Summary of 2023: Public Opinion of Ukrainians

Opinion polls
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9 January 2024

The nationwide survey was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the Razumkov Center sociological service on December 8-15, 2023.

The face-to-face survey was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnepropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv. In Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions, the survey was conducted only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and where no combat actions are taking place.

The survey was conducted using a stratified multi-stage sampling using random selection at the first stages of sampling and a quota method of selecting respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected in accordance with gender and age quotas).  The structure of the sample population corresponds to the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

2019 respondents aged 18 and older were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sample deviations may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced displacement of millions of citizens.

Emotions and experiences of the passing year

In 2023, it was their families and loved ones inspired and motivated 43% of Ukrainians to get through this difficult year. Moreover, the reliance on family and friends as a support has become more widespread (30% at the end of 2022). At the same time, just like in 2022, our defenders serving in the Ukrainian Defense Forces remain the second most common source of inspiration and motivation for Ukrainians (16%). Thus, over the second year of the full-scale invasion, the sources of support and motivation for the society remain unchanged.

In late 2023, Ukrainians are hopeful about both their own future (55%) and the future of Ukraine (61%). Besides hope, Ukrainians most often feel anxiety (40%) and optimism (28%) when thinking about their own future. And while hope continues to be the most common emotion as in 2022, the number of those who feel anxious has slightly increased (compared to 33% in 2022), and the number of optimists has also decreased (36%). Anxiety about the future of Ukraine in general has also increased from 24% at the end of 2022 to 34% in December 2023.

The war affects the daily lives of the vast majority of Ukrainians (95%), 61% of whom call this impact decisive. Such assessments are typical for all macro-regions of Ukraine, but most of all for the East, where the war has a dramatic impact on the daily lives of 68% of the population. The war also affects people's lives regardless of their age. Only among young people (18-29 years old), the share of those whose lives are greatly affected by the war is lower than in other age groups. However, even among young people, this figure makes up the majority of respondents (54%).

The impact of the war is also related to the perception that the life of Ukrainians has worsened over the past year: 35% say that life has become slightly worse, and another 40% feel that it has become significantly worse.

 The war and the victory

The belief in victory continues to unite the vast majority of Ukrainians (88%), 63% of whom believe in victory without any doubt. Only 5% of respondents doubt the victory of Ukraine. However, compared to December 2022, the ratio has changed somewhat between those who believe in victory without any doubt (78% in December 2022 compared to 63% now) and those who somewhat believe in victory (15% in December 2022 compared to 25% now).

The vast majority of residents in all macro-regions are convinced of Ukraine's victory, although there are slightly more doubters in the South (10%) than in the other macro-regions.

The belief in Ukraine's victory prevails in all age groups.

More than half of Ukrainians (58%) believe that Ukraine will win this war in the short term: 6% believe that this will happen in the next few months, 21% believe in the vuctirt by the summer of 2024, and another 31% believe that Ukraine will win in 1-2 years. 15% of respondents consider the Ukrainian victory to be in the mid-term (3-5 years). At the same time, adherents of the most pessimistic scenario, who do not believe that victory will occur in their lifetime, are in the absolute minority (2.5%).

In the regional breakdown, the share of those who believe that Ukraine will achieve victory in 1-2 years ranges from 27% in the South to 36% in the West. The number of those who believe in victory by the summer of 2024 is the lowest in the East (16%) and the highest in the South (25%). At the same time, the share of believers in the most optimistic scenario of victory in the next few months is almost the same in all macro-regions (5-7%).

When it comes to the desired achievements in the war that Ukrainians expect to see, there is a clear pattern of linking the achievements in the war to the rescue of Ukrainian citizens and the demand for justice and punishment of Russia. Thus, among the various achievements that might be possible as a result of the war, most Ukrainians are focused on the release of all prisoners and the return of deported Ukrainians (69%). The second place is shared by three options that are equally important to citizens: Ukraine's accession to NATO to guarantee protection from another war (42%), punishment of all Russian war criminals (42%), and compensation for all damages caused to the economy and citizens (41.5%).

In the regional breakdown, the release of all prisoners and the return of deported citizens is most demanded in the country as a whole, but the highest demand is in the South (80%). Ukraine's accession to NATO as a guarantee of protection against another war is approximately equally important in all macro-regions (from 39% in the West to 44% in the Center). Compensation for all damages caused to the economy and citizens was most often mentioned in the Center (46%) and in the South (48%). Similarly, in the South, the demand for punishment of all Russian war criminals is higher than in other regions (46%).

