



National EXIT POLL:

2014
Presidential
Elections



Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives
Foundation



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INTRODUCTION

From the very beginning the role of exit polls has become more important than just being an integral part of post-election night talk-show.

In a society, that is on the stage of democratic transition, where the fairness of elections did not become an unconditional norm for politicians, the results of exit-polls represent a proof of validity of the official results.

Being a reliable method of public control over the integrity of elections, exit polls also perform important functions such as prevention of disorders. That means mainly preventing intentions to falsify results or embody «peacekeeping» mission – because after the elections politicians try to justify their defeat by reference to falsification occurred.

In Ukraine exit polls sometimes influence the political life: for example, in the 2002 the results of exit polls during parliamentary elections gave a possibility to preserve and overcome the electoral threshold of two opposition political forces – the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialist Party. Another example is the presidential election in 2004, when the National exit poll found the proof of falsification of election – that happened to be one of the main reasons for re-elections.

However, the decisive factor was without any doubt the Orange Revolution. After such a preventive measure during all future national elections official results and exit polls did not have significant differences.

National Exit Poll 2014 conducted by consortium of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Razumkov Centre became the thirteenth all-Ukrainian research for the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, but for the first time it was held in such extreme conditions.

Presidential elections were pre-scheduled as the result of series of extraordinary events – Euromaidan, which began as a protest against Ukrainian authorities when they had refused to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. It ended with truly people revolt and fleeing of Viktor Yanukovich and key figures of the previous political power to Russia.

Deputy corps has significantly «thinned». So the question of forming a new government has moved to a new level.

Legitimate election of a new President was necessary for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it meant to form all required governmental positions (as significant portion of senior officials is appointed by the President). Secondly, elections of a new president meant stopping speculations of Russia, that

tried to explain its aggressive actions with idea of the «coup» and the lack of legitimate power in Ukraine.

In addition, the legitimate formation of all the branches of power was extremely necessary for negotiations with international institutions.

Presidential elections had to be held in the most democratic, transparent, and fair way, so nobody – in Ukraine or abroad – would have any doubts about the legitimacy of the newly-elected head of state. In this case exit polls played an undeniable and crucial role to satisfy everybody's demand for fair elections.

Conducting the elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions was the most serious problem, because till the day of election it wasn't clear what voting stations would be ready to hold it.

The defeat of the voting stations, the destruction of election documents, voter intimidation, and seizure of election commissioners were the unheard-of before reality of the electoral process in Donbas.

But it was the information on what part of voters could vote in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, that significantly influenced exactness of exit-poll's results.

That is why, on the election day in these two areas we conducted a telephone survey, which aimed to find out who how many people managed to vote at polling stations.

The results of this survey are presented in this book in the section which describes the methodology of the exit poll.

Unfortunately, the voting process in the vast majority of voting stations was disrupted. In the Donetsk region it was managed to organize elections at 7 districts, in Luhansk – only at two.

In fact, only 5% of the voters took part in elections in Donbas, while 43% intended to do that according to our pre-election survey.

Queues were also a problem during the exit polls, especially in districts, where presidential elections and local elections – mayors and local councils – were held at the same time.

In some places people even had to stand up for 2–3 hours in the queues, some voters could not hold it and went home, some of them returned again, but interviewers had to hold on tight to the process of selection of voters who had already voted.

However, in the end, the main criterion of success is the result.

Exit poll conducted by «National Exit poll 2014» Consortium composed of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Razumkov Centre was the most accurate: the maximum difference between the exit poll data that were released at 20.00, and the official election results was only 1,2%, and after the final revision of data (after receiving all the hard questionnaires from all the stations) – 0.9%.

However, it should be noted that the other two exit polls were also successful – the biggest difference from the result of the winner was 2.3%.

Thus, the legitimacy of new president election has been proved with the help of different methods: the exit polls and the conclusions of all international missions and observers, that were present on a record scale – almost three thousand people.

Whereas there are traditionally several exit polls that are held during elections in Ukraine, we should outline specific features of the National exit poll.

Firstly, National exit poll is specific in terms of the maximum of transparency both in methodology and funding sources.

Secondly, two sociological companies – Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Razumkov Centre – work simultaneously, but each of them has a separate sample. Thus, in fact we conduct two separate exit polls, that appears to be an additional indicator of the reliability of data.

Thirdly, experts from other countries take part in the process of exit poll monitoring. During this exit poll Sam Kliger from the United States and Katerina Kozerenko from Russia took charge of its execution.

Fourthly, Supervisory Board, which consisted of authoritative Ukrainian NGOs' representatives, carries out its public control over financial component, and thus provides impartiality of exit poll.

A distinctive feature of our National exit poll is also independence from any political influence, as it is traditionally funded by several international donors. Occasionally, we express our deep gratitude to international funds that supported the National Exit poll 2014: International Fund «Renaissance», MATRA program of Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine, National Endowment for Democracy (USA), UNITER project «PACT», European Union.

And finally, other exit polls cease to exist as soon as their results are declared. For us exit polls, besides of the fact that it is an integral component of the night show, means first of all methods of control over the fair results, prevention of fraud, and are indispensable source of knowledge about the electoral process in Ukraine.

Information about peculiarities of electorates of different political forces and candidates, the dynamics of electoral choice and more interesting facts can be found in our publications that are published in accordance with the results of each exit poll.

We really hope that this book will be interesting and useful for our readers.

Iryna BEKESHKINA

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Section 1

Iryna FILIPCHUK

CHRONICLE OF RESEARCH

Every year we publish a book on the results of exit polls from conducted during the latest parliamentary or presidential elections providing a chronology of research conducted and a detailed description of the process. Every research has its particularities, which is why the systematization of polling of the National Exit Poll in Ukraine that would allow for quickly recreating it in the minds of the people and draw a full picture of the exit polls in the electoral history of Ukraine is to our advantage.

As such, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation introduced the conducting of exit polls in Ukraine in 1998 and the first such polling was conducted on March 29 during the parliamentary elections. The idea was formed in the process of cooperation between the Democratic Initiatives Foundation with its U.S. colleague QEV – Analytics. From that time the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, which was the pioneer of this project in Ukraine and the designer of the project, conducted 15 exit polls, 13 of which were nationwide in Ukraine and two in Kyiv and Mukacheve.

The author of the idea of the first exit poll in Ukraine was the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the first to react to it were Ukrainian journalists. So, through mutual efforts the Ukrainian Media Club, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Studio 1+1 television channel broadcast a successful TV show on the basis of the results of the exit poll on the day and night of the elections. The Socis company was responsible for all aspects of the field work and sociologist Elegiya Skochlyas of the U.S. company QEV-Analytics consulted on the process of the exit poll. The results of the first exit poll held in Ukraine were quite close to the election results and allowed in advance to name eight parties and blocs that surpassed the 4% threshold and won seats in the parliament.

During the 1999 presidential elections the Democratic Initiatives Foundation organized exit polls in the first and second rounds, when then President Leonid Kuchma and leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petro Symonenko advanced to the final round. Three Ukrainian sociological services – Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), Socis and the Sociological Monitoring center – conducted a public opinion poll. The results of the polls coincided with the official results with a great degree of accuracy.

It was then that the first exit polls demonstrated its specific nature in Ukraine as it turned the attention of the people not only to the elections, but also served as control mechanism that lowered the probability of falsification of votes. During those elections we not only improved the methodology of polling, but also the means of informing citizens. We did not limit ourselves to television channels, but instead developed a special strategy that would capture the greater attention of the mass media.

The fourth exit poll organized by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation during the parliamentary elections on March 31, 2002 was conducted by the same three sociological firms that conducted them in 1999. The Exit Poll 2002 was a triumph of Ukrainian sociologists. The results of the Central Election Committee were very close to those of the exit poll and showed that the Our Ukraine bloc was victorious. The experience of 2002 demonstrated the ability of Ukrainian sociologists to conduct quality exit polls and the reliability of exit polls as a means of control of the honesty of tallying votes.

The true test of democracy and sociologists in Ukraine was the presidential elections in 2004. Then the Democratic Initiatives Foundation organized three exit polls – October 31 (Round 1 of elections, on November 21 (Round 2 of the elections) and December 26 (revoting in Round 2 of the elections). Unfortunately, in the first round two participants of the consortium conducting the National Exit Poll 2004 – the Socis and Social Monitoring centers – rigged the results of polling that were made public the night the voting booths were closed.

With all due respect to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center, they conformed to the highest professional standards, withstood the pressure from the previous exit polls and came out unscathed by this scandal.

The results of the exit poll conducted during the second round of the elections showed that Yushchenko beat Yanukovych by 11% and became one of the realistic arguments for the Orange Revolution. On April 18 of this year a regional exit poll was conducted in the elections of the mayor of Mukacheve, which showed that the ruling power at that time ignored the real expression of the will of the people that voted in favor of a false winner. From that time the notion of an exit poll has been viewed as a unique possibility to counteract the falsification of the voting process, which is quite a new phenomenon in world practice.

