NATIONAL EXIT POLL: parliamentary election '2012



Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation

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Iryna BEKESHKINA

Director, Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation

Introduction

Election to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that took place on October 28, 2012, was the sixth Parliamentary election in the history of independent Ukraine. Elections differed from each other, each having its own peculiarities. It should be mentioned that almost all elections (except for snap elections of 2007, which took place in a year after election of 2006) were carried out under different laws. The first Parliamentary election in 1994 was conducted using majority lists, elections of 1998 and 2002 were half majority, half party-list, elections of 2006 and 2007 were conducted using party lists only and in 2012 elections were again conducted according to mixed system. The voting threshold was changed (4%, 3% and 5%), different voting procedures and many other things were also modified. However, as opposed to other post-Soviet countries (except for Baltic states), where the results were predictable and authorities have won, all elections in Ukraine were really competitive with unprogrammed results.

The significant role in democratization of election processes was played by the public organizations which provided enlightenment of the voters, conducted the monitoring of election campaigns on honesty and provision of equal possibilities for all election participants, worked as observers during elections. Independent sociologic researches had particular importance in campaign fairness protection, especially exit-polls, which served as the reliable indicator of the votes' calculation correctness.

All this significant and useful activity of the public sector during election campaign became possible due to the support of international foundations and organizations from the countries with developed democracies, which contributed to Ukraine's movement toward the path of democracy development.

The last Parliamentary election was extremely important because of many reasons. Conducting fair and democratic elections was one of the requirements of the signing Association Agreement with the EU. At the same time the rollback of democratic achievements during the last three years of Victor Yanukovitch presidency, and, in particular, misuses and falsifications during the local elections of 2010, caused grounded suspicions that Parliamentary election will not be fair and just. These suspicions have partially come true in some majority districts, where, after the reaction of Ukrainian and international public, the Central Elections Committee was forced to cancel the fraudulent results. The results of party component of election in general coincided with the data of exit-polls conducted on the day of elections.

Basically, it can be concluded that Parliamentary election of 2012 was worse than it should have been (especially comparing with the previous elections of 2006 and 2007), but better than it was expected. Fair politicians, Ukrainian and international public joined their forces so that this election would not become the end of the European perspective of Ukraine.

Considering increased interest towards Ukraine today, when it stands at the crossroads of the historic choice, we decided to present the collection of materials in English for our foreign readers. These materials were included into our two publications: the book «National Exit-poll: Parliamentary election 2012» and the bulletin #39 of our Foundation «Political portrait of Ukraine», which was wholly dedicated to Parliamentary election of 2012. We hope that presented materials will be useful for our foreign colleagues and add to better understanding of political life in Ukraine.

First of all we considered it necessary to present detailed results of the exit-poll conducted by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with our partners in the project «National Exit-poll 2012»: Kiev International Institute of Sociology and Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies. These data give the possibility to know the peculiarities of currently present in Verkhovna Rada parties' voters as well the trends of changes in electorates from election to election.

The other part of the book is compiled of summarized statements of numerous surveys conducted during election campaign and after the election by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with other partners in the project «National Exit-poll 2012». Our surveys were not limited to the party ratings, but also included questions that were extremely important to other public organizations for further implementation of their elections projects. On the whole these materials and results of expert polls conducted during the election campaign are outlined in aforementioned DIF bulletin «Political portrait of Ukraine». We tried to select materials that most accurately characterize peculiarities of Ukrainian voters perception and explain their electoral choice to our English-speaking readers.

Last but not least we would like to thank international foundations, which supported the complex project «National Exit-poll 2012»: International Renaissance Foundation, MATRA program of the Embassy of Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine, National Endowment for Democracy, PACT project UNITER, and the European Union. We would also like to express special thanks to MATRA project for the support of publications dedicated to election campaigns and exit-poll results.

We hope that by joining forces we will be able to lead Ukraine to the path of the stable democratic development and our country will possess the rightful place in the European family of democratic societies.