One in four Ukrainians (26%) would consider the collapse of Russia as a state an achievement as a result of the war. At the same time, there are significant regional differences in the perception of this option. Thus, in the West, the largest share of the residents would consider this an achievement (40%). In the Center and in the East, 23% and 24%, respectively, consider this a likely achievement in the war. In the South, however, only 10% preferred this over other possible achievements and outcomes.

Volunteering and assisting the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Despite the overall deterioration of the quality of life mentioned above, Ukrainians continue to provide financial and other material assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and internally displaced persons. Thus, 63% say that over the past 12 months they have personally transferred money to volunteers and charitable organizations that help the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, 46% transferred funds to a special bank account of the NBU for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Nearly half of all respondents (51%) have helped internally displaced persons with money, clothing, food or other items.

One in four Ukrainians (26%) helped to produce supplies for the Armed Forces (e.g., weaving nets, repairing equipment, 3D printing of spare parts for drones etc. 23% have participated in various charity events to support the Armed Forces and persons affected by the war. And 13% say that in the last 12 months they have been directly involved in volunteer work in the medical treatment and provision of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In the regional breakdown, the provision of financial assistance in favor of the Armed Forces is somewhat less recorded in the East and South. At the same time, the share of those who help IDPs in various ways is the same in the East as in the West (51%). The largest share of the locals who have personally volunteered to help treat and supply the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the past year is recorded in the East of Ukraine (17%).

Foreign Policy Issues in the Public Opinion of Ukrainians

Poland has the most favorable attitudes of Ukrainians among Ukraine's neighboring countries. Thus, 66% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude toward Poland, while only 8% have a negative attitude, while 22% of citizens are neutral. Every second Ukrainian (51%) believes that the Polish citizens have a positive attitude toward Ukraine, while 13% of respondents believe that Poles are negative toward Ukraine.

The leader of the anti-rating among neighbors (Russia was not included in this list) is Belarus. Thus, 78% of Ukrainians currently have a negative attitude toward Belarus, with 58% having a strongly negative attitude. A neutral attitude is shown by 12% (the lowest rate of neutrality among all neighbors), while less than 5% have a positive attitude toward Belarus at the end of 2023. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians believe that the population of Belarus also has a negative attitude toward Ukraine (61%, including 41% who have a strongly negative attitude). Only 7% of Ukrainians believe that Belarusians have a positive attitude toward Ukraine.

Ukrainians are mostly positive about both Moldova (49.5% vs. 8% of Ukrainians who are negative towards Molvoda) and Romania (47% vs. 9% of Ukrainians who are negative towards Romania). Neutral attitudes toward both countries are shared by 38% of Ukrainians.

The attitude of Ukrainians toward Slovakia is equally divided between those who have a neutral and positive opinion of the country (38.5% each).

Hungary is the only neighboring EU member state that is currently viewed negatively by a relative majority of Ukrainians (46%). 27% have a neutral attitude toward Hungary, and 21% have a positive attitude. At the same time, Ukrainians think that Hungarian citizens' attitudes toward Ukraine are also predominantly negative. 37% of Ukrainians think that Hungarians have a negative attitude toward Ukraine. 17% of Ukrainians believe that Hungarians have a positive attitude toward Ukraine.

Regarding the conflict in the Middle East, the majority of Ukrainians (66%) believe that HAMAS is the aggressor, and only 5.5% believe that Israel is the aggressor. At the same time, 23% of respondents do not have a clear opinion on who is the aggressor in this war.

Citizens' Assessments of the State of Affairs in the Country. Trust in Social Institutions, Politicians, Officials and Public Figures

The results of a sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Center's sociological service in cooperation with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation from December 8 to 15, 2023.

The face-to-face survey was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnepropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv. In Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions, the survey was conducted only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and where no combat actions are taking place.

The survey was conducted using a stratified multi-stage sampling using random selection at the first stages of sampling and a quota method of selecting respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected in accordance with gender and age quotas).  The structure of the sample population corresponds to the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

2019 respondents aged 18 and older were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sample deviations may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced displacement of millions of citizens.                                                          

Evaluation of the developments in the country

After the outbreak of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the share of citizens who believe that events in Ukraine are developing in the right direction increased significantly (from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in September-October 2022, reaching its highest level in February-March 2023 (61%). Since then, there has been a downward trend in this indicator (to 45% according to the latest survey). 33% of respondents believe that events are developing in the wrong direction (21.5% are not sure).

32% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine is able to overcome the existing challenges in the next few years, 45% believe that Ukraine will be able to overcome the challenges in the longer term, and 7% believe that Ukraine is not able to overcome the existing challenges (the rest are undecided).

Ukrainians were most optimistic about overcoming challenges and complications in late 2022 and early 2023 (for example, in February-March 2023 - 49%, 36%, and 3%, respectively). And the opinions before the outbreak of a full-scale war  were much more pessimistic (in December 2021 the figures were 18%, 54% and 18%, respectively).         

Economic situation assessment

Ukrainian citizens are quite skeptical about the economic situation in the country: in May 2021, eight months before the outbreak of full-scale war, 60% of respondents considered it "very bad" or "rather bad" (and only 5% as "good" or "very good", and 32% as "neither bad nor good"). In September-October 2022, seven months after the outbreak of the war, the share of citizens who assessed it as "very bad" or "rather bad" increased (to 64.5%). These assessments improved in February-March 2023, when a decrease in negative assessments was recorded even compared to the "pre-war" period: 55% of respondents assessed the economic situation in the country as "very bad" or "rather bad" (4% as "good" or "very good", 37% as "neither bad nor good"). However, according to the survey conducted in December 2023, these evaluations have deteriorated (66.5%, 3%, and 27%, respectively) and now do not differ statistically from those observed in September-October 2022.

Citizens tend to assess the well-being of their own families better than the economic situation in the country. In May 2021, only 36% assessed their family's well-being as "very" or "fairly" bad, 48% as "neither bad nor good," and 14% as "good" or "very good"). In September-October 2022, the share of citizens who rated it as "very" or "fairly" bad slightly increased (to 39%), while the share of those who considered it "good" or "very good" decreased to 10%. The survey conducted in February-March 2023 revealed that, similarly to the assessment of the economic situation in the country, the assessment of family well-being has slightly improved and is close to the indicators observed in May 2021: 35% rated it as "very" or "fairly" bad, 50% as "neither bad nor good," and 12% as "good" or "very good." However, since then, assessments of their own family's well-being have deteriorated somewhat (37%, 51%, and 10.5%, respectively) and do not differ statistically from those observed in September-October 2022.

When assessing the family's financial well-being in terms of what purchases family income allows, after the outbreak of full-scale aggression, compared to June 2021, there has been an increase in the share of people who say they can barely make ends meet, with not enough money even for basic groceries (from 9% in June 2021 to 14% in February-March 2023). However, in December 2023, the share of such people decreased to 10% and is now not statistically different from the figure for mid-2021. Similarly, in June 2021 and December 2023, significant differences are not observed betweem those who reported "having enough money only for food and to buy necessary inexpensive items" (38% and 39%, respectively), those who said "in general, we have enough to live on, but buying durable goods such as furniture, fridge, TV is already causing difficulties" (44% and 42%, respectively), and "we live well, but we are not yet able to make some purchases (buy an apartment, car, etc.)" (6% and 7%, respectively). However, while in June 2021, 0.9% of respondents answered "we can afford to buy almost anything we want," no respondents gave this answer now).

Before the outbreak of full-scale war, citizens did not believe much in rapid changes in the economic situation: in May 2021, only 12% believed that the country's economic situation would change for the better in the next 3 months, and 13% hoped that their family's well-being would improve over that time. More often, citizens expected the situation to deteriorate in the months following the survey: 22% said that the country's economic situation would change for the worse, 18% thought that their family's well-being would change for the worse. However, the most widespread opinion was that the situation would not change significantly in 3 months (56% and 57%, respectively, did not expect changes in these areas).

In September-October 2022, the share of those who expected the economy to deteriorate increased significantly to 35% (due to a decrease to 37.5% of those who believed that the situation would not change), while only 9.5% believed that the situation would change for the better. However, according to a survey conducted in February-March 2023, the share of those who expected the economy to deteriorate within 3 months decreased to 23%. At the same time, the share of those who expected the situation to improve increased (to 13%) as well as the share of those who believed it would not change (to 45%). In December 2023, the share of those who believe the situation will change for the better decreased to 7%, those who believe it will worsen increased to 33%, and the share of those who believe it will not change is 48% and does not differ statistically from the indicator for February-March 2023.

