ATTITUDES OF UKRAINIANS TOWARDS NATO: recent trends, hidden motivations and tasks for the future
The informational-analytical publication “Public Opinion” is a reflection of the latest trends in public opinion among the Ukrainian population, informing the broad public about the dynamics of the moods of the Ukrainian people regarding topical problems in the establishment of democracy and statehood, commentary of experts on relevant issues and recommendations on improving the situation in different spheres of social life. This is one of the projects of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) – one of the leading think-tanks of Ukraine which focuses its activity on fostering the development of democracy, market economy and the integration of Ukraine into the European and Euro-Atlantic community.

**What is public opinion?**

Public opinion is the aggregate of moods, assessments, judgments, views and opinions of society. The research of public opinion implies studying the views of the population on specific problems and issues of political, economic and social life. This is an assessment given by the people on the course of events and to the politicians, and also a source of information about the problems and priorities of the people. Public opinion is an indicator of the level of satisfaction of the people with the government and the situation in society in general. Constant monitoring of public opinion and the widespread dissemination of results fosters understanding of rational and emotional elements and factors which define the nature of social interaction between members of society.

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The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the author express their gratitude to the Office of the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine for assistance in preparing the polling regarding NATO which is the basis of this analytical material.
ATTITUDES OF UKRAINIANS TOWARDS NATO: recent trends, hidden motivations and tasks for the future

Ukrainian society increasingly supports the idea of Ukraine’s accession to NATO as a mechanism for guaranteeing national security. In recent years a dynamic growth in the level of such support has been observed in every region of Ukraine. At the same time, such support does not prevail in all regions: residents of the East and South continue to remain more skeptical regarding the prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration than residents of the West and Center of Ukraine. This does not, in truth, give grounds to speak of a sustainable interregional consensus in support of the Euro-Atlantic vector of integration in Ukraine. It is quite obvious that the overall situation in regard to security, the prospects of regulating the conflict in Donbas, the effectiveness of cooperation with NATO, and the readiness of the latter to meet Ukraine halfway on the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of official Kyiv will have an impact on the stability of the current indicators of support for NATO. The absence, due to these or other reasons, of the tangible results of Ukraine’s implementation of the Euro-Atlantic agenda could serve as a factor in society’s disappointment and repel Ukrainian citizens from the Alliance which, in turn, poses a threat to the stability of the newly chosen foreign policy course of Ukraine. The possibility of maintaining the current level of support for NATO (or the expansion and plateauing of the base of this support amongst the regions) will depend on a proper understanding of the motivations for support or opposition to the North Atlantic Alliance in Ukrainian society, as well as devising an effective information policy about NATO which would best correlate with the respective motivations and inquiries of society.
In June 2017, the support of NATO in Ukraine reached a record-high – 47%. The results of nationwide polling conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) jointly with the Razumkov Centre testify to this.\(^1\) Thus, one can affirm that practically every second resident of Ukraine considered NATO membership to be the best option for guaranteeing national security.

Such a level of support for NATO among Ukrainian citizens was difficult to fathom some five years ago when, according to sociological studies, at best only one-eighth of the residents of Ukraine (13%) gave preference to this variant of guaranteeing national security. Moreover, in 2012 the option of Ukraine’s joining NATO was notably less popular than the idea of Ukraine’s non-aligned status (42%), and was two times less popular among Ukrainians than the support of a military union with Russia and other CIS countries (26%).

Undoubtedly, the Russian military aggression in the East of Ukraine in 2014 became the turning point in the shift of public opinion regarding NATO over the entire history of Ukraine’s independence. It was precisely from that point that a notable growth in support of the idea of Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance was observed: 33% in support of NATO in May 2014, while in September of that same year already 44% of Ukrainians were among the proponents of the country’s joining the North Atlantic Alliance.

Here, it is indicative that the ascending dynamics were observed not only in the mostly pro-NATO oriented regions of the West and Center of Ukraine, but also in the South and the East. Even in the Donbas, where the prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration earlier did not have tangible support and the respective indicators were in the range close to the statistical margin of error, support for NATO accession increased substantially.