Anton HRUSHETSKYI, Volodymyr PANIOTTO, Natalia HARCHENKO,

Methodology and technology of the National Exit Poll'2012 conduction

On October 28, 2012, the day of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the National Exit Poll'2012 Consortium, which is made up of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Economic and Political Studies Center, has conducted exit-poll.

Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation provided the overall coordination of the project, its' financial and media management. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology was responsible for scientific management of the project, development of the sample and coordination of the polling. The polling of voters at the exits of polling precincts was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center.

The National Exit Poll'2012 was conducted with financial support of international donors: International Renaissance Foundation, MATRA program of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Embassy in Ukraine, the National Endowment for Democracy (USA), UNITER (Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms) project «PACT», and the European Union.

Coordinator of the project «National Exit Poll'2012» Iryna Bekeshkina

Scientific supervisor Natalia Harchenko

Manager of the project activity at the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology **Anton Hrushetskyi**

Managers of the project activity at the Razumkov Center Andriy Bychenko, Mykhaylo Mishchenko

Consultants Volodymyr Paniotto, Peter Lynn

International observers over exit-poll and foreign consultants **Yelizavieta Diuk** (expert-consultant, Levada Centre, Russia), **Oleksii Levinson** (expert-consultant, Levada Centre, Russia), **Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin** (expert, Institute of Public Affairs, assistant professor, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Poland), **Peter Lynn** (professor, University of Essex, UK).

Sample

Constituents who voted at polling precincts (except for special polling districts – hospitals, prisons etc., and foreign electoral district) made up total population of the exit poll. The sample was developed as representative for Ukraine in general and for its 4 regions – West, Centre, East and South¹.

Each of research companies – Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Razumkov Economic and Political Studies Center – worked on separate representative samples, that was an additional tool for control of the quality.

The sample was two-stage stratified one. Stratification was made in two ways – by region and place of living (city or village). Altogether 51 stratums were selected (Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kyiv and 24 regions, each having urban and rural population).

On the first stage in each region polling precincts were selected with the equal probability. Then sample was divided between the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov Center by systematic selection – every second polling precinct was selected for one company, and remaining stations formed sample for another company.

On the second stage selection of voters at the polling stations was made randomly and systematically (applying a step). Constant selection step was used during the elections' day without predetermined in advance certain number of interviews.

Methodology used for the sample development, on the one hand, and systematic selection of the respondents by constant step, on another, ensure recieving independent from the Central Electoral Commission assessment of the turnout on elections.

Number of the electoral precincts, included into the sample, was 400 in total (200 districts for each sociological company). It was planned to interview in average about 50 respondents at each of the polling precinct, thus 20 000 of respondents in total. In practice, 19 611 respondents were questioned.

Defining the selection step was based on the previous experience of conduction the exit polls and the data of electoral statistics²:

On the ground of the experience of former exit polls, which were carried out with the application of the same methodology, we assume that sample error will not exceed 2,5% for the leaders and will be within the limits of 0,5 - 1,5% for the other parties and blocks. In the early parliamentary elections of 2007 maximum sample error for all parties and blocks did not exceed 1,1%.

Data collection method and tools

Data collection during exit poll was based on methodology of the «secret ballot». In particular, respondents were proposed to fill their answers about their electoral choice directly in the questionnaire (it included names of candidates), without assistance of the

interviewer. After that, respondents have to throw filled questionnaire into the sealed cardboard box, where there were already blanks with other respondents' answers. Usage of the «secret ballot» methodology during exit polls increases trust of respondents in the anonymity of the poll and helps to avoid interviewer's influence. Participation of the interviewer in process of filling in the questionnaire was allowed only in exceptional cases, for example, if respondent wasn't able to fill in the questionnaire because of poor eyesight.

The main question in the questionnaire was «Whom did you vote for?», but besides of that respondents were proposed to answer several additional questions, mainly demographic, but it was underlined that it was not obligatory. Additional questions included such parameters as sex, age group, education, time of making decision whom to vote for etc.

Questionnaires were prepared both in Ukrainian and Russian. Respondents could choose in what language it would be more comfortable to answer.

There were about 1000 interviewers involved in the polling, two at each ordinary precinct and three at very big ones, situated, usually, in regional centers. Almost all the interviewers were generally trained and had operational experience.