The data gathered from the eighth exit poll on March 26, 2006 conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in the consortium with KIIS and the Razumkov Center differed from the official results of the elections by no more than 1.1%. This exit poll provided grounds to believe that there was no vote-rigging during the parliamentary elections in 2006 that would essentially change the results of voting.

The ninth exit poll had its peculiarities, one of them being that four organizations announced their intention of conducting exit polls during the 2007 elections. The ICTV channel announced its intention of conducting an exit poll ordered by the European marketing agency TNS and the U.S. companies TNS, PSB and Public Strategies. The sociological companies R&B and the Sociovymir also planned to conduct their own research. One American observer Elegiya Skochylyas noted: «I would jokingly say that the U.S. is way behind Ukraine as it conducts only one exit poll, while in Ukraine several held. Mind you, there is no sense in holding more than one exit poll.»

At the same time, Executive Director of the International Renaissance Foundation Yevhen Bystrytskyi noted: «At the moment, we do not understand why four exit polls will be held in Ukraine. On the one hand, this is a good thing. After all, the more exit polls, the better. But given the current circumstances there is a real threat that certain political forces may stand behind the exit polls. This is quite dangerous as certain political forces that order and pay for the conducting of an exit poll can exploit it in their own personal interests.»

For this very reason the National Exit Poll-2007 consortium proposed to organizers of other exit polls to make public their surveys, sources of financing and research methodology so that every exit poll would be under self-control. The consortium called on organizers to ensure that alternative exit polls conform to professional standards of WAPOR/AAPOR, ESOMAR regarding the conduct of exit polls and election research.

DIF very peacefully reacted to the phenomenon of cloning of exit polls at it does not fear competition. However, if to legally investigate the publications about the work of sociological companies in Ukraine, one will find that no other organization aside from DIF provided transparent information regarding its financing.

On September 30, 2007, on the day of the snap elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Studies conducted their ninth exit poll.

The final results of the exit poll on the day of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on September 30, 2007 exceeded all expectations of sociologists. The results of votes upon exit from the voting stations were almost equal to those counted by the Central Election Commission. The margin of error was only 0,96%, though according to sociological norms a swing from 3% to the negative side is permissible. As such, these results showed that early parliamentary elections in 2007 transpired without serious falsifications.

Immediately after the results of the exit poll were announced politicians began speaking about the preliminary election results, though a proven fact

did not wait for the data of the Central Election Commission and announced the composite of the future coalitions in the parliament.

The Democratic Initiatives Foundation conducted the 10th and 11th national exit polls in the 1st and 2nd round of the presidential elections on January 17 and February 7 in 2010. They were conducted by the National Exit Poll 2010 consortium of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Ukrainian Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies.

The main distinctive feature of these exit polls is that the Democratic Initiatives Foundation appealed to average citizens, presidential candidates and businessmen to make charitable contributions for conducting them. Such support of civil society demonstrated the democratic sentiments of Ukrainian society as it alone must build democracy in its native country to guarantee its successful future.

The project was executed under the monitoring and control of international observers and the Oversight Council, which authoritative national and foreign experts were part of. In addition to the independent exit poll conducted by the consortium, three nationwide exit polls ordered for the presidential elections in 2010 were conducted.

Despite the particularities of all exit polls conducted in Ukraine, the results were similar. Only the nationwide exit poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the

Razumkov Center and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed a lower deviation between the leaders of the election race. The organizers explained that such a deviation was due to the lower coverage in election constituencies in Ukraine.

One of the distinctive features of the National Exit Poll 2010 was the use of New Media (namely, direct broadcasting of the announced results of the exit poll in the YouTube network. Besides that, this information was synchronously published in the Ukrainian and English languages on the websites <http://www.exitpoll.org.ua>, dif.org.ua and newcitizen.org.ua disseminated through the electronic mail and social networks Twitter, Facebook, Livejournal and Vkontakte.

The 2010 Presidential Elections once again confirmed the popularity of such a lever of public control of the results of elections such as exit polls. On the day of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on October 28, 2012 the consortium National Exit Poll 2012 the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Studies conducted their 12th exit poll.

The Democratic Initiatives Foundation financed the project and media management of the exit poll. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology

and the Razumkov Center conducted the poll. The aggregate of the exit poll results was set by the electorate that voted at constituencies throughout Ukraine (with the exception of special voting stations). The margin of error was representative for Ukraine in general. During the exit polls a total of 19,600 respondents at 400 voting stations where the methodology of «secret voting» was applied.

The maximum divergence in the results of the exit poll was no higher than 1,9% for five parties that won seats in the parliament and did not exceed 0,2% for the other 16 parties that ran in the elections. Overall, this means that among the «proportional» part of the elections (during voting in a large-mandate constituency) there was no falsification during the counting of votes or it was no higher than 2%.

The exit poll project, aside from conducting it on the day of the elections, included several serious and large-scale programs and measures, in particular pre-election and post-election surveys, training of journalists, surveying of experts and the preparation, publication and dissemination of books about the National Exit Poll 2012 to the rest of the world.

The 12th exit poll was financially backed by international donors: the International Renaissance Foundation, the Matra program of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine, the National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.), PACT, the UNITER project and the European Union. It was conducted under the monitoring of international observers of the Levada-Center (Russia), the Institute of Public Affairs (Poland) and the University of Essex (UK).

The project was executed under the control of the Oversight Council, which leaders of non-government organizations, leading Ukrainian journalists and Ukrainian and foreign experts joined. Information was made public in the Ukrainian and English languages on the websites dif.org.ua and chesno.org was disseminated through electronic mail servers and social networks.

The 13th exit poll regarding the early elections of the President of Ukraine on May 25, 2014 conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the KIIS and the Razumkov Center was marked by the extremely difficult socio-political situation in the country. The elections themselves were the consequence of three months of acts of protest on the Maidan and ousting of the former president Viktor Yanukovich from office. In addition to that, these acts were conducted in conditions of a non-declared war by Russia, which is why the distinctive feature of this exit poll was that sociologists did not know which constituencies would be working in the east of Ukraine to the very last day and whether they would even be able to conduct public opinion polls in those regions.

As a result, of 68 constituencies in which KIIS and the Razumkov Center that had planned to conduct exit polls in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, polls were only held at 24 of them. But this did not obstruct receiving reliable

data in those oblasts and quality results all over Ukraine. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea annexed by Russia no exit polls were conducted at all.

The difference in the results of the National Exit Poll 2014 and the official data from the presidential elections were much less than those in the announced margin of error – the maximum difference in the results of the exit poll published at 20:00 from the data of the CVU were no higher than 1,2% and the final data did not differ from the elections results by more than 0,9%.

One of the surprises in the presidential elections in 2014 was the support of the newly elected president Petro Poroshenko in all regions of Ukraine and his victory in the first round. So, this was the first time that only one exit poll was held during the presidential elections

During the exit polls a total of 17,516 respondents at 351 voting stations were surveyed. The unwillingness of respondents to take part in the opinion polls in this case did not have an impact on the conducting of this exit poll, which sociologists feared. Just as in previous exit polls the level of achievement of reach to voters was nearly 80%, which from the vantage point of conducting exit polls, is a fairly high indicator. At those voting stations that were opened in Luhansk the level of reach was 61% and in Donetsk – 79%, though in these regions the percentage of citizens that showed up to vote given the political situation was the lowest in Donetsk – 3% and in Luhansk – 5%.

The National Exit Poll 2014 was conducted with the financial support of international donors International Renaissance Foundation, the Matra Program of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine, the National Endowment Fund (U.S.), PACT, the UNITER project and the European Union.

Just as in the previous exit poll an Oversight Council represented by different civil and media sources was present, in particular key observer and monitoring civil organizations that are involved in elections – the CVU, OPORA, Telekrytyky, the Center for Political-Legal Reform and well-known journalists. The Information sponsor of the National Exit Poll 2014 is the Ukrinform national information agency.

International expert observers – Director of a Department of the Levada Analytical Center in Moscow Katerina Kozerenko and founder of the Research Institute for New Americans Sam Kliger familiarized themselves with the research methodology, visited the voting stations where exit polls were held and presented their conclusions at a press conference summarizing their findings.

The final conclusion of the National Exit Poll 2014 was that during the difficult political situation in the country it was conducted at a respectable level and confirmed that the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2014 were fair and democratic.

Section 2

Anton GRUSHETSKY, Volodymyr PANIOTTO, Natalia KHARCHENKO

METHODOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE NATIONAL EXIT POLL-2014 CONDUCTION

1. Introduction

On May 25, 2014, the day of pre-term elections of the President of Ukraine, the National Exit Poll-2014 Consortium composed of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Economic and Political Studies Center has conducted exit-poll.

The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation provided the overall coordination of the project, its' financial and media management. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology was responsible for scientific management of the project, development of the sample and coordination of the polling. The polling of voters at the polling stations was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center.

The National Exit Poll-2014 was conducted with financial support of international donors: International Renaissance Foundation, MATRA program of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy in Ukraine, the National Endowment for Democracy (USA), UNITER (Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms) project of PACT, USAID, and the European Union.