Similar trends were observed in the dynamics of expected changes in the short-term level of their family's well-being. According to the latest survey, the share of those who believe that it will improve over this period is 8%, those who believe that it will deteriorate make up 25%, and those who think it will not change make up 53%.

It should be noted that expectations of changes in the short term are less pessimistic than in December 2020: back then, 41% of respondents expected a deterioration in the economic situation in the country over the next 3 months, and 32% expected a deterioration in their own family's well-being.

After the outbreak of a large-scale war, there was a significant improvement in economic expectations in the mid-term (2-3 years). Thus, the share of those who expected the country's economic situation to improve in the next 2-3 years increased from 30% to 43% in September-October 2022 compared to May 2021, and in February-March 2023 it increased to 52%. However, in December 2023, this optimism declined, with 34.5% now believing so (which is still 5% more than in May 2021). The share of those who expect the situation to worsen is 22% (about the same as in May 2021), while 16% believe that the situation in this area will not change (which is 10% less than in May 2021).

The share of those who expected their family's well-being to improve in the next 2-3 years increased from 29% to 41% in September-October 2022 compared to May 2021, and in February-March 2023 it increased to 49.5%. According to the latest survey, the share of such people is 34%. 18% believe that family well-being will deteriorate during this period, and 19% think it will not change.

Trust in social institutions

Among governmental and social institutions, the most trusted are the Armed Forces of Ukraine (94% of respondents trust them), volunteer military units (89%), volunteer organizations (86%), State Emergency Service (83%), National Guard of Ukraine (82%), Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (73%), State Border Guard Service (72%), Security Service of Ukraine (71%), President of Ukraine (68%), Church (63%), NGOs (63%), National Police of Ukraine (58%), Mayor of the city (town, village) where the respondent lives (53%), National Bank of Ukraine (51%).

Also, more often trust is expressed than distrust in the Ukrainian media (48% and 43%, respectively), the council of the city (town, village) where the respondent lives (47% and 41%, respectively), and the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) (43% and 31%, respectively).

The majority of respondents express distrust in political parties (76% do not trust them), the bureaucracy (officials) (73% do not trust them), courts and the judicial system in general (72% express distrust), the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (66%), the Government of Ukraine (63%), the Prosecutor's Office (62%), commercial banks (58%), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (52%), the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (51%), and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (51%).

Also, more often distrust than trust is expressed in trade unions (46.5% distrust them, while 25% trust them).

Trust in politicians, officials and public figures

Among the politicians, officials, and public figures analyzed in this study, respondents most often expressed trust in Volodymyr Zelenskyi (71%), Vitalii Kim (65%), Dmytro Kuleba (56%), Serhii Prytula (55%), and Mykhailo Podoliak (52%).

More often respondents expressed trust than distrust in Oleksii Danilov (44% trust him and 30% do not trust), Vasyl Malyuk (41% and 21%, respectively), Rustem Umerov (35% and 22%, respectively), and Ihor Klymenko (31% and 21%, respectively). The shares of those who trust and distrust Iryna Vereshchuk (40% and 39%, respectively) and Yaroslav Zhelezniak (19% and 21%, respectively) do not differ statistically significantly.

The majority of respondents do not trust Yulia Tymoshenko (85%), Oleksii Arestovych (82%), Yurii Boiko (81%), Petro Poroshenko (74%), Mariana Bezuhla (58.5%), Davyd Arakhamia (57%), Andrii Yermak (54%).

Distrust rather than trust was expressed more often in Vitalii Klychko (45% do not trust him, while 40% trust), Denys Shmyhal (42% and 38%, respectively), Ruslan Stefanchuk (41% and 28%, respectively), Oleh Tatarov (34% and 10%, respectively), Danylo Hetmantsev (33% and 20%, respectively), Olha Stefanyshyna (23% and 17%, respectively), and Rostyslav Shurma (21% and 10%, respectively).

Citizens' Assessments of the State of Affairs in the Country. Trust in Social Institutions, Politicians, Officials and Public Figures

The results of a sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Center's sociological service in cooperation with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation from December 8 to 15, 2023.

The face-to-face survey was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnepropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv. In Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions, the survey was conducted only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and where no combat actions are taking place.

The survey was conducted using a stratified multi-stage sampling using random selection at the first stages of sampling and a quota method of selecting respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected in accordance with gender and age quotas).  The structure of the sample population corresponds to the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

2019 respondents aged 18 and older were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sample deviations may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced displacement of millions of citizens.
 