The political elite of Ukraine tried to catch the new “wave” of steadily changing attitudes in society regarding NATO. By the end of 2014, the Ukrainian parliament cancelled the so-called “non-aligned status” of Ukraine, which was approved during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych in 2010. At the same time, it did not proclaim a clear course towards NATO membership at this point in time. However, in February 2017 President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko made an unexpected statement in an interview for a German newspaper about his intention to hold a referendum on Ukraine’s membership in NATO, appealing to the real-time trends of public opinion. Subsequently, a new approach in relations with NATO was approved at the level of the Ukrainian legislature upon the initiative of the president. On June 8, 2017, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decided upon certain legislative amendments in the section regarding the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine which defined, in particular, “gaining membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” as the foreign policy priority of Ukraine.

Moreover, during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in July 2017, the Ukrainian president pointed out that “Ukraine has a clear timetable or a roadmap of what needs to be done so that by 2020 the country will comply with the NATO membership criteria”. Therefore, the official policy vector of Kyiv regarding Euro-Atlantic integration was gradually transformed in correspondence to real changes in the sentiments of society and public opinion trends.

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5 “Poroshenko: Ukraina gotova provesti reformy dlya dostizheniya kriteriyev chlenstva v NATO” ['Poroshenko: Ukraine is ready to conduct reforms to meet the NATO membership criteria'] / Voice of America, 10.07.2017. – https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/tb-/3936228.html
The regional “gap” on the NATO issue: persisting, but gradually narrowing

Despite the notable changes in the structure of public opinion in Ukraine over the past several years, a line of division between the pro-NATO oriented West-Center and predominantly skeptical South and East of Ukraine remains intact, as the results of the latest sociological studies demonstrate.⁶

Hence, a hypothetical referendum on the possibility of Ukraine’s accession to NATO in the regional cross-section would be “won” by sympathizers of the Alliance only in the West of Ukraine (71% “in favor” and 12% “against”) and in the Center of Ukraine (52% “in favor” and 30% “against”). In the South and the East of Ukraine, despite the considerable increase in support of NATO over recent years, the number of opponents of the Euro-Atlantic vector of integration still notably prevails: 43% of respondents in the South are “against” NATO accession while solely 25% are “in favor” of it. Similarly, 53% in the East are “against” joining the Alliance and only 32% are “in favor”.

If you participated in a referendum on accession to NATO, how would you vote?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would vote in favor of accession</td>
<td>71,3</td>
<td>52,3</td>
<td>24,7</td>
<td>31,9</td>
<td>48,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would vote against accession</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>30,3</td>
<td>42,6</td>
<td>53,1</td>
<td>33,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>17,3</td>
<td>17,4</td>
<td>32,7</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>18,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF)

At the same time, it should be noted that the interregional “gap” in regard to support of the Alliance across Ukraine notably narrowed in recent years. While this gap in support of the Euro-Atlantic vector of integration still persists, it is not as extensive as could be observed in “pre-war” 2012. While in April 2012 the number of proponents of NATO in the Donbas and the East of Ukraine was around 1-2%, in several years – by May 2016 – the figure in these regions grew to 24% and 29%, respectively, which is the testimony to a considerable and unprecedented increase.⁷

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Support of NATO in Ukraine: what is hidden behind the numbers?

Assuming that aspirations in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration will continue to develop, it is quite important to understand as best as possible the underlying reasons that pushed Ukrainians to support NATO starting in 2014 and motivates them to support the Alliance today. Equally important is to understand the factors that stimulate or limit potential further growth in public support of the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine, in particular the hidden phobias and widespread stereotypes of NATO, the overall level of awareness of Ukrainians about this organization, as well as those principles underpinning its functioning.

One of the latest sociological studies conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) was targeted precisely at studying the aforementioned motivational aspects of NATO support in Ukraine and, on the contrary, the origin of the bias of Ukrainians regarding the North Atlantic Alliance.

The results of the study generally confirm the fact that, among the overwhelming majority of the current supporters of NATO membership – (86%), the prime motivation behind supporting the accession of the country to NATO is the expectation to achieve “guarantees of security for Ukraine”. Such an attitude is not that surprising taking into account the protracted armed conflict in the Donbas which half of the population considers to be the main problem facing Ukraine.