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Consultant – **Volodymyr Paniotto**

International observers over exit-poll and foreign consultants – **Kateryna Kozerenko** (expert-consultant, Levada Centre, Russia), **Sam Klinger** (head of the Research Institute for New Americans – RINA, USA).

2. Methodology of the exit poll conduction in the first round

2.1. Sample

2.1.1. The concept of the sample

Constituents who voted at polling stations (except for special polling stations) made up total population of the exit poll, excluding temporarily occupied territory of the Crimea peninsula. The sample was developed as representative for Ukraine in general and for its 4 regions – West, Centre, East and South¹.

The concept of the sample gives an unbiased result and equal chance of being interviewed for every voter. Each of research companies – the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Economic and Political Studies Center – worked on separate representative samples that were an additional tool for control of the quality.

The sample was two-stage stratified one. Stratification was made in two ways – by region and place of living (city or village). Together 49 strata were selected (24 regions, each having urban and rural population and Kyiv). All selected urban and rural polling stations were represented in equal proportions, the regional strata were distributed in proportion with the number of polling stations in every region. To be able to overcome possible extraordinary circumstances on the day of elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, the number of polling stations, where the polling must have been held, was increased. Besides, telephone polling of citizens of these two regions was performed in the elections day in order to specify the percentage of voters who were able to participate. However, in the result, this information hasn't been used to specify their significance in the array of exit poll data, since there was more reliable information from the Central Election Commission available on the day of elections. In Appendix 1, the complications of work in Donetsk and Lugansk region and the results of telephone polling are considered in detail.

During the first stage, polling stations were selected with the equal probability in each region. Then the sample was divided between two research institutions by systematic selection – every second polling station

¹ **West** – Zakarpatskyj, Volynskiy, Rivnenskyj, Lvivskyj, Ivano-Frankivskiy, Ternopilskiy, Chernivetskyj, and Khmelnytskyj region; **Centre** – Zhytomyrskyj, Vinnytskyj, Kirovogradskyj, Cherkasskyj, Sumskyj, Chernigivskyj, Kyivskyj region and Kyiv; **South** – Odesskyj, Mykolayivskyj, Khersonskyj, Zaporozhskyj and Dnipropetrovskyj region; **East** – Kharkivskyj, Donetskyy, and Luganskyj region.

was reserved for one company, and remaining stations were reserved for another one.

During the second stage, selection of voters at the polling stations was made randomly and systematically (step-by-step). Constant selection step was used during the election day without predetermined number of interviews. Herewith, every polling station balanced itself, i.e. the number of respondents selected in every station was proportional to the number of those from this stratum who came to vote.

Methodology used for the sample development, on the one hand, and systematic selection of the respondents by constant step, on the other hand, ensured receiving independent from the Central Electoral Commission results on the electoral turnout in all four mentioned regions (if not by all oblasts – because of insufficient number of stations).

2.1.2. Polling stations and voters excluded from the sample

The total population of exit poll is the voters who voted on usual polling station on the mainland Ukraine. Herewith, specialized polling stations (hospitals, prisons etc.) and foreign polling district were excluded from the sample. If they got into the sample, they were replaced. The replacements were carried out randomly within the region.

The exit poll sample didn't include those who voted at home as well.

It wasn't clear till the election day where exactly it was possible to organize and hold the voting for the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Initially, any station could be included into the sample. Then, if any information about an impossibility to perform the poll appeared in some stations (areas) before the election day, they were replaced randomly with those where it was probable to exercise the elections. If some stations happened not to function, no polling was held there and no replacement was made.

2.1.3. Sample size, selection step, planned margin of error.

Number of the electoral stations included into the sample was 400 (200 stations for each sociological company). Out of 200, 191 stations were divided equally among all strata (see item 2.1.1). 9 another stations were added to Donetsk and Lugansk regions in order to compensate for extraordinary circumstances. There were totally 356 electoral stations on the election day (in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, polling was performed in 24 of 68 stations).

We planned to interview about 45 respondents at each polling station,

and the total number of respondents was expected to be around 17 000. In practice, 17 217 respondents were surveyed.

The selection step estimates were based on the previous experience of conducting the exit polls and data of electoral statistics²:

Overall number of electoral districts*	188
Number of polling stations	29 099
Number of voters included to the voters list on polling stations	34 214 652
Number of voters included to the voters list on polling stations where the voting was organized and held.	30 095 028
Number of voters in the excerpt from voters list at their place of residence	815 640
Number of voters who participated in voting in the polling premises	17 318 937
Number of voters who participated in voting at their place of residence	703 243
Overall number of voters who participated in voting	18 022 236
Expected turnout	65%
Actual turnout of voters (among those voters whose polling stations were functioning on the election day)	59,9%
Actual turnout of voters (among all voters)	52,7%
Average number of voters**	1098
Number of voting ballots in the state multi-member constituency recognized to be invalid	244 555

* These data apply only to those areas where the voting was organized and held.

** Average number of voters was estimated among all stations, including those where the voting wasn't organized and held.

Basing on the experience of previous exit polls, average step was established on the level of 12 (similar step was used on 2012 parliamentary elections).

The experience of the previous exit polls shows that the interviewers at big polling stations should survey 20 persons per hour in morning period (which is marked by the highest voters' activity) applying 12 selection step, i.e. spend less than 3 minutes for polling, which was clearly insufficient.

Therefore, because of big size of stations we established «technical» 18 selection step for regional centers aiming to reduce the interviewers' workload (then we imposed the weight of 1,5 for «reducing» the step to 12).

² Protocol of the Central electoral commission on results of election the national deputies of Ukraine in national multi-member electoral district – http://www.cvk.gov.ua/info/protokol_cvk_25052014.pdf

Thus, the step equaled to 18 for regional centers and 12 for other cities and villages.

The planning of the sampling error was carried out according to the following considerations. The statistical sampling error including design-effect doesn't exceed 1,3%, but there are also systematic errors which depend on various factors (including weather conditions) and their evaluation is complicated.

On the ground of the experience of previous exit polls which were carried out using the same methodology, we assumed that sample error would not exceed 2,5% for the leaders and will stay within the limits of 0,5-1% for other candidates. On the 2012 parliamentary elections, maximum sample error for all parties and blocks did not exceed 1,9%.

2.2 Data collection methods and tools

Data collection during the exit poll was based on methodology of the «secret ballot». In particular, respondents were proposed to write their answers about their electoral choice directly in questionnaire (it included names of candidates) and to throw completed questionnaire into the sealed cardboard box, where there were already blanks with other respondents' answers. Usage of the «secret bulletin» methodology during exit polls increases trust of respondents in the anonymity of the poll and helps to avoid interviewer's influence. Participation of an interviewer in process of completing the questionnaire was allowed only in exceptional cases, for instance if a respondent wasn't able to fill in the questionnaire because of poor eyesight.

The main question in the questionnaire was «Whom did you vote for?» Additionally, respondents were proposed to answer several other questions, mainly demographic, but it was underlined that it was not obligatory. Additional questions included such parameters as gender, age, education level, time of making voting decision etc.

Questionnaires were prepared both in Ukrainian and Russian. Respondents could choose the language they felt more comfortable to answer.

2.3 Data collection

2.3.1 Training of interviewers

There were about 1000 interviewers involved in the polling, two persons for each ordinary station and three for very big ones, which were usually situated in regional centers. Almost all the interviewers were previously trained and had operational experience. If one of the interviewers of a

polling station didn't fit those requirements, he was instructed to count the voters who have already voted on the exit of a station within the established step, while more experienced colleague had the direct contact with potential respondents.

Before the exit poll, regional teams of interviewers were trained in a centralized way by instructors-supervisors from research companies. Consultations were also provided via telephone both in advance and on the day of the exit poll.

2.3.2 The polling procedure

The polling procedure included following steps:

- The interviewer selects a respondent using the established step;
- The interviewer invites the respondent to participate in the research, addressing him/her in accordance with the text of the address. During this contact, the respondent receives more detailed information about the survey which ensures sincerity of his/her answers;
 - In case of respondent's agreement to take part in the polling, the interviewer finds out, which language is more comfortable for him/her. Then the respondent is given the questionnaire and proposed to fill it himself/herself, fold it and put it in the box.
 - If the selected respondent refuses to participate, the refusal is being recorded (as well as reason of refusal, gender and approximate age of the person) on the «Form of refusal records». Thereafter, the respondent is being replaced with the next one.

Polling was conducted during the following time intervals:

In regional centers, other towns and towns	8 AM – 8 PM
In villages	8 AM – 5 PM

The response rate was 77%. The list of refusal reasons is presented in the table:

The respondent didn't tell the reason of refusal	37,8
I voted, but I would like not to tell for whom I cast my vote	21,1
I have no time to participate in the survey	16,6
I don't want my choice to be public	15,9
I don't trust sociologists	2,6
I don't believe in the fair nature of these elections	2,5
I was recommended not to answer the questions of sociologists	1,5
Other	3,2

As the following table demonstrates, the comparison of demographical data of those voters who agreed to participate in the polling and those who disagreed shows several significant differences:

- Seniors (60 and more years old) were more enthusiastic to participate in exit poll
- Citizens of the Western and the Central regions more often agreed to take part in the poll, while the voters from the Southern and the Eastern regions agreed less often.
- Most refusals were recorded in cities with a population up to 20,000 and towns. Rural voters were most active participants.