Evaluation of the developments in the country

After the outbreak of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the share of citizens who believe that events in Ukraine are developing in the right direction increased significantly (from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in September-October 2022, reaching its highest level in February-March 2023 (61%). Since then, there has been a downward trend in this indicator (to 45% according to the latest survey). 33% of respondents believe that events are developing in the wrong direction (21.5% are not sure).

32% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine is able to overcome the existing challenges in the next few years, 45% believe that Ukraine will be able to overcome the challenges in the longer term, and 7% believe that Ukraine is not able to overcome the existing challenges (the rest are undecided).

Ukrainians were most optimistic about overcoming challenges and complications in late 2022 and early 2023 (for example, in February-March 2023 - 49%, 36%, and 3%, respectively). And the opinions before the outbreak of a full-scale war  were much more pessimistic (in December 2021 the figures were 18%, 54% and 18%, respectively).          

Economic situation assessment

Ukrainian citizens are quite skeptical about the economic situation in the country: in May 2021, eight months before the outbreak of full-scale war, 60% of respondents considered it "very bad" or "rather bad" (and only 5% as "good" or "very good", and 32% as "neither bad nor good"). In September-October 2022, seven months after the outbreak of the war, the share of citizens who assessed it as "very bad" or "rather bad" increased (to 64.5%). These assessments improved in February-March 2023, when a decrease in negative assessments was recorded even compared to the "pre-war" period: 55% of respondents assessed the economic situation in the country as "very bad" or "rather bad" (4% as "good" or "very good", 37% as "neither bad nor good"). However, according to the survey conducted in December 2023, these evaluations have deteriorated (66.5%, 3%, and 27%, respectively) and now do not differ statistically from those observed in September-October 2022.

Citizens tend to assess the well-being of their own families better than the economic situation in the country. In May 2021, only 36% assessed their family's well-being as "very" or "fairly" bad, 48% as "neither bad nor good," and 14% as "good" or "very good"). In September-October 2022, the share of citizens who rated it as "very" or "fairly" bad slightly increased (to 39%), while the share of those who considered it "good" or "very good" decreased to 10%. The survey conducted in February-March 2023 revealed that, similarly to the assessment of the economic situation in the country, the assessment of family well-being has slightly improved and is close to the indicators observed in May 2021: 35% rated it as "very" or "fairly" bad, 50% as "neither bad nor good," and 12% as "good" or "very good." However, since then, assessments of their own family's well-being have deteriorated somewhat (37%, 51%, and 10.5%, respectively) and do not differ statistically from those observed in September-October 2022.

When assessing the family's financial well-being in terms of what purchases family income allows, after the outbreak of full-scale aggression, compared to June 2021, there has been an increase in the share of people who say they can barely make ends meet, with not enough money even for basic groceries (from 9% in June 2021 to 14% in February-March 2023). However, in December 2023, the share of such people decreased to 10% and is now not statistically different from the figure for mid-2021. Similarly, in June 2021 and December 2023, significant differences are not observed betweem those who reported "having enough money only for food and to buy necessary inexpensive items" (38% and 39%, respectively), those who said "in general, we have enough to live on, but buying durable goods such as furniture, fridge, TV is already causing difficulties" (44% and 42%, respectively), and "we live well, but we are not yet able to make some purchases (buy an apartment, car, etc.)" (6% and 7%, respectively). However, while in June 2021, 0.9% of respondents answered "we can afford to buy almost anything we want," no respondents gave this answer now).

Before the outbreak of full-scale war, citizens did not believe much in rapid changes in the economic situation: in May 2021, only 12% believed that the country's economic situation would change for the better in the next 3 months, and 13% hoped that their family's well-being would improve over that time. More often, citizens expected the situation to deteriorate in the months following the survey: 22% said that the country's economic situation would change for the worse, 18% thought that their family's well-being would change for the worse. However, the most widespread opinion was that the situation would not change significantly in 3 months (56% and 57%, respectively, did not expect changes in these areas).

In September-October 2022, the share of those who expected the economy to deteriorate increased significantly to 35% (due to a decrease to 37.5% of those who believed that the situation would not change), while only 9.5% believed that the situation would change for the better. However, according to a survey conducted in February-March 2023, the share of those who expected the economy to deteriorate within 3 months decreased to 23%. At the same time, the share of those who expected the situation to improve increased (to 13%) as well as the share of those who believed it would not change (to 45%). In December 2023, the share of those who believe the situation will change for the better decreased to 7%, those who believe it will worsen increased to 33%, and the share of those who believe it will not change is 48% and does not differ statistically from the indicator for February-March 2023.