Alongside that every third proponent of NATO sees in membership a favorable opportunity to “strengthen and modernize the Ukrainian army” (33%), while one fourth of respondents expects “growth of Ukraine’s authority in the international arena” (25%) from gaining NATO membership.

Therefore, the factors that sparked notable growth in support of NATO among Ukrainian citizens over recent years were largely foreseeable and dictated for the most part by the current challenges to the security of Ukraine. In this regard, many Ukrainians are probably looking for tools to quickly overcome security threats by sheltering under the “umbrella” of the most powerful military-political alliance.

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Why do Ukrainians oppose NATO?

The more interesting considerations are reflected in the views of those Ukrainians who are somewhat inclined to not support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The fears that membership in NATO could “pull Ukraine into NATO military actions” (44%), “provoke Russia to direct military aggression” (28%) and, finally, the conviction that “Ukraine should be a non-aligned country” (27%) are determining factors for this segment of respondents.11

While the last of the aforementioned arguments is a part of standard and firmly established convictions of certain Ukrainian citizens, the other two more widespread arguments are partly grounded in erroneous judgments or dictated by the lack of understanding of objective realities.

Even though Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it has participated and, apparently, will continue to participate in different military operations and exercises jointly with NATO member countries. In particular, the Ukrainian military contingent jointly with NATO military forces took part in the IFOR/SFOR peace support operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo (KFOR). Also, Kyiv was engaged in the ongoing NATO counter-terrorist operation “Active Endeavour” in the Mediterranean and NATO counter-piracy operation “Ocean Shield”.12 Therefore, fears of “pulling Ukraine into the military actions of NATO” are largely exaggerated and speculative in nature, if one considers the existing experience of cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Alliance.

The participation in peacekeeping operations and joint NATO-Ukraine training exercises is particularly needed for Ukraine today as an important practical instrument for enhancing the combat capability of the Ukrainian army as well as ensuring its compatibility with the forces of the Alliance. Simultaneously, this functions as an important prerequisite of meeting the criteria which are necessary for gaining NATO membership in the future.

Although the fear among Ukrainians of “provoking Russia to direct military aggression” by joining NATO is certainly justified, as the rapprochement of Ukraine with NATO could aggravate the conflict and potentially lead to a full-scale Russian military offensive, it has to be acknowledged that Russian aggression and military presence is already a self-evident fact in Crimea and the Donbas region. In this context, it would also be interesting to raise the question whether the so-called

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12 Participation of Ukraine in peacekeeping operations under the leadership of the Alliance / Mission of Ukraine to NATO – http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/ua/ukraine-nato/contribution
“non-aligned status” and, consequently, the absence of any effective security guarantees for Ukraine, have contributed to the military aggression of Russia in the first place.

Significant regional differences in the perception of citizens on whether NATO is primarily for the “defense of Ukraine” or “a threat to Ukraine” can be traced back to certain deeply-rooted stereotypes regarding the North Atlantic Alliance in Ukrainian society.

While in the western and central regions of Ukraine the perception of NATO as “a defense” mechanism definitely prevails (81% and 68% respectively), in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine such unanimity in public opinion is not found. In both of the latter regions, approximately the same number of residents perceive NATO as a “defense” mechanism and a “threat”, while 25% of the respondents in the South and 30% in the East do not perceive NATO as neither one nor the other. The respondents in the southern oblasts of Ukraine also demonstrate a comparatively high level of uncertainty on this issue in comparison to other regions of Ukraine.

It is indicative that among the opponents of NATO, along with the above-mentioned fears, roughly every fourth respondent in the respective group is guided by the Soviet propaganda cliché that “NATO is an aggressive imperialistic bloc” (25%) as a justification of his/her position, as the results of the public opinion poll show.

If you are against Ukraine’s accession to NATO, please indicate the reason why? (Choose no more than three options), % of those who would vote against accession to NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>June 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO is an aggressive imperialistic bloc</td>
<td>24,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This requires significant additional funds</td>
<td>25,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This will ultimately ruin relations with Russia</td>
<td>20,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This will provoke Russia to direct military aggression</td>
<td>27,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This may draw Ukraine into the military actions of NATO</td>
<td>44,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine in principle should be a non-aligned state</td>
<td>26,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners and foreign capital will take control of Ukraine</td>
<td>22,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western culture and morals will spread throughout Ukraine</td>
<td>6,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF)

Problem of the awareness of Ukrainian citizens about NATO

It is obvious that not the least of the problems with the perception of NATO and negative opinions regarding the Alliance can be traced back to the lack of an efficient information policy in Ukraine on this issue.