	Respondents	Non-respondents	Deviation
Gender			
Men	41,6	45,6	0,5
Women	53,9	54,4	- 0,5
Age			
18–29	16,4	16,9	- 0,4
30–39	18,7	19,1	- 0,4
40–49	19,2	20,1	- 0,1
50–59	21,4	21,3	0,1
60 years and older	24,2	22,5	1,7*
Macroregions			
Western	29,9	24,5	5,4**
Central	39,3	34,4	4,9**
Southern	22,9	28,8	- 5,9
Eastern	7,9	12,3	- 4,4**
Type of settlement			
Regional center	35,2	35,3	- 0,1
City with a population of 100,000 and more	5,9	6,3	- 0,4
City with a population from 50,000 to 100,000.	5,4	4,7	0,6
City with a population from 20,000 to 49,000.	6,1	6,8	- 0,6
City with a population less than 20,000.	4,1	5,9	- 1,8**
Town	9,2	11,1	- 1,9**
Village	34,1	29,9	- 4,2**

2.5 The interviewers work control

Within the framework of the research, 10-percent cross-control of the interviewers' work was conducted. In particular, controllers of the Razumkov Centre controlled stations of KIIS, and controllers from KIIS controlled the Razumkov Centre's stations. In addition, the research companies made internal checks of the quality of their own survey networks' work. In addition, regional observations on the quality of work were made by invited auditors. Monitoring was made during the whole day of elections, and its results were reported to the central office on regular basis.

The control was conducted by visual observation method; moreover, the special attention was paid to the following points:

1. Presence of two interviewers with noticeable badges and boxes for questionnaire collection at exit of polling station.
2. Use of secret voting procedure.
3. Adherence to the selection step.
4. Refusal record.

The results of monitoring didn't reveal any significant deviations from the procedure of the polling. In case of insignificant violations of the procedure (for instance, only one interviewer works in the station during periods of decrease in voting intensity; increase in the quantity of omitted respondents; crowding at exits of big stations etc.), operational adjustments were made to working process on polling stations.

2.6.1 Transfer of information

Transfer of information from interviewers to regional team-leaders was made by telephone – four times for cities and three times for villages.

Regional team-leaders delivered the information to Kyiv central office on each station separately as soon as they received it by telephone, fax, and e-mail.

On the next day after the survey, regional team-leaders of interviewers collected paper questionnaires, checked the correctness of filling in the information and sent data to Kyiv.

2.6.2 Data input

Data coding and data input were carried out with unified standardized forms of OSA and SPSS statistical packages. Final data were presented in SPSS format for Windows. Data input was performed in two steps. On the day of the exit poll, the aggregated data were input on the polling station

level. After obtainment of paper questionnaires, data from all regions were input again, this time on individual level.

2.6.3 Methodology of data weighting

We have used two groups of weights – intermediate and final weight. Intermediate weight was used for the first-level informational share, which happened immediately after the polling stations closed at 8 PM. By that moment there weren't any complete information (in particular, there was no information about voting in cities after 6 PM because the interviewers have sent us information as of 6 PM and continued working)

Intermediate weight compensated the absence of this information.

Final weight was used after obtainment of all data. It included:

1) Weight that compensates the steps deviation

The methodology by itself implied a survey with single step (12), but on the regional centers different «technological» step (18) was established to give interviewers enough time to question everyone who suits the sample. Therefore, the application of this weight includes respondents of regional centers in such amount as if the step was 12, not 18.

2) Weight that compensates early work completion

In cities, polling had been running till the end of voting (8 PM), and in the village work finished at 5 PM. Thus, weight which allows forecasting data collected as if the interviewers worked until 8 PM were used in village. To calculate this weight, the post-electoral data of former polls were used.

3) Weight that compensates disproportion of the sample by settlement type

The number of village and city polling stations is the same in the sample, although there are more stations in village (the correlation of a station number is about 45% to 55%). The weights compensate these disproportions.

Final weight is a product of the three mentioned weights.

3. Comparison of the exit poll results with the elections results.

Exit poll data was updated three times:

– immediately after closing of the polling stations – basing on aggregated data collected before 6 PM and results obtained via telephone;

– 3 hours after closing of the polling stations – adding the data collected at polling stations where the voting took place until 8 PM (also obtained via telephone);

– After receiving paper questionnaires from regions and processing of the data.


Thus, we will compare preliminary and final data of the exit poll with the election results.

In the Table 1 and on Diagram 1, the exit poll results presented after closing of the polling stations are compared with the official elections results.

Table 1. **National Exit Poll-2014 results as of 6 PM compared with the official elections results:**

The candidate:	Official elections results	Exit poll data as of 18:00	Deviation
Poroshenko P.	54,7	55,9	-1,2
Tymoshenko Y.	12,8	12,9	-0,1
Lyashko O.	8,3	8,0	0,3
Hrytsenko A.	5,5	6,3	-0,8
Tihipko S.	5,2	4,7	0,5
Dobkin M.	3,0	2,1	0,9
Rabinovych V.	2,3	1,9	0,4
Bohomolets O.	1,9	1,9	0,0
Symonenko P.	1,5	1,1	0,4
Tyahnnybok O.	1,2	1,3	-0,1
Yarosh D.	0,7	0,9	-0,2
Hrynenko A.	0,4	0,5	-0,1
Konovalyuk V.	0,4	0,3	0,1
Boyko Y.	0,2	0,2	0,0
Malomuzh M.	0,1	0,1	0,0
Kuzmin R.	0,1	0,1	0,0
Kuybida V.	0,1	0,0	0,1
Klymenko O.	0,1	0,1	0,0
Tsushko V.	0,1	0,1	0,0
Saranov V.	0,0	0,2	-0,2
Shkiryak Z.	0,0	0,1	-0,1
Spoiled bulletins	1,4	1,4	0,0

Diagram 1. **Comparison of the exit poll data presented immediately after closing of the polling stations with the official election results (candidates who received more than 1% of votes).**



Preliminary exit poll data differs from election results by no more than 1.2%.

In the Table 2, final results of the exit-poll obtained from original questionnaires are compared with official elections results.

Table 2. **Final National Exit Poll-2014 results compared with the official elections results:**

Candidate:	Elections results, % FOR	Final exit poll data	CEC Comparison
Poroshenko P.	54,7	55,9	- 1,2
Tymoshenko Y.	12,8	12,5	0,3
Lyashko O.	8,3	8,0	0,3
Hrytsenko A.	5,5	6,3	- 0,8
Tihipko S.	5,2	4,8	0,4
Dobkin M.	3,0	2,2	0,9
Rabinovych V.	2,3	2,0	0,3
Bohomolets O.	1,9	2,0	- 0,1
Symonenko P.	1,5	1,2	0,3
Tyahnybok O.	1,2	1,3	- 0,2

As we can see, the maximum difference between the exit poll data and the official elections results remained 1,2% for Petro Poroshenko whose support was somewhat overestimated. The explanation may be either occasional stochastic cutout or the fact that during the exit poll we didn't interview some categories of population who participated in the elections: those who voted abroad, those who voted at home, and those who voted in prisons and in hospitals. However, the difference between the exit poll data and the official elections results was small and corresponded with intended level of the sample error. The performed analysis gives grounds to believe that during the presidential election 2014 there were no massive falsifications that could significantly change results of the voting. Such a close coincidence of the exit poll data and the official elections results also proves that used methodology was rather effective and can be applied in subsequent exit polls.

Appendix 1

Challenges of conduction of the presidential election in Donetsk and Lugansk Regions and the telephone polling results

Within the framework of the National exit poll'2014 project, a survey was run in the Eastern region of Ukraine on the election day in order to evaluate electoral activity in Donetsk and Lugansk regions and ability of expression of voters' will and to look into the reasons of refusals to vote.

The polling was held on May 25, 2014 from midday until 8 pm by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). Data was collected through telephone interviewing via stationary and mobile phones in accordance with stochastic sample (stratified by TEDs for each region), which represents population of these areas above 18 years with quota selection on the last stage.

2000 respondents were interviewed during the fieldwork. Among the, 1273 agreed to give interviews and 727 refused to do so after getting acknowledged with the topic of survey. Most often, refusals were explained by fear of talking about politics and unwillingness to answer the questions concerning elections in Ukraine, since those respondents considered them to be part of Donetsk/Lugansk National Republic or Novorossia. Share of respondents who participated in the research totaled 64%. Statistical sample error with a probability of 0.95 did not exceed 2.8%. 25 KIIS interviewers participated in the fieldwork of the research.

According to the poll, only 12.5% of potential voters expressed the opinion that the voting was held on their voting stations. More than half of them (57.0%) said that there were no elections being held and almost a third didn't know whether the elections were held or not.

Answering to the question about their intention to vote, the vast majority of respondents (69.4%) informed that they wouldn't do it, while only 5.7% of respondents were able to vote (see Table 1).