Similar trends were observed in the dynamics of expected changes in the short-term level of their family's well-being. According to the latest survey, the share of those who believe that it will improve over this period is 8%, those who believe that it will deteriorate make up 25%, and those who think it will not change make up 53%.

It should be noted that expectations of changes in the short term are less pessimistic than in December 2020: back then, 41% of respondents expected a deterioration in the economic situation in the country over the next 3 months, and 32% expected a deterioration in their own family's well-being.

After the outbreak of a large-scale war, there was a significant improvement in economic expectations in the mid-term (2-3 years). Thus, the share of those who expected the country's economic situation to improve in the next 2-3 years increased from 30% to 43% in September-October 2022 compared to May 2021, and in February-March 2023 it increased to 52%. However, in December 2023, this optimism declined, with 34.5% now believing so (which is still 5% more than in May 2021). The share of those who expect the situation to worsen is 22% (about the same as in May 2021), while 16% believe that the situation in this area will not change (which is 10% less than in May 2021).

The share of those who expected their family's well-being to improve in the next 2-3 years increased from 29% to 41% in September-October 2022 compared to May 2021, and in February-March 2023 it increased to 49.5%. According to the latest survey, the share of such people is 34%. 18% believe that family well-being will deteriorate during this period, and 19% think it will not change.

Trust in social institutions

Among governmental and social institutions, the most trusted are the Armed Forces of Ukraine (94% of respondents trust them), volunteer military units (89%), volunteer organizations (86%), State Emergency Service (83%), National Guard of Ukraine (82%), Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (73%), State Border Guard Service (72%), Security Service of Ukraine (71%), President of Ukraine (68%), Church (63%), NGOs (63%), National Police of Ukraine (58%), Mayor of the city (town, village) where the respondent lives (53%), National Bank of Ukraine (51%).

Also, more often trust is expressed than distrust in the Ukrainian media (48% and 43%, respectively), the council of the city (town, village) where the respondent lives (47% and 41%, respectively), and the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) (43% and 31%, respectively).

The majority of respondents express distrust in political parties (76% do not trust them), the bureaucracy (officials) (73% do not trust them), courts and the judicial system in general (72% express distrust), the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (66%), the Government of Ukraine (63%), the Prosecutor's Office (62%), commercial banks (58%), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (52%), the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (51%), and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (51%).

Also, more often distrust than trust is expressed in trade unions (46.5% distrust them, while 25% trust them).

Trust in politicians, officials and public figures

Among the politicians, officials, and public figures analyzed in this study, respondents most often expressed trust in Volodymyr Zelenskyi (71%), Vitalii Kim (65%), Dmytro Kuleba (56%), Serhii Prytula (55%), and Mykhailo Podoliak (52%).

More often respondents expressed trust than distrust in Oleksii Danilov (44% trust him and 30% do not trust), Vasyl Malyuk (41% and 21%, respectively), Rustem Umerov (35% and 22%, respectively), and Ihor Klymenko (31% and 21%, respectively). The shares of those who trust and distrust Iryna Vereshchuk (40% and 39%, respectively) and Yaroslav Zhelezniak (19% and 21%, respectively) do not differ statistically significantly.

The majority of respondents do not trust Yulia Tymoshenko (85%), Oleksii Arestovych (82%), Yurii Boiko (81%), Petro Poroshenko (74%), Mariana Bezuhla (58.5%), Davyd Arakhamia (57%), Andrii Yermak (54%).

Distrust rather than trust was expressed more often in Vitalii Klychko (45% do not trust him, while 40% trust), Denys Shmyhal (42% and 38%, respectively), Ruslan Stefanchuk (41% and 28%, respectively), Oleh Tatarov (34% and 10%, respectively), Danylo Hetmantsev (33% and 20%, respectively), Olha Stefanyshyna (23% and 17%, respectively), and Rostyslav Shurma (21% and 10%, respectively).

To download the press release with tables of distribution of answers "Summary of 2023: Public Opinion of Ukrainians" (emotions and feelings of the year, war and victory, volunteering and assistance to the Armed Forces, foreign policy issues)", click  HERE.

To download the press release with tables of distribution of answers "Citizens' Assessments of the State of Affairs in the Country. Trust in Social Institutions, Politicians, Officials and Public Figures", click  HERE.