Before the exit poll regional teams of interviewers were in a centralized way trained by instructors – supervisors from research companies. Consultations were provided also via telephone before and exactly on the day of the exit poll.

Polling was conducted in the following time intervals:

In regional centers, other towns and urban villages	8.00-20.00
In villages	8.00-17.00

The response rate was 77%.

In the framework of research the 10% cross-control of the interviewers' work was conducted. In particular, controllers of the Razumkov Centre controlled districts of the KIIS, and controllers from KIIS controlled Razumkov Centre districts. Research companies in addition made internal checks of the quality of their own survey networks' work. Besides of that, regional observations on the quality of work were made by invited auditors. Monitoring was made during the whole day of elections, and its results were regularly reported to the central office.

The results of monitoring didn't reveal any significant deviations from the procedure of the polling.

Transfer of information from interviewers to regional team-leaders was made by telephone four times for cities and three times for villages.

Regional team-leaders of interviewers delivered the information to Kyiv central office on each precinct separately as soon as they received it by telephone, fax and e-mail.

The day after the survey, regional team-leaders of interviewers collected paper questionnaires, checked the correctness of filling in the information and sent data to Kyiv.

¹ West – Zakarpatskyj, Volynskyi, Rivnenskyj, Lvivskyj, Ivano-Frankivskyi, Ternopilskyj, Chernivetskyj, and Khmelnytskyj region; Centre – Zhytomyrskyj, Vinnytskyj, Kirovogradskyj, Cherkasskyj, Sumskyj, Chernigivskyj, Kyivskyj reagion and Kyiv; South – Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Odesskyj, Mykolayivskyj, Khersonskyj, Zaporozhskyj and Dnipropetrovskyj region; East – Kharkivskyj, Donetskyj, and Luganskyj region.

 $^{^2}$ Protocol of the Central electoral commission on results of election the national deputies of Ukraine in national multi-mandate electoral district - // http://www.cvk.gov.ua/info/zbvo_2012.pdf

Comparison of the exit poll results with election results

Exit poll data was updated three times:

- immediately after closing polling precincts – on the ground of aggregated data, collected 2 hours before the end of voting process (in particular before 18.00), and obtained via telephone;

- 3 hours after closing polling precincts – with adding the data collected at polling districts where work was carried out until closing at 20.00 (also obtained via the telephone);
 - After receiving paper questionnaires from regions and data entry.

In the table 1 and on Diagram 1 there is a comparison of the exit poll data, presented after closing polling precincts, with election results.

Table 1.


National Exit Poll'2012 data as of 18.00 in comparison to results of Ukrainian voters' voting on October, 28 2012:

Party title:	Election results	Exit-poll data as of at 18.00	Deviation
Socialist Party of Ukraine	0.45	0.5	-0.1
Communist Party of Ukraine	13.18	11.8	1.4
Political Union "Ridna Vitchyzna"	0.16	0.1	0.1
Party "Ruskyi Bloc"	0.31	0.3	0.0
Nataliia Korolevska's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!"	1.58	1.6	0.0
All-Ukrainian Union "Hromada"	0.08	0.1	0.0
Ukrainian National Assembly	0.08	0.0	0.1
Liberal Party of Ukraine	0.07	0.1	0.0
Party "Nova Polityka"	0.10	0.1	0.0
All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"	10.44	12.3	-1.9
Ukrainian Party "Zelena Planeta"	0.34	0.3	0.0
Party of Pensioners of Ukraine	0.56	0.5	0.1
Political Party "Nasha Ukraiina"	1.11	1.2	-0.1
Political Party "Zeleni"	0.25	0.3	-0.1
Party of Greens of Ukraine	0.34	0.4	-0.1
Political Party "Vitalii Klychko's UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms)"	13.96	15.1	-1.1

Political Party "Ukraiina Maibutnogo"	0.18	0.4	-0.2
All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"	25.54	24.7	0.8
Party of Regions	30.00	28.1	1.9
Political party "Narodno-Trudovyi Soiuz Ukraiiny"	0.11	0.1	0.0
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	1.08	0.9	0.2
"I have crossed out everyone/crossed the entire list/ spoiled the ballot"	_	1.1	-1.1
TOTAL	99.92	100	_

Diagram 1.