Table 1. Index of answers of Donetsk and Lugansk oblast resident on their intention to vote.

Question 1: Some people have already voted on the President election today, some plan to vote later, others won't participate in the elections. Which option corresponds to your situation?

	Frequency	Percentage
I have already voted today	73	5,7
I have tried to vote, but was unable to do so	212	16,6
I will vote later today ³	47	3,7
I will not vote	883	69,4
I don't know	58	4,6
Total	1273	100,0

Taking into consideration the sample error (including refusals) and the tendency to slightly exaggerate information concerning electoral activity inherent to most electoral surveys, we consider estimate of the turnout received in the research to be close to the official electoral data (see Table 2).

Table 2. Estimate of the turnout in Donetsk and Lugansk regions according to the CEC⁴:

	Donetsk region	Lugansk region	Both regions
Official turnout on those polling stations where the voting took place	15%	39%	20,5%
Turnout as to total approximate number of voters from the electoral lists	3,4%	4,7%	3,8%
Results of the poll	4,6%	7,8%	5,7%

³ We recall that the polling was held during the election day and the number of those who claimed to vote later made up 4.4% as of 5 pm.

⁴ <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2014/wp001>

The electoral preferences of small number of residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions who have made their political choice and thus voted or had an intention to vote on the May 25, 2014 Presidential election, are as follows (see table 3).

Table 3. Electoral sympathies of the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions according to the data collected on the election day.

	Voted	Intended to vote	Would prefer to vote if there was a possibility
Olga BOHOMOLETS	0,1	0,1	0,1
Yuri BOIKO	0	0	0,2
Anatoly GRYTSENKO	0,1	0	0,5
Mikhailo DOBKIN	0,2	0,1	0,9
Oleg LYASHKO	0	0,4	0
Petro POROSHENKO	1,0	0,9	4,5
Vadim RABINOVICH	0,1	0,1	0,7
Petro SYMONENKO	0	0	0,3
Yulia TYMOSHENKO	0,1	0,1	0,1
Sergei TIGIPKO	1,6	1,1	4,8
Yarosh DMITRY	0	0	0,2
Crossed out all candidates	0	1,4	,9
I don't remember	0,1	0,3	0,3
Refusal	2,5	4,1	3,1
No answer	94,3	91,7	83,4
Total	100%	100%	100%

Taking into consideration the small number of respondents, it is impossible to say, which candidate suffered most from inability of voters to freely express their will.

We were especially interested in barriers of participation in elections; therefore, we tried to find out the reasons of non-participation of the respondents (see Table 4).

Table 4. **The reasons of non-participation in elections of the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions according to the results of the poll on the election day:**

Question 2: *Why haven't you participated in the election?*

	The frequency	Percentage of those who do not intend to vote	Percentage of all respondents
I know that my polling station doesn't work	155	17,5	12,2
There are no voting in our area at all	74	8,4	5,8
I can see nobody to be worth voting for	259	29,3	20,3
To my mind, our region is not a part of Ukraine	70	7,9	5,5
It is dangerous to go to the polling station	55	6,3	4,3
I don't believe in fairness of the elections	106	12,0	8,3
I cannot vote due to family reasons	82	9,2	6,4
I have no time for going to the polling station	59	6,7	4,6
Other	24	2,7	1,9
Total	883	100,0	69,4

Thus, according to the results of both questions, we can claim that the third (34,6%) of all voters in Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts were unable to vote because it was impossible to do so (16,6% of them tried to vote, but didn't manage to, 12,2% reported their polling station didn't function, and 5,8% said that there were no voting in their area at all). The other important reason of non-participation was the absence of worthy candidates – as every fifth respondent reported. Doubts about the fairness of the elections prevented voting of 8% respondents; 4% of voters directly pointed at the danger of voting, and 5,5% informed that their region is not a part of Ukraine any more.

Section 3

Mykhailo MISHCHENKO

ELECTORATE OF CANDIDATES IN DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS

Results of the exit poll present the unique opportunity to analyze voting features and level of electoral activity of representatives of different socio-demographic electorate groups according to region, settlement type, age, gender, and education level.

Discrepancies between different regions of Ukraine in level of support of various political forces manifest themselves on each election. As we can see from Table 1, the winner of the elections, Petro Poroshenko, took the first place in all regions. However, unlike in Western and Central regions, where he got absolute majority of votes, only relative electoral majority supported him in the South and the East.

The level of support of Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleh Lyashko was also higher in the West and the Center in comparison with the South and the East. At the same time, Serhiy Tihipko was most supported in the South and the East and Mykhaylo Dobkin – mainly in the East where 16,8% voters supported him and where he took second place after Poroshenko. Petro Symonenko, Vadym Rabinovych, and Olha Bohomolets were more often voted for in the South and the East of Ukraine.

We must also note relatively large share of those who crossed out all candidates or spoiled a ballot in the East (5,3%).

Table 1. **«Pick the candidate for President of Ukraine you have just voted for, please», regional distribution, %**

	Ukraine in general, N=17217	Regions*:			
		West, N=4935	Center, N=6462	South, N=3894	East, N=1926
Poroshenko P.	55,6	62,3	59,6	45,9	38,0
Tymoshenko Y.	12,5	14,2	13,7	10,0	7,0
Lyashko O.	7,9	9,7	9,5	4,5	3,5
Hrytsenko A.	6,3	6,1	6,8	6,1	4,8
Tigipko S.	4,8	1,1	2,4	12,1	8,9
Dobkin M.	2,1	0,2	0,4	2,7	16,8
Rabinovych V.	2,0	0,6	1,2	4,7	3,3

End of the table

	Ukraine in general, N=17217	Regions*:			
		West, N=4935	Center, N=6462	South, N=3894	East, N=1926
Bohomolets O.	2,0	1,4	1,6	3,3	2,5
Symonenko P.	1,2	0,4	0,5	2,5	3,4
Tyahnybok O.	1,3	1,4	1,4	1,2	0,9
Yarosh D.	1,0	0,9	0,9	1,3	1,4
Other candidates	1,4	0,9	1,0	2,6	1,7
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a ballot	1,3	0,5	0,6	2,4	5,3
Don't remember who I voted for	0,4	0,1	0,3	0,7	1,7
Invalid answer	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,8

***West** – Transcarpathian, Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi and Khmelnytsky regions; **Center** – Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv region and Kyiv; **South** – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk region; **East** – Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

Judging from the Table 2, considerable discrepancies in electoral preferences of urban and rural voters could be observed. But mostly they are caused by varying levels of urbanization in regions. So, it is reasonable to consider differences in urban and rural elections separately by regions (see table 3).

Table 2. «Pick the candidate for President of Ukraine you have just voted for, please», type of settlement distribution, %

	Cities and town, N=12176	Village, N=5041
Poroshenko P.	55,7	55,4
Tymoshenko Y.	10,6**	16,1**
Lyashko O.	6,9**	10,0**
Hrytsenko A.	7,0**	5,0**
Tigipko S.	5,4**	3,5**
Dobkin M.	2,4**	1,6**
Rabinovych V.	2,3**	1,4**
Bohomolets O.	2,3**	1,5**
Symonenko P.	1,2	1,1
Tyahnybok O.	1,3	1,3

End of the table

	Cities and town, N=12176	Village, N=5041
Yarosh D.	1,2**	0,6**
Other candidates	1,4	1,3
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	1,6**	0,9**
Don't remember who I voted for	0,4	0,4
Invalid answer	0,2	0,0

* Difference is statistically significant at the p<0,05 level

** Difference is statistically significant at the p<0,01 level

Petro Poroshenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Olga Bohomolets were more often supported by urban voters as compared with rural residents of Western and Central regions, Oleh Tyahnybok and Dmytro Yarosh were more voted for in the West, while Tihipko – in the Center. At the same time, Tymoshenko was more supported by villagers in three regions – the West, the Center and the East. Villagers from Western and Central regions voted for Lyashko more often than urban dwellers, while villagers from the East were more in favor of Symonenko.

The level of electoral support of Tymoshenko and Poroshenko increased with the age of voters, while the level support of Lyashko and Yarosh decreased with the age of voters. Symonenko was traditionally more popular among representatives of senior age group though his popularity has decreased compared to the presidential election 2010. Then, 6,5% of voters of 60 and more years voted for this candidate. On the last elections, this share dropped to 2,5% (see table 4).

