The nuclear factor in the Russian-Ukrainian war (expert survey)

The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation conducted a survey of experts on the nuclear factor in the Russian-Ukrainian war from 16 September to 24 October 2025. The purpose of the survey was to find out the experts' opinions on the potential use of nuclear weapons by the Kremlin. Twenty-five foreign policy experts responded to the questionnaire. 

The nuclear factor in the Russian-Ukrainian war: geopolitical and security aspects

  • 20 interviewed experts consider it unlikely or categorically impossible that Russia would use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, with only 5 participants in the study considering such a scenario likely. 
  • 23 experts assess the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons against European countries as low, while only two consider such scenario quite likely.
  • Experts are unanimous in their estimation of the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons against the United States, considering it unlikely (with 15 out of 25 experts having responded ‘definitely not’).
  • 23 experts consider a Russian attack on American military facilities outside the United States unlikely.
  • However, experts' opinions differ on the probability of a nuclear strike by the Kremlin on neutral territories. 16 experts consider such a scenario unlikely, while 9 respondents believe it is likely.
  • 22 experts consider Moscow's nuclear arsenal to be the main factor restraining Western countries from increasing military aid to Ukraine in its fight against the aggressor, while only 3 experts disagree with this. 
  • The 18 interviewed experts believe that Moscow's periodic escalation of hostilities near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is a deliberate attempt to cause a nuclear disaster and achieve the same political/psychological effect as the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Another 6 experts note that such actions by the Russians pursue other goals. And only one expert considers those actions to be unconscious.
  • 21 experts believe it is reasonable for Ukraine to continue operations to destroy components of the Russian Federation's nuclear triad, while 4 respondents abstained from answering this question. 

The Kremlin's nuclear arsenal: between propaganda and reality

  • In the opinion of 10 experts, the declared size of Russia's nuclear arsenal is close to the real number. Another 7 respondents believe that the real size of Russia's nuclear arsenal is far from what the Kremlin claims, while 8 experts noted that this question is difficult to answer.  

Ukraine's nuclear status: historical and political myths

  • 13 of the experts surveyed believe that Ukraine's nuclear arsenal would not have prevented Russia from attacking. The opposite view is held by 10 experts.
  • 10 experts surveyed consider that acquiring nuclear power status is impossible for Ukraine, as this would weaken Ukraine's relations with Western countries and could provoke a nuclear strike from the Kremlin. On the other hand, 7 interviewed experts expressed a positive opinion on this prospect if there are no other real security guarantees for Ukraine. For 8 experts, this question was difficult to answer.
  • Periodic mentions in the global media about Ukraine's possible plans to restore its nuclear potential have no impact on the course of the war, according to 11 surveyed experts. In the opinion of 8 respondents, such mentions rather draw attention to Ukraine's need for security guarantees. Meanwhile, 5 participants in the study consider that this harms Ukraine by creating additional tension in its relations with the international community.  

Nuclear blackmail and the balance of power in modern geopolitical  and security realities

  • Experts were almost equally divided on the possibility of European nuclear powers (The United Kingdom and France) becoming an alternative nuclear ‘umbrella’ for the European Union in countering the Kremlin's nuclear blackmail. 13 respondents answered in the positive, while 12 experts were sceptical about this possibility.  

Geopolitical aspects of US nuclear strategy:  is Washington afraid of nuclear blackmail?

  • 20 experts agreed that the current White House administration is extremely vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by authoritarian regimes (Russia, Iran, North Korea). Only 5 of the experts surveyed disagreed.  

The Kremlin's nuclear blackmail:  disinformation and  propaganda campaigns

  • On the question of whether Moscow's periodic nuclear threats during the Russian-Ukrainian war should be taken seriously, experts' opinions were almost equally divided: 13 experts answered in the positive, while 12 respondents think that such threats from Russia should be ignored, as this rhetoric is evidence of Moscow's military weakness in the conventional war against Ukraine. 
  • 18 experts surveyed agree that the Kremlin's periodic nuclear blackmail deters Western countries from providing substantial assistance to Ukraine, while 6 participants in the study believe that the Russian Federation's periodic nuclear blackmail is gradually ‘dulling’ the fear of Western countries and contributing to their determination to help Ukraine.