answer / I disagree with both options | 21.9 |
16.
Conflict in Donbas is Russian aggression with the use of local militants | 68.3 |
Conflict in Donbas is an internal Ukrainian conflict, a civil war | 15.6 |
It's difficult to answer / I disagree with both options | 16.1 |
17.
Ban on certain artists and Russian films in Ukraine was a necessary step to protect the state | 43.8 |
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens | 37.0 |
It's difficult to answer / I disagree with both options | 19.2 |
18. Do you often have doubts about the veracity of messages in the media or on social networks that you read?
Often | 29.5 |
Not often, but it happens | 38.7 |
Quite rarely | 13.8 |
This almost does not happen | 5.5 |
Never | 2.8 |
It's hard to answer | 9.7 |
19. What do you usually do if you have doubts about the veracity of the message in the media or on social networks? (several options are possible)
I am trying to find out more about the owner of this media, the author of the post | 8.8 |
I look for information in other sources to check the message | 40.1 |
I turn to organizations that check facts | 5.7 |
I think about who benefits from this interpretation of events | 31.5 |
I perceive this information as one of the possible versions of events | 24.1 |
I unsubscribe from the page of the author of such messages | 9.3 |
Other | 3.0 |
It's hard to answer | 17.1 |
20. In your opinion, what should be more present in the Ukrainian information media? (not more than five answers)
Coverage of reforms | 27.6 |
Coverage of positive changes in the state and society | 37.1 |
Coverage of civil society initiatives | 19.3 |
Critics of the government | 24.7 |
Exposing corruption | 45.8 |
Disclosure of acute social problems | 28.9 |
Analysis and critique of law enforcement | 18.4 |
Analysis and explanation of the economic situation in Ukraine and the world | 40.6 |
Coverage of hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions | 19.4 |
Educational materials | 19.8 |
Materials for children | 11.9 |
Materials on health care and the work of medics | 23.5 |
Materials about culture | 12.1 |
Materials about the life of Crimea and the occupied part of Donbas | 7.1 |
Materials about important events in the world | 24.2 |
Other | 0.9 |
It's hard to answer | 4.6 |
21. What should the state do to counteract disinformation?
Prosecute disseminators of disinformation in the manner prescribed by law | 23.1 |
Regulate on legislation level the activities of those who may spread disinformation | 24.6 |
Record cases of disinformation and debunk them | 20.6 |
Conduct awareness-raising activities for citizens on how to protect themselves from disinformation | 12.2 |
Nothing, because it can violate the right to freedom of expression | 9.4 |
Other | 0.3 |
It's hard to answer | 10.0 |
22. What is more important: freedom of speech or protection of the state from disinformation that could harm its territorial integrity and national security?
Freedom of speech is more important | 40.7 |
State protection is more important | 41.7 |
It's hard to answer | 17.6 |
23. In your opinion, does President Volodymyr Zelenskyi have the opportunity to fully communicate his position to the citizens of Ukraine in the information space?
Yes, in full | 60.4 |
Yes, but partly | 15.5 |
No, not at all | 4.1 |
It's hard to answer | 20.0 |
24. If you think that President Volodymyr Zelenskyi does not have the opportunity to express his position at all or has only partially, what should he do to have such an opportunity? (several possible answers;% among those who believe that President Zelenskyi does not have the opportunity, or has only a partial opportunity to express his position)
Create a state TV channel | 24.2 |
Nationalize TV channels owned by oligarchs | 24.1 |
Use social networks and Internet resources more actively | 19.8 |
Develop the capabilities of the Public Broadcaster (television channel, radio and Internet resource) | 19.8 |
Work on the quality of own arguments for greater persuasiveness compared to others | 37.6 |
Other | 1.1 |
It's hard to answer | 10.1 |
The nationwide survey was commissioned by Detector Media NGO and carried out by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the Razumkov Center's sociological service from December 17 to 22, 2021.