Table 3. «Pick the candidate for President of Ukraine you have just voted for, please», region and type of settlement distribution, %

	West		Center	
	City and town, N= 3077	Village, N=1858	City and town, N=4387	Village, N=2075
Poroshenko P.	64,3**	60,2**	61,0**	56,5**
Tymoshenko Y.	10,6**	17,9**	12,2**	17,2**
Lyashko O.	8,8*	10,7*	8,3**	12,3**
Hrytsenko A.	7,5**	4,7**	7,5**	5,3**
Tihipko S.	1,4	0,9	2,7*	1,8*
Dobkin M.	0,1	0,3	0,4	0,4
Rabinovich V.	0,7	0,5	1,2	1,1

End of the table

	West		Center	
	City and town, N= 3077	Village, N=1858	City and town, N=4387	Village, N=2075
Bohomolets O.	1,9*	1,0*	1,9*	1,1*
Symonenko P.	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,6
Tyahnybok O.	1,7*	1,1*	1,3	1,6
Yarosh D.	1,2*	0,6*	1,0	0,6
Other candidates	0,8	0,9	1,0	0,8
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	0,6	0,5	0,7	0,3
Don't remember who I voted for	0,0	0,2	0,2	0,5
Invalid answer	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,0

	West		Center	
	City and town, N= 3029	Village, N=865	City and town, N=1683	Village, N=243
Poroshenko P.	46,0	45,7	38,6	35,9
Tymoshenko Y.	9,3*	12,2*	7,5	4,8
Lyashko O.	4,4	4,7	3,4	4,0
Hrytsenko A.	6,5	5,0	4,6	5,4
Tihipko S.	12,1	12,3	8,5	10,3
Dobkin M.	2,6	2,9	16,6	17,7
Rabinovich V.	5,1	3,5	3,0	4,8
Bohomolets O.	3,2	3,5	2,2	3,4
Symonenko P.	2,5	2,3	2,8*	5,7*
Tyahnybok O.	1,2	1,1	0,9	0,9
Yarosh D.	1,5	0,5	1,7	0,6
Other candidates	2,5	2,8	1,5	2,3
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	2,5	2,2	5,6	4,3
Don't remember who I voted for	0,6	1,0	2,2	0,0
Invalid answer	0,0	0,1	1,0	0,0

* Difference is statistically significant at the p<0,05 level

** Difference is statistically significant at the p<0,01 level

Table 4. «Pick the candidate for President of Ukraine you have just voted for, please», age, %

	18–29, N=2635	30–39, N=3066	40–49, N=3176	50–59, N=3539	60 and older, N=3984
Poroshenko P.	51,0	54,3	56,7	57,2	58,8
Tymoshenko Y.	9,5	11,3	11,9	14,0	14,4
Lyashko O.	15,5	9,8	7,2	5,5	4,7
Hrytsenko A.	5,6	6,0	7,7	6,7	5,7
Tihipko S.	4,7	5,0	4,6	4,6	4,3
Dobkin M.	2,6	1,6	1,8	2,2	2,4
Rabinovich V.	1,7	2,4	1,6	2,4	1,4
Bohomolets O.	2,3	2,3	2,4	1,8	1,4
Symonenko P.	0,6	0,3	0,9	0,8	2,5
Tyahnybok O.	1,1	1,9	1,4	1,2	1,1
Yarosh D.	2,3	1,2	0,9	0,7	0,2
Other candidates	1,3	1,4	1,3	1,3	1,5
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	1,3	1,7	1,5	1,1	0,8
Don't remember who I voted for	0,5	0,6	0,2	0,3	0,5
Invalid answer	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1

Women were more favorable to Tymoshenko, Bohomolets and Dobkin than men, while men more often supported Lyashko, Hrytsenko and Yarosh (see Table 5).

Table 5. «Pick the candidate for President of Ukraine you have just voted for, please», gender, %

	Men, N=7475	Women, N=8831
Poroshenko P.	56,2	55,7
Tymoshenko Y.	10,8**	13,7**
Lyashko O.	8,6*	7,7*
Hrytsenko A.	7,0**	5,7**
Tihipko S.	4,4	4,8
Dobkin M.	1,9*	2,4*
Rabinovich V.	2,0	1,8
Bohomolets O.	1,6**	2,3**

End of the table

	Men, N=7475	Women, N=8831
Symonenko P.	1,3	1,0
Tyahnybok O.	1,5	1,2
Yarosh D.	1,3**	0,7**
Other candidates	1,5	1,3
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	1,4	1,2
Don't remember who I voted for	0,4	0,4
Invalid answer	0,1	0,1
Bohomolets O.	1,6**	2,3**

* Difference is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level

** Difference is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level

The level of electoral support of Poroshenko, Hrytsenko, Bohomolets rose with increase of education level of respondents, whilst the level of support of Tymoshenko, Lyashko, Dobkin and Symonenko dropped with increase of education level. People with higher education were more likely to vote for Yarosh than the representatives of other educational groups (see Table 6).

Table 6. «Pick the candidate for President of Ukraine you have just voted for, please», education level, %

	Incomplete secondary, N=927	Complete secondary general, N=2968	Complete secondary special, N=5507	Higher or incomplete higher, N=6727
Poroshenko P.	50,3	54,1	55,5	57,8
Tymoshenko Y.	18,5	14,4	13,3	10,2
Lyashko O.	9,9	9,8	8,3	7,0
Hrytsenko A.	4,4	4,9	6,0	7,5
Tihipko S.	3,8	4,0	4,4	5,1
Dobkin M.	2,9	2,6	2,4	1,6
Rabinovich V.	1,1	1,8	2,0	2,0
Bohomolets O.	1,1	1,8	1,6	2,5
Symonenko P.	1,6	1,6	1,3	0,8
Tyahnybok O.	1,4	1,4	1,2	1,4
Yarosh D.	0,7	0,6	0,7	1,4
Other candidates	2,0	1,2	1,6	1,2
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	1,0	1,3	1,3	1,1
Don't remember who I voted for	1,3	0,4	0,4	0,4
Invalid answer	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1

Overall, analysis of connection between electoral support of the presidential candidates with socio-demographical characteristics of voters based on the analysis of correlation coefficients Cramer V, which characterizes the level of correlation, gives us reasons to state that the correlation of electoral support to region is most obvious when it deals with Dobkin, Tihipko, Poroshenko, and Rabinovich.

As well as region, age of voters is also important in Symonenko case. The support of Lyashko and Yarosh mostly depends on the age of respondents (see Table 7). In is hard to specify dominant factor for Tymoshenko's electorate – the correlation coefficients of her support and regions, settlement type, education, age and gender differ insignificantly. The same is for Hrytsenko and Bohomolets. The correlation of electoral support of Tyahnybok with most factors is not statistically important, with the exception of age (although, this indicator doesn't make the correlation high).

Table 7. Levels of correlation of distribution of votes for presidential candidates in the first round of the 2014 presidential elections with socio-demographic characteristics of voters (Cramer's V coefficient)*

	Socio-demographical characteristics:				
	Region	Type of settlement	Age	Gender	Education
Poroshenko P.	0,163	0,003	0,054	0,005	0,040
Tymoshenko Y.	0,070	0,078	0,054	0,043	0,069
Lyashko O.	0,093	0,054	0,137	0,015	0,040
Hrytsenko A.	0,023	0,039	0,032	0,027	0,045
Tihipko S.	0,209	0,042	0,011	0,011	0,023
Dobkin M.	0,304	0,028	0,025	0,015	0,032
Rabinovich V.	0,117	0,031	0,031	0,005	0,015
Bohomolets O.	0,052	0,025	0,028	0,024	0,032
Symonenko P.	0,099	0,003	0,078	0,014	0,031
Tyahnybok O.	0,013	0,003	0,026	0,014	0,006
Yarosh D.	0,019	0,031	0,068	0,030	0,037

* Numbers in bold are statistically significant at the $p < 0,001$ level; numbers in bold and italics are statistically significant at the $p < 0,01$ level; numbers in italics are statistically significant at the $p < 0,05$ level, other numbers are statistically insignificant at $p > 0.05$ level.

The differences in levels of support by the representatives of various social groups cause differences in the characteristics of these politicians' electorates (see table 8).

First, it is important to specify substantial differences in the «regional» structure of electorates. While 83,6% of voters of Lyashko, 77,2% of Tymoshenko, 75,6% of Poroshenko, 73,6% of Tyahnybok, 71,7% of Hrytsenko, and 60,7% of Yarosh were Western and Central residents; the electorate of Dobkin (90,5%), Tihipko (72,8%), Symonenko (72,0%), and Rabinovych (67,5%) consisted mostly of Southern and Eastern residents. At the same time, 61,9% of those who voted for Dobkin were citizens of Eastern region, and 54,4% live in Kharkiv oblast alone. 58,1% of those who voted for Tihipko, 54,3% of those who voted for Rabinovych, and 48,8% of those who voted for Symonenko were residents of the Southern region.

The biggest share of urban voters is in the electorate of Yarosh – 80,1%, Rabinovych – 76,2%, Tihipko – 74,8%, Dobkin – 74,7%, Bohomolets – 74,2%, Hrytsenko – 72,9%. The biggest share of rural voters are among the electorates of Tymoshenko (44,0%) and Lyashko (42,8%).

Symonenko was traditionally embraced by the «oldest» electorate, with 54,9% of his voters were 60 or more years old. Yarosh and Lyashko had the biggest share of young electorate (from 18 to 29 years old) – 38,5% and 31,5%, correspondingly. Share of men was bigger than share of women at the statistically significant level among those who voted for Yarosh. Women dominated at the statistically significant level among voters of Bohomolets, Tymoshenko, Dobkin, Tihipko, and Poroshenko.