The results of a recent sociological study revealed that a considerable part of Ukrainians admits that they lack information about NATO. Indeed, 55% of the respondents polled in Ukraine affirm that “they know something about NATO”, while 22% know practically nothing about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Against this backdrop the traditional indicative question on how NATO makes decisions demonstrated an even gloomier picture of Ukrainian society’s true understanding of the Alliance’s principles. Based on the results of polling, only every fifth (21%) Ukrainian knows about the consensus principle in the approval of decisions by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) while the most popular answer was “by the majority of votes of member countries” in the organization (34%). In addition, approximately every tenth Ukrainian is convinced that the decisions in the Alliance are approved only by “old” members of NATO, while “new members” are deprived of such a right.14

Herewith, it is worth noting that almost no tangible regional differences were observed in terms of perception by Ukrainians of the level of their own awareness about NATO, the only exception being the residents of the southern macroregion of Ukraine, among whom a considerable number of citizens – 22% – mentioned that they are “not interested at all” in information about the Alliance.15

One should also pay attention to the fact that the majority of Ukrainian citizens (55%) expressed a wish to receive more information about NATO, while slightly more than a third (36%) of the polled did not express such a wish. In this context, the regional differences in public opinion are noteworthy: in the West and Center the wish for receiving such information about NATO is significantly higher (64% in the West and 62% in the Center) than in the East and South of Ukraine (45% and 34% respectively).

Would you like to learn more about NATO?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>64,2</td>
<td>61,5</td>
<td>34,1</td>
<td>45,1</td>
<td>54,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>23,2</td>
<td>30,8</td>
<td>48,1</td>
<td>48,4</td>
<td>35,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>17,9</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>9,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF)


15 Ibid.
What exactly do Ukrainians want to know about NATO?

In order to respond most efficiently to the interest of Ukrainian society in information about NATO, it is important to understand which issues associated with the corresponding topic are the most interesting for society.

Polling conducted by DIF showed that Ukrainians would be most interested in an analysis of “what possible gains and losses there could be from Ukraine’s accession to NATO” (38%). Besides that, Ukrainians wanted to know more about “how NATO guarantees the security of its member states” (22%) and “whether the new member countries from among the former socialist republics benefited from accession to the Alliance” (21%). Approximately every sixth respondent polled was interested in finding out more about “the experience of the participation of NATO member countries in peacekeeping operations” (17%).

What information about NATO are you most interested in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What information about NATO are you most interested in?</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History of the creation of this organization and the principles of its functioning</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>17,1</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>12,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of NATO countries in peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>16,2</td>
<td>23,7</td>
<td>14,1</td>
<td>13,4</td>
<td>17,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian non-military NATO programs</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>19,7</td>
<td>11,3</td>
<td>11,9</td>
<td>13,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO guarantee of security of its members</td>
<td>25,7</td>
<td>26,2</td>
<td>19,1</td>
<td>20,5</td>
<td>22,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New NATO members (former socialist countries) – did they gain from accession to NATO?</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td>25,2</td>
<td>21,8</td>
<td>19,2</td>
<td>20,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What assistance does Ukraine receive from NATO?</td>
<td>47,8</td>
<td>42,3</td>
<td>32,7</td>
<td>31,9</td>
<td>37,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine’s accession to NATO – possible gains and probable losses</td>
<td>53,8</td>
<td>34,4</td>
<td>38,2</td>
<td>36,6</td>
<td>37,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>16,9</td>
<td>18,4</td>
<td>26,6</td>
<td>32,6</td>
<td>21,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF)
Given the hierarchy of today’s requests of Ukrainian society regarding NATO, one can see the orientation of citizens not just towards some general information about the activity or history of the formation of NATO as a military-political alliance but rather to a greater extent towards the activity of the Alliance directly related to Ukraine. Ukrainians want to better understand what the consequences of realization of the Euro-Atlantic aspirations may be for their country and how beneficial cooperation of Ukraine with NATO is today.