Comparison of the exit poll data, presented immediately after closing the polling precincts, with election results (parties, which received more than 1% of votes).



Preliminary exit poll data differs from election results not more than in 1.9%.

In the table 2 there are results of comparison between specified exit-poll data and data, received not via telephone, but in paper questionnaires.

Table 2.

Final National Exit Poll'2012 data in comparison to results of voting on October, 28 2012:

Party title:	Election results, %	Final exit-poll data, %	Comparison with Central Electoral Commission data
Party of Regions	30,00	28,4	-1,6
All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"	25,54	24,7	-0,8
Political Party "Vitalii Klychko's UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms)"	13,96	15,5	1,5
Communist Party of Ukraine	13,18	11,6	-1,6
All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"	10,44	12,3	1,9

As we can see, the maximum difference between the exit poll data and elections' results remained at 1,9% for the All-Ukrainian union «Svoboda», whose support was somewhat overestimated. It is worth noting, that during exit poll we didn't interview some categories of population, who participated in elections: those who have voted abroad; those who have voted at home; and also those who have voted in prisons and in hospitals. In addition, in the exit poll data there was a position «I have crossed out everyone/crossed the entire list/ spoiled the ballot», which was 1%, while Central Electoral Commission doesn't account invalid ballots for the distribution of votes. We recall, that number of invalid ballots in the national multi-mandate district on elections 2012 was 409 068. Growth of invalid ballots in number is associated, mainly, with cancellation of the opportunity to vote «against all» on elections.

However, the difference between the exit poll data and elections' results was small and corresponded with intended level of the sample error. Conducted analysis provides ground for stating that during parliamentarian elections'2012 there were no massive falsifications, that could significantly change results of voting. Such a close coincidence of the exit poll data and elections' results also proves that used methodology was rather effective and can be applied in subsequent exit polls.

Electorate of parliamentary elections: demographic dimensions

Results of exit poll present unique opportunity to analyze voting features and level of electoral activity of representatives of different socio-demographic electorate groups according to region, settlement type, age, gender, and education level.

Discrepancies between different regions of Ukraine in level of support of various political forces manifest themselves at each election. As we can see from table 1, during 2012, 2006, and 2007 elections, the Party of Regions (PoR) was a clear leader of electoral sympathies in Eastern and Southern regions. However, it saw decrease in its level of support: from 69.7% in 2007 to 50.9% in 2012 in the East and from 49.9% to 37.9% in the South³. In Central region, it remained almost the same (16.0% and 17.3% correspondingly) and in Western region, it increased from 6.2% to 12.1%.

Decrease in level of support of PoR in the East and the South was paralleled by considerable growth of level of support of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in these regions (from 6.5% to 18.6% in Eastern region and from 7.7% to 16.3% in Southern region). This allows us to assume that at least some part of the former PoR electorate changed its preference in favor of CPU during inter-electoral period.

In Western and Central regions, All-Ukrainion Union «Batkivshchyna» proved to be electorate's favorite (similar to Iuliia Tymoshenko Block during last elections). At the same time, mostly due to tightening of competition on the «Orange» electoral field, level of «Batkivshchyna» support decreased: from 52.3% to 31.7% in Western region and from 46.8% to 34.4% in Central region. In Southern region, the level of support insignificantly dropped (from 19.6% to 17.5%) while in Eastern region, it actually increased from 6.3% to 10.1%.

All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda» saw sharp rise in its electoral support in the West, from 7% to 26.4%, and in the Centre (from 0.8% to 12.6%). By-turn, Political Party «Nasha Ukraiina» faced decrease of its level of support as compared to that of 2007 «Nasha Ukraiina» – Narodna Samooborona» Block in all regions, with the biggest losses being in the West (from 29.4% to 2.5%) and in the Centre (from 17.2% to 1.1%).