Share of those with higher or incomplete higher education is the biggest for Yarosh voters (60,3%), the smallest – for Symonenko (28,8%), Dobkin (31,8%), Tymoshenko (34,3%), and Lyashko (36,4%).

Table 8. Socio-demographical composition of electorates of candidates in the first round of the 2014 presidential elections, %

	Regions			Settlement type		Age					Education level			
	West	Centre	South	East	Cities or town	Villages	18–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60 and older	Complete secondary		Higher of incomplete higher
												general	special	
P. Poroshenko, N=9415	33,5	42,1	18,9	5,4	66,0	34,0	15,0	18,2	19,4	22,0	25,4	33,6	43,5	
Y. Tymoshenko, N=2087	34,0	43,2	18,3	4,4	56,0	44,0	12,6	17,0	18,3	24,1	28,0	36,0	34,3	
O. Lyashko, N=1347	36,6	47,0	12,9	3,5	57,2	42,8	31,5	22,7	17,0	14,6	14,2	34,4	36,4	
A. Hrytsenko, N=1083	29,1	42,6	22,3	6,0	72,9	27,1	14,6	17,6	23,3	22,8	21,7	31,9	49,9	
S. Tihipko, N=857	7,1	20,1	58,1	14,7	74,8	25,2	16,6	20,4	19,1	21,3	22,6	32,3	46,9	
M. Dobkin, N=393	2,2	7,3	28,6	61,9	74,7	25,3	20,2	14,2	16,5	21,6	27,6	37,6	31,8	
V. Rabinovych, N=368	9,1	23,4	54,3	13,2	76,2	23,8	14,4	23,6	16,5	27,3	18,1	35,4	44,0	
O. Bohomolets, N=357	21,3	31,9	37,2	9,6	74,2	25,8	19,2	21,6	22,6	19,7	16,9	27,6	52,4	
P. Symonenko, N=222	11,4	16,7	48,8	23,2	67,1	32,9	8,8	5,8	14,6	15,9	54,9	37,6	28,8	
O. Tyahnybok, N=231	31,9	41,7	21,0	5,4	67,1	32,9	13,2	26,8	20,4	19,2	20,4	31,3	43,4	
D. Yarosh, N=178	26,9	33,8	28,2	11,1	80,1	19,9	38,5	22,5	17,5	16,0	5,5	24,6	60,3	
	Gender		Women		Men		Incomplete secondary		Complete secondary		Higher of incomplete higher			
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
P. Poroshenko, N=9415	46,3	53,7	46,3	53,7	46,3	53,7	46,3	53,7	46,3	53,7	46,3	53,7	46,3	53,7
Y. Tymoshenko, N=2087	40,3	59,7	40,3	59,7	40,3	59,7	40,3	59,7	40,3	59,7	40,3	59,7	40,3	59,7
O. Lyashko, N=1347	48,6	51,4	48,6	51,4	48,6	51,4	48,6	51,4	48,6	51,4	48,6	51,4	48,6	51,4
A. Hrytsenko, N=1083	51,2	48,8	51,2	48,8	51,2	48,8	51,2	48,8	51,2	48,8	51,2	48,8	51,2	48,8
S. Tihipko, N=857	43,6	56,4	43,6	56,4	43,6	56,4	43,6	56,4	43,6	56,4	43,6	56,4	43,6	56,4
M. Dobkin, N=393	41,1	58,9	41,1	58,9	41,1	58,9	41,1	58,9	41,1	58,9	41,1	58,9	41,1	58,9
V. Rabinovych, N=368	47,9	52,1	47,9	52,1	47,9	52,1	47,9	52,1	47,9	52,1	47,9	52,1	47,9	52,1
O. Bohomolets, N=357	37,7	62,3	37,7	62,3	37,7	62,3	37,7	62,3	37,7	62,3	37,7	62,3	37,7	62,3
P. Symonenko, N=222	52,4	47,6	52,4	47,6	52,4	47,6	52,4	47,6	52,4	47,6	52,4	47,6	52,4	47,6
O. Tyahnybok, N=231	51,9	48,1	51,9	48,1	51,9	48,1	51,9	48,1	51,9	48,1	51,9	48,1	51,9	48,1
D. Yarosh, N=178	61,0	39,0	61,0	39,0	61,0	39,0	61,0	39,0	61,0	39,0	61,0	39,0	61,0	39,0

Finally, we should look upon the issue of electoral activity of the representatives of different socio-demographic groups. As the results of previous exit polls conducted in Ukraine show, there are substantial differences in electoral turnout among the representatives of different age groups. What was the level of electoral activity of different age groups on the recent elections?

We can judge about electoral activity of different age groups by comparing the age structure of the array of interviewed people (those who agreed to answer exit poll questions and those who refused to) with the age structure of the adult population of Ukraine, according to state statistics.

Table 9. **Comparison of socio-demographic structure of adult population of Ukraine (according to official data) and structure of electorate (according to the exit poll data), %**

Socio-demographic characteristics	Official state statistics ¹	Exit poll data, socio-demographic structure:*		
		those who agreed to participate in the survey and those who refused, N=22318	those who agreed to participate in the survey, N=17217	those who refused to participate in the survey, N=5101
Gender**:				
Men	45,1	46,0	46,1	45,6
Women	54,9	54,0	53,9	54,4
Age**:				
18–29	21,8	16,6	16,4	16,9
30–39	18,0	18,8	18,7	19,1
40–49	16,6	19,4	19,2	20,1
50–59	17,6	21,4	21,4	21,3
60 and older	26,0	23,8	24,2	22,5
Settlement type:				
City	69,4	66,8	65,9	70,1
Village	30,6	33,2	34,1	29,9

* Number in bold differ from official data at the $p < 0.01$ level. Number in italics differ from official data at the $p < 0.05$ level. Other numbers don't differ from official statistics at the $p < 0.05$ level.

** Numbers in age and gender segments in exit poll column are calculated as shares of those who indicated their age and gender during filling a questionnaire and those whose age and gender were indicated by interviewers in forms of refusal.

¹ Data on age and gender population structure are given according to state statistics as of January 1, 2013.

From Table 9, one can make a conclusion that, according to the exit poll data, the share of rural population who participated in the election is 2,6% bigger than total share of rural adult population. This indicates that rural population is more electorally active than urban population.

Share of young people under 30 among the participants of the election is 5.2% lower than the share of this age group in adult population of Ukraine. Low electoral activity of youth remained similar to those on all previous elections. Share of «senior» voters (60 and more years old) proved to be relatively low. However, this could be explained as follows: considerable part of elderly people voted not at the polling stations, but at home, so they were not included in the total number of exit poll respondents.

40-59 age group proved to be most active. This group is traditionally the most active on the elections. 30-39 age group was slightly more active than average among the population of the country (the group was overrepresented by 0,8% on the elections). On the last parliamentary elections (in 2012), it was 0,7% lower than among general population.

Share of men among the total electorate was 0.9% bigger than share of men among all adult population. This indicates that men participated in the elections more actively than women. On the 2004 presidential election the deviation was 1,8%, on the 1999 presidential election – 4,3%. So, despite the fact that men are more electorally active, the difference between men and women electoral activity has decreased in recent years.

Section 4

Iryna BEKESHKINA

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1999, 2004, 2010 AND 2014 THROUGH THE EYEGLASS OF THE EXIT POLLS

The presidential elections in 2014 in Ukraine were the sixth held in the history of Ukraine and the fourth in which exit polls were conducted. All elections have their particularities, though those held in 2014 considerably significantly differed from the previous elections. For the first time this year's elections were not the main event in the country due to the start of the war in the east of Ukraine and Ukrainian citizens living in Crimea and the Donbas region could not vote. Besides that, the election campaign was very short. In other words, the circumstances under which the presidential elections in 2014 were held were out of the ordinary.

Be that as it may, how did these elections differ from the previous ones regarding the electorate's preferences? An analysis of the data of the exit polls of the presidential elections will provide the answer to these questions. During the exit polls voters were asked when they made their voting decision. Comparisons of the presidential elections on a time scale of the voters' choice shown in Table 1 look, at first glance, quite paradoxical. On the one hand, the voters' choice was quite high long before the presidential election campaigns in 2004 and 2010. On the other hand, the results of elections in 1999 and 2014 are quite comparable despite different circumstances.

The similarity of the results on the time of voting decision of 2004 and 2010 elections can be explained: those elections were held in a situation of strong popularization, particularly in 2004, when practically half of the electorate favored Viktor Yushchenko and the other half was for Viktor Yanukovich and right before the start of the elections voters knew who they would vote for – either for Yushchenko or for Yanukovich – which in the first round had already garnered more than 80% of the votes. The other candidates garnered much less votes: Oleksandr Moroz – less than 6% and Petro Symonenko – less than 5%.

In 2010 such polarity between the «orange camp» and the «white and blue» transformed into a stand-off between Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshenko. The side that lost in the previous elections made all efforts to seek revenge.

However, unlike in the elections in 2004 new candidates that appeared on both sides of resistance garnered less votes than the leaders, though considerably more than the leaders though considerably less votes than the underdogs – Serhiy Tihipko (13,05%) and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (6,09%). But the main resistance unfolded due to the polarity between Tymoshenko and Yanukovich.

