Trust in the Prosecutor's Office in Ukraine: An Assessment of the Prosecutor General's Independence and Public Attitudes Towards an Open Selection Process

METHODOLOGY

A nationwide survey was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in collaboration with KMIS, commissioned by the Anti-Corruption Action Center, from 21 August to 10 September 2026.
Using the computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) method, 1,050 respondents aged 18 and over were surveyed. They reside in the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Luhansk, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv and Chernivtsi regions, as well as the city of Kyiv.
In the Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions – only in those areas controlled by the Ukrainian government and where there is no active fighting.
To conduct the survey, mobile phone numbers for all major mobile operators in Ukraine were generated entirely at random during the initial stage. The proportion of generated numbers allocated to each mobile operator was approximately proportional to the proportion of total mobile numbers allocated to each mobile operator (according to KMIS surveys). Interviewers then rang the generated numbers and asked respondents who answered the call to take part in the survey.

The theoretical margin of sampling error does not exceed 3.9 per cent.
Additional systematic sampling errors, however, may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

Composition of the macro-regions:

• West – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi regions;

• Centre – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy and Chernihiv regions, and the city of Kyiv;

• South – Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odesa regions; 

• East – Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions.

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Note: As the figures have been rounded to whole percentages, the sum of the individual response categories may differ slightly from 100 per cent.

Trust in the Ukrainian prosecution service

The majority of those surveyed do not trust the Ukrainian prosecution service. 70 per cent of respondents stated that they tend not to trust or do not trust the prosecution service at all, compared to 26 per cent who do trust it. A further 4 per cent were unable to decide on an answer. Among the specific response options, 41 per cent of respondents tend not to trust the prosecution service, 30 per cent do not trust it at all, 23 per cent tend to trust it and 3 per cent trust it completely. Thus, distrust of the prosecution service is almost three times greater than trust.

In terms of educational attainment, the difference in attitudes towards the prosecution service is relatively small. 72 per cent of respondents with secondary education or below do not trust the prosecution service, as do 75 per cent of those with higher education. At the same time, 4 per cent of respondents with a lower level of education fully trust the prosecution service, compared with just 1 per cent of those with a higher education. In summary, a low level of trust is characteristic of both educational groups, although distrust is slightly more widespread among respondents with a higher education.

Assessment of the independence of the Prosecutor General

The majority of respondents do not consider Ruslan Kravchenko, who was serving as Prosecutor General at the time of the survey, to be an independent figure. 51 per cent of those surveyed replied that he was not independent, whilst 16 per cent consider him to be independent. A further 32 per cent were unable to decide, whilst around 1 per cent declined to answer. Thus, amongst those who have a definite opinion, negative assessments of the Prosecutor General’s independence significantly outweigh positive ones.

Opinions on the independence of the Prosecutor General vary depending on the type of settlement in which the respondent lives. Among residents of regional centres and the capital, 17 per cent consider the Prosecutor General to be independent, whilst 83 per cent hold the opposite view. In other cities, 26 per cent of respondents consider him to be independent, whilst 74 per cent do not. Among residents of villages and small towns, the corresponding figures are 32 per cent and 68 per cent. Thus, a positive assessment of the Prosecutor General’s independence is more common among residents of villages and small towns, and least common among residents of regional centres and the capital. At the same time, the view that the Prosecutor General is not independent prevails in all types of settlements.   

There are also marked differences based on educational attainment. Among respondents with secondary education or below, 30 per cent consider the Prosecutor General to be independent, whilst among those with higher education, the figure is 17 per cent. Conversely, 71 per cent and 83 per cent of respondents, respectively, do not consider him to be independent. Consequently, people with a higher education are noticeably more critical in their assessment of the Prosecutor General’s independence.

Citizens who trust the prosecution service are significantly more likely to view the Prosecutor General as independent, whilst among those who do not trust the prosecution service, the overwhelming majority do not regard him as an independent figure. Among those who do not trust the prosecution service, 87 per cent do not consider the Prosecutor General to be independent, and only 13 per cent hold the opposite view. By contrast, among those who trust the prosecution service, 54 per cent consider the Prosecutor General to be independent, whilst 46 per cent do not.

The impact of an open competition involving international experts on public confidence in the prosecution service and the Prosecutor General

Respondents were asked to imagine a situation in which the new Prosecutor General and other prosecutors would be selected through an open competition involving independent international experts. 56 per cent of those surveyed stated that, under such a scenario, they would have greater trust in the Prosecutor General. Only 4 per cent said they would trust him less. For 34 per cent, such a selection mechanism would not affect their level of trust, whilst 6 per cent were undecided. Thus, an open competitive selection process involving independent international experts has significant potential to increase trust in the Prosecutor General. At the same time, for around a third of citizens, a change in the selection procedure alone is not enough to alter their attitude towards the Prosecutor General.

Similar views are held regarding the prosecution service as a whole. 53 per cent of respondents stated that they would have greater confidence in the prosecution service if the Prosecutor General and other prosecutors were appointed through an open competition involving independent international experts. 6 per cent said that, under such a scenario, they would have less confidence in the prosecution service. For 33 per cent, such a change would not affect their level of trust, whilst 8 per cent were undecided.

TABLES

1. To what extent do you trust or not trust the Ukrainian prosecution service? (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)

1.1 Breakdown by educational attainment (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)

* There is a statistically significant correlation between level of education and trust in the prosecution service (χ²(2) = 13.43; p = 0.004), but the strength of this correlation is weak (Cramér’s  V = 0.12)

2. In your opinion, is the current Prosecutor General, Ruslan Kravchenko, an independent figure? (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)

2.1 Breakdown by type of settlement (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)

* There is a statistically significant association between settlement type and the perceived independence of the Prosecutor General (χ²(2)=15.79; p<0.001), but the strength of this association is weak (Cramér’s  V=0.15)

2.2 Breakdown by educational attainment (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)

* There is a statistically significant association between level of education and the assessment of the Prosecutor General’s independence (χ²(2)=15.55; p<0.001), but the strength of this association is weak (Cramér’s  V=0.15)

2.3 Breakdown by level of trust in the Ukrainian prosecution service (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)

* There is a statistically significant correlation between trust in the prosecution service and the assessment of the Prosecutor General’s independence (χ²(2) = 127.71; p < 0.001), with the strength of this correlation being moderate (Cramér’s  V = 0.43)

3. Please imagine that Ukraine has introduced new selection rules and that the new Prosecutor General and other prosecutors will be selected through an open competition involving independent international experts. How would this affect your trust in the Prosecutor General and other prosecutors: would you trust them more, trust them less, or would it make no difference? (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)

4. Please imagine that Ukraine has introduced new selection rules and that the new Prosecutor General and other prosecutors will be selected through an open competition involving independent international experts. How would such a selection process affect your trust in the prosecution service as a whole? (as a percentage; respondents could choose one answer)