Among parties that managed to overcome 5% threshold, support for «Vitalii Klychko's UDAR» party was distributed among different regions the most evenly: it was supported by 18.4% in the West, 18.7% in the Centre, 14.4% in the South, and 8% in the East.

In Southern and Eastern regions, share of those who told that they crossed out all candidates or spoiled a ballot was higher than that in Western and Central regions.

³ Hereafter, results of previous exit-polls are cited according to the following editions: Parlamentski vybory-1998. Prezydentski vybory-1999. Parlamentsli vybory-2002. – Kyiv: Zapovit, 2002; Natsionalnyi ekzyt-pol: parlamentski vybory'2006. – Kyiv: Fond «Demokratychni Initsiatyvy», 2006; Natsionalnyi ekzyt-pol: pozacherhovi parlamentski vybory'2007. – Kyiv: Fond «Demokratychni Initsiatyvy», 2007.

Table 1.

«Pick the political party or block you have just voted for at the elections to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?», *regional distribution*, %

	Ukraino		Регіо	ни*:	
Party title:	Ukraine, N=19611	West, N=4562	Centre, N=6084	South, N=4633	East, N=4332
Party of Regions	28,1	12,1	17,3	37,9	50,9
"Batkivshchyna"	24,5	31,7	34,4	17,5	10,1
"Vitalii Klychko's UDAR"	15,3	18,4	18,7	14,4	8,0
Communist Party of Ukraine	11,5	3,7	8,8	16,3	18,9
"Svoboda"	12,2	26,4	12,6	5,8	3,4
Nataliia Korolevska's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!"	1,6	1,3	1,5	2,0	1,8
"Nasha Ukraiina"	1,2	2,5	1,1	0,6	0,5
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	0,9	0,5	1,6	0,5	0,7
Other parties	2,8	2,0	2,6	3,4	3,0
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	0,9	0,3	0,6	1,3	1,6
Invalid answer	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,2
Don't remember who I voted for	0,8	0,8	0,7	0,4	1,2

* **West** – Zakarpattia, Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts;

Centre – Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv oblasts and city of Kyiv;

South – Sevastopol, Odesa, Mykolaiiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

East - Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.

Overall, we can state that the inter-regional differences in electoral preferences which manifested themselves during 2004 and 2010 presidential elections and 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections remained unchanged: the West and the Centre favored «Orange» forces, while the East and the South – PoR and CPU. Still, compared to previous elections to Verkhovna Rada, level of electoral polarization between regions decreased. This trend revealed itself in closure of gap between levels of support of parties of opposing political spectrum in Western-Central and Eastern-Southern parts of the country.

As can be seen from table 2, considerable discrepancies in electoral preferences of urban and rural voters could be observed.

Table 2.

«Pick the political party or block you have just voted for at the elections to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?», $settlement\ type,\ \%$

Party title:	City or town, N=13930	Village, N=5681
Party of Regions	27,3**	29,7**
"Batkivshchyna"	22,5**	28,6**
"Vitalii Klychko's UDAR"	15,9**	14,2**
Communist Party of Ukraine	12,0**	10,5**
"Svoboda"	14,0**	8,6**
Nataliia Korolevska's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!"	1,7	1,5
"Nasha Ukraiina"	1,1	1,4
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	0,7**	1,2**
Other parties	3,0**	2,3**
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	1,1**	0,6**
Invalid answer	0,2	0,2
Don't remember who I voted for	0,5**	1,2**

* Difference is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level

** Difference is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level

In 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, level of PoR electoral support in cities and towns was significantly higher than that in villages (40.3% and 22.0% correspondingly). On 2012 parliamentary elections, the proportions reversed and PoR was more supported by rural voters (29.7%) than by urban voters (27.3%). Compared to previous elections, level of PoR support among urban dwellers considerably dropped, while that among rural dwellers increased. Such tendency was observed in all regions of Ukraine.

«UDAR» was more embraced by urban voters on all-Ukrainian level and in most regions (except for Western part where the difference in level of «UDAR» support in cities and villages wasn't statistically significant).