Table 1. **When did the voters decide whom to vote for?** (%)

When did the voters make their decisions?	Exit poll-1999	Exit poll-2004	Exit poll-2010	Exit poll-2014
I was a proponent of this candidate prior to the elections	43,2	71,3	63,0	40,0
Less than three months before the election campaign started	15,2	–*	11,6	16,1
One month earlier than the elections	13,4	6,0	6,2	11,8
During the last month prior to the election	9,2	12,4	6,1	12,1
During the last week prior to voting	9,6	3,6	3,9	8,2
On the day before voting	7,9	2,2	3,5	4,8
I decided at the voting station	1,2	2,4	2,3	3,7
Difficult to say/I don't know	0,4	2,1	3,4	3,2
	100%	100%	100%	100%

* This variant of responses was not in effect in 2004

So, it is not strange that on condition of the antagonistic split of the electorate by the principle «ours – not ours» the voters knew before the elections for whom they would vote – «mainly, for ours». Table 2 clearly shows that more than 80% of the voters were prepared to vote in favor of Yushchenko in the 2004 elections before the election campaign, while 81.5% supported Yanukovich in 2010. We should note the main opponents in the elections were mobilized prior to the election campaign: 65.5% of the voters in favor of Yanukovich in 2004 and 71% of the proponents of Tymoshenko in 2010.

Table 2. **When did the voters decide whom to vote for? Winners of different elections (%)**

When did the electorate make a decision on the winner?	Kuchma, 1999	Yushchenko, 2004	Yanukovych, 2010	Poroshenko, 2014
I was a proponent of this candidate long before the elections	50,0	79,8	81,5	39,1
Less than three months before the election campaign started	15,5	–	7,2	19,3
One month before the elections	11,7	4,8	2,7	12,9
During the last month prior to the elections	7,9	9,1	2,7	12,4
During the last week before voting	7,7	2,4	2,2	6,7
On the last day before voting	5,8	1,4	1,3	4,0
I decided at the voting station	1,0	1,5	1,5	2,7
Difficult to say/I don't know	0,3	1,0	2,2	2,9
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Meanwhile, the similarity of data of the voters' decisions in the presidential elections in 1999 and 2014 is rather surprising. In the presidential elections in 2014 it is understood why the minority of voters knew whom to vote for long before the elections. The situation considerably changed – after the ex-President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country the long-standing resistance of supporters of the «white and blue» party basically disappeared and instead new politicians and candidates appeared.

It suffices to say that in October the electoral ratings of current President Petro Poroshenko was only 2% and he only managed to gain popularity during the Euro-Maidan. Hence, it is not surprising that up to the start of the election campaign only 39% voted for Poroshenko.

This begs the question: why was there such a low pre-election decisiveness in 1999? After all, at that time the president in office Leonid Kuchma was re-elected for a second term and clearly during his rule people could choose whether to vote for him or not. At the same time, of those citizens that voted for Kuchma in the first round of the presidential elections, only 50% made their choice prior to the start of the election campaign.

There was one common factor in the difference in the circumstances in the elections in 1999 and 2014: it was hard for voters to make their choice. In 2014 this was due to rapid changes that were taking place, while in 1999 there was excessive stability that did not satisfy citizens and they did not see a candidate that could change the situation for the better. As a reminder, the resistance of political forces according to the regional principle was started by certain political analysts during the presidential elections in 2004. Prior to that, the main watershed was based on political stances against the Communist Party of Ukraine and the communist past. During a year prior to the parliamentary elections in 1998 the CPU was the leader garnering nearly 25% of the votes and in the next parliamentary elections in 2002 it gained nearly 20% of the votes.

For this reason, while the majority of Ukrainians were not satisfied with the ruling president Leonid Kuchma, the alternative could have been Petro Symonenko or the «progressive socialist» Natalia Vitrenko (and for some time sociological polls showed that she would advance to a second round together with Kuchma) or leader of the Socialist Party Oleksandr Moroz.

The national-democratic forces failed to put forth a candidate that would be competitive. For this reason, a significant segment of voters despite their negative attitude towards Kuchma decided to vote for him in the first round of the elections seeing him as a leader that would preserve Ukraine's statehood and stand against the revival of the Communist past. The comparison of voting in the regions in favor of the winners of the presidential elections is quite interesting (See Table 3).

Table 3. **Voting for winners of the presidential elections in different regions of Ukraine (%)**

Winners of the presidential elections	West*	Center	South	East
Leonid Kuchma, 1999	54,1	33,6	36,8	34,6
Viktor Yushchenko, 2004	77,4	53,7	21,2	8,4
Viktor Yanukovych, 2010	8,9	16,0	50,3	66,8
Petro Poroshenko, 2014	62,3	59,6	45,9	38,0

* **Western region** – Zakarpattia, Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi and Khmelnytsk oblasts; **Central region** – Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv oblasts and Kyiv; **Southern region** – Odesa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. **Eastern region** – Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

As the table shows, while during the presidential elections in 2004 and 2010 when the main battle between candidates were regionally based («ours – not ours», the winner in the first round of elections reaped a rich harvest of votes in one region and a poor harvest in other regions. The results of Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 and Viktor Yanukovich in 2010 were almost mirror images: in the eastern regions Yushchenko had the least support in 2004 garnering 8,9% of the votes and Viktor Yanukovich garnered close to the same amount in the 2010 elections in the western regions of Ukraine.

The regional partition of the results of the winner of the elections in 2004 has more in common with the results of the first round of the elections in 1999 that Kuchma won. The impressive results of Petro Poroshenko in the eastern regions of Ukraine in the past elections were mainly dictated first and foremost by the fact that a majority of the voters did not find its candidate and therefore did not turn out to vote, while in the Donbas regions the elections were severed by armed militants. At the moment it is difficult to foresee whether the next elections will be based on contrasts in content – i.e. ideological, platforms or proposals – or voters will once again make a regional choice based on the «ours – not ours» principle.

Comparison of votes of the electorate in different age categories during the presidential elections (See Table 4) shows that victory of the candidates in the elections does not generally depend on the age of the electorate as the overwhelming support of candidates by voters of the younger or older generation depends not only on the candidate, but also on who his or her opponent is.

Table 4. Voting for winners in the presidential elections by voters in different age categories (%)

Winners of presidential elections	18–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60 and older
Leonid Kuchma, 1999	45,4	42,2	39,5	37,4	34,4
Viktor Yushchenko, 2004	45,0	45,7	44,9	39,0	33,0
Viktor Yanukovich, 2010	30,8	31,4	30,5	34,3	33,7
Petro Poroshenko, 2014	51,0	54,3	56,7	57,2	58,8

It is quite strange how Leonid Kuchma managed to attract the youth. Indeed, the votes of the younger generation in the first round of the elections were 10% higher than those in the age category of voters over 60, which was 45% overall. This figure was exactly the same when Yushchenko ran for office in 2004. As a reminder, however, we must recall who were the main

opponents to Kuchma in the 1999 elections – Communist Petro Symonenko, Socialist Oleksandr Moroz and the «progressive Socialist» Natalia Vitrenko.

It is quite clear that the youth did not have much of a choice and it voted. In 2014, older electorate voted for Poroshenko because younger electorate was highly competed for (predominantly by Liashko who among voters younger than 30 got second place with 15,5%).

So, the greater or lower support of the candidate by voters in different age categories to a greater extent depends on the specific situation during elections and first and foremost on the composite of opponents.

Meanwhile, the support of candidates is less dependent on the level of education and is more tied to the personality of candidates. Moreover, it is perhaps not surprising that Viktor Yanukovich garnered the lowest number of votes with a higher education in the first round of the election than all other winners of presidential elections, while Petro Poroshenko gained the highest percentage of votes of educated people (See Table 5).

Table 5. Voting for winners of presidential elections by voters with different levels of education (%)

Winners of presidential elections	Incomplete secondary	Complete secondary	Complete special secondary	Higher or incomplete higher
Leonid Kuchma, 1999	35,0	41,0	41,1	38,8
Viktor Yushchenko, 2004	32,1	37,3	41,8	43,0
Viktor Yanukovich, 2010	35,2	35,8	34,8	27,3
Petro Poroshenko, 2014	50,3	54,1	55,5	57,8

Given this, what conclusions can be drawn from this overview of voting at the presidential elections?

After the recent turbulent events in Ukraine – the Euro-Maidan, the fleeing of ex-President Viktor Yanukovich, the changing of the guard, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the separatist acts in the southern and eastern oblasts of Ukraine and the military actions in the Donbas region and undeclared war by Russia, the political life in Ukraine is going through a period of uncertainty.

The presidential elections passed abruptly in the first round and for the first time the contender for the office of president won in all oblasts of Ukraine and the election campaign launched by politicians did not speculate

on issues that would split Ukraine. So, how will the political life in Ukraine develop in the future? Will a partition of political forces manage to overcome the danger to the unity of Ukraine introduced in the presidential elections in 2004 along the lines of «East-West»?

We will find out the answer to this question very soon during the next parliamentary elections.