**Tasks for the future**

The public opinion in Ukraine regarding NATO has undergone far-reaching changes over the past several years, starting in 2014. The general support of accession to NATO in Ukraine is as high as ever, and is considered to be the most popular option of guaranteeing the country’s national security. At the same time, a more profound analysis of sociological data gives certain grounds to assert that there still remain tangible differences between the regions of Ukraine in terms of support of the country’s Euro-Atlantic vector of integration.

Such a state of affairs poses a potential threat that the matter of Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO could transform into a factor of polarization in Ukrainian society along regional lines of division. What is more, it could enable activation of different political speculations on this topic with the aim of gaining quick electoral dividends and arousing acts of protest in the most vulnerable regions of Ukraine through anti-NATO slogans.

Considering the recent legislative amendments on approving Ukraine’s foreign policy course towards NATO membership, the responsible public authorities, mass media, and civil society organizations face the important task of gradually and smoothly “pulling up” the level of support for NATO in the East, South, and the Donbas to the average Ukrainian level over the coming years.

Fulfilling this ambitious task will require, first and foremost, creating an effective information policy and the subsequent informing of Ukrainian citizens regarding NATO. As the results of public opinion studies demonstrate, Ukrainian society to a large extent lacks relevant and comprehensive information about NATO, and most importantly – a substantial share of the Ukrainian public wishes to receive this kind of information.

In light of this, while developing an effective information policy of Ukraine regarding NATO, it is important to consider the following:

- information policy should be drafted with consideration and priority orientation to those macroregions of Ukraine where the level of NATO support today is relatively low (the regions of the East, South, and the Donbas) in order to
reach the greatest interregional consensus possible on the issue of implementing the Euro-Atlantic agenda;

● the information about NATO should be provided in the most convenient formats (using visual materials) that are easily understood by various audiences considering also the age, socio-economic background, language preference, political orientation, gender, and other specifics of potential recipients of the respective information;

● in particular, attention should be paid to enlightening the younger generations of Ukrainians (school pupils, university students, etc.) that are obviously much less vulnerable to the perception of ideological clichés of the past regarding NATO and could become a reliable social pillar in support of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic vector of integration;

● informing the adult population of Ukraine should be performed taking into consideration those specific thematic inquiries that respondents voiced during the public opinion polling (information about assistance to Ukraine from NATO, analysis of probable gains and losses from Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance, etc.);

● It is worth placing a particular accent on dispelling ideological clichés, myths, and false judgments about NATO which today are widespread among a significant number of Ukrainian citizens and continue to be passed on from one generation to the next;

● it would be expedient to study the experience of post-socialist neighboring countries (for instance, the Baltic states) which, prior to gaining membership, implemented the NATO support policy; therein, the strengths and weaknesses of their policies should be considered and the best practices should be applied to today’s realities in Ukraine;

● the 17% of the respondents polled (basically, every sixth in Ukraine) who are thus far undecided on the most optimal strategy for guaranteeing security of Ukraine could potentially be hidden “reserves” of support for the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine in the event that the approaches to information policy mentioned above are effectively implemented.
It is worth noting that, since recently, the Ukrainian government is making additional efforts aimed at raising the awareness of Ukrainian citizens about NATO and the process of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. To this end, a plan of measures aimed to improve the policy of public information on the issues of Euro-Atlantic integration was approved in May 2017.\textsuperscript{16} Ultimately, there are expectations that the respective policy will further increase the trust of Ukrainians in NATO. After all, it is clear that without building up such trust and, consequently, without having stable public support for the idea of Ukraine’s membership in NATO, it will be difficult to hope for the success of the governmental policy in the Euro-Atlantic path.

\textsuperscript{16} “On the approval of the plan of measures regarding the realization of the Concept for Improving Public Informing on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Integration in 2017” № 308-r – edition of 11.05.2017 / Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine – Accessed: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/cardnpd?docid=249974855
Informational-analytical publication “Public Opinion”

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This publication was prepared with the financial support of “Matra”, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

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Printing services:
Physical Person Entrepreneur (PPE) I.P. Artyushenko
Printing house address: 84 Vyborska St., Kyiv, Ukraine
Tel: +380 44 227 78 17; +380 50 358 80 88
Format: 60x84/8
Print run 100 copies