On aggregated level, CPU is slightly more supported by urban dwellers, but in Central and Southern regions, share of its voters was bigger among rural population. In addition, urban voters supported "Svoboda" more than rural voters (only in Eastern region level

of its support among urban population did not differ significantly from that among rural population).

Analysis of age dimension of electoral preferences points to traditionally higher popularity of CPU among older people (see Table 3). The same tendency is characteristic for PoR. Level of «Batkivshchyna» support among the youngest voters (18-29 years) is slightly lower than that among other age groups. The younger the respondents were, the more popular «UDAR» was among them and the more frequently they crossed out all candidates or spoiled bulletins (the latter was also characteristic for residents of the South and the East). Age differences among «Svoboda» electorate were statistically insignificant.

Table 3.

«Pick the political party or block you have just voted for at the elections to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?», $age,\,\%$

Party title:	18–29 N=3233	30–39 N=3210	40–49 N=3398	50–59 N=4087	60 and older, N=5006
Party of Regions	23,9	26,6	28,8	28,5	32,1
"Batkivshchyna"	21,3	23,6	25,1	25,9	25,0
"Vitalii Klychko's UDAR"	26,0	21,1	15,6	11,4	7,3
Communist Party of Ukraine	5,7	6,7	9,3	14,2	17,3
"Svoboda"	11,2	13,4	13,0	12,8	11,5
Nataliia Korolevska's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!"	2,8	2,1	1,7	1,2	0,9
"Nasha Ukraiina"	1,4	1,1	1,2	1,1	1,0
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	1,1	0,7	1,0	0,9	0,9
Other parties	3,5	2,5	2,5	2,7	2,6
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	1,6	1,2	1,1	0,6	0,5
Invalid answer	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2
Don't remember who I voted for	1,3	0,8	0,5	0,5	0,8

Comparing gender dimensions of voting patterns, we should note higher popularity of PoR among women (which was also the case on 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections). Women were also more favorable to «Batkivshchyna» and «Ukraiina – Vpered!». «UDAR», «Svoboda», and CPU got more support from men (see table 4).

Table 4.

«Pick the political party or block you have just voted for at the elections to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?», gender, %

Party title:	Men N=8738	Women N=10038
Party of Regions	21,5**	31,4**
"Batkivshchyna"	22,2**	26,3**
"Vitalii Klychko's UDAR"	17,8**	12,9**
Communist Party of Ukraine	12,1**	10,8**
"Svoboda"	14,3**	10,5**
Nataliia Korolevska's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!"	1,4**	1,9**
"Nasha Ukraiina"	1,2	1,1
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	0,9	0,9
Other parties	2,9	2,7
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	1,1*	0,8*
Invalid answer	0,2	0,1
Don't remember who I voted for	0,9	0,7

* Difference is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level

** Difference is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level

Among differences in voting patterns of people with different education level, exit-poll results show evidence that the level of PoR support drops with increase of education level of respondents (see table 5). In similar vein, the more advanced level of education was possessed by respondent, the less likely he/she was to vote for CPU.

The level of «Batkivshchyna» support on national level didn't differ among groups of respondents with various education levels. This was caused by the fact that different trends were characteristic for different regions: in Western region, level of its support among voters with higher or incomplete higher education was lower than among those with other education levels while in Southern and Eastern regions, on the contrary, it was higher. Thus, in the South and in the East where supporters of PoR dominated «Batkivshchyna» was embraced mostly by voters with higher education levels.

At the same time, level of support for both «UDAR» and «Svoboda» grew with increase in education level of voters (this trend was apparent in every region of Ukraine).

Table 5.

«Pick the political party or block you have just voted for at the elections to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?», *education level*, %

Party title:	Incomplete secondary N=1407	Complete secondary general N=3261	Complete secondary special N=6588	Higher or incomplete higher N=7409
Party of Regions	35.7	30.3	31.1	24.0
"Batkivshchyna"	23.9	24.2	24.7	24.1
"Vitalii Klychko's UDAR"	10.3	14.3	13.8	17.9
Communist Party of Ukraine	15.0	13.3	12.6	8.9
"Svoboda"	5.3	8.4	10.7	16.5
Nataliia Korolevska's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!"	1.1	2.3	1.5	1.6
"Nasha Ukraiina"	1.4	1.3	1.0	1.2
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party	0.6	1.2	0.9	0.9
Other parties	4.2	2.6	2.1	3.1
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin	0.5	1.0	0.9	1.1
Invalid answer	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1
Don't remember who I voted for	1.7	0.9	0.7	0.5

Overall, analysis of connection between electoral support of parties and blocks with socio-demographical characteristics of voters gives us reason to state that voters' support of six out of eight parties that passed 1 per cent threshold (PoR, «Batkivshchyna», CPU, «Svoboda», «Nasha Ukraiina», and Radical Party) correlated the most with their region of inhabitance. At the same time, voting for Nataliia Korolevska's Party «Ukraiina – Vpered!» and «UDAR» was mostly explained by age differences.

Discrepancies in level of support of various political parties by representatives of different socio-demographical groups conditioned different nature of electorate of these political forces. Different regional structure of electorates was the most obvious example. Among PoR voters, 70.9% were from Eastern and Southern regions, while the same number for CPU equaled to 68.7%. On the contrary, 65.7% of «UDAR» voters, 73.7% of «Batkivshchyna» voters, and 82.5% of «Svoboda» voters resided in Western and Central regions (see table 6). «Svoboda» had the highest level of localization of voters: 50.7% of its voters came from the one, Western, region.

However, in 2007, level of localization was even higher. For instance, voters from Eastern and Southern Ukraine amounted then to 82.4% of PoR supporters, while voters from Western and Central Ukraine amounted to 78.8% of «Batkivshchyna» supporters and 94.9% of «Svoboda» supporters. Only the level of CPU's localization was relatively similar to that on the last elections.

«Svoboda» possessed the highest share of urban voters (76.4%), despite the fact that its supporters came predominantly from Western and Central regions which have low level of urbanization. Share of urban voters among PoR electorate dropped compared to 2007 – from 81.4% to 64.8%.

CPU had the «oldest» electorate, with 40.1% of its voters were 60 or more years old. Yet, this number is lower than that of 2007 (49.3%) while the share of CPU voters who were 40 years old or younger actually rose from 13.1% to 18.6%. «Ukraiina – Vpered!» and «UDAR» had the largest share of young voters, with more than half of them were younger than 40. «Batkivshchyna» electorate, by-turn, became «older». If in 2007, people who were 60 or more years old amounted to 18.6% of its electorate, the same share in 2012 amounted to 27.2%, while share of 40-year old and younger decreased from 38.6% to 31.4%.

It is known that women constitute the majority of Ukrainian voters. They also account for larger share of electorates of PoR, «Batkivshchyna», «Ukraiina – Vpered!», and Radical Party. «Svoboda» and «UDAR» had more men among their supporters, while the proportions were close to fifty-fifty in cases of CPU and «Nasha Ukraiina».

«Svoboda» led the way according to education level of its voters, with 54.1% of them were people with higher or incomplete higher education. «UDAR» electorate also had rather high education level, while CPU and PoR had the least-educated voters.

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Settlement type

Regions

Age

		D							þ		
	West	Centre	South	East	Cities or town	Villages	18–29	30–39	40-49	50-59	60 and older
Party of Regions, N=5621	10.1	19.0	33.5	37.4	64.8	35.2	14.4	15.9	18.2	21.6	29.9
"Batkivshchyna", N=4716	30.4	43.3	17.8	8.5	61.1	38.9	15.0	16.4	18.5	23.0	27.2
"Vitalii Klychko's UDAR", N=2965	28.2	37.5	23.4	10.9	69.2	30.8	29.3	23.5	18.4	16.2	12.7
Communist party of Ukraine, N=2302	7.6	23.7	35.2	33.5	69.69	30.4	8.6	10.0	14.6	26.8	40.1
"Svoboda", N=2350	50.7	31.8	11.8	5.7	76.4	23.6	15.5	18.5	18.9	22.4	24.7
Nataliia Korolevksa's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!", N=326	18.4	28.4	30.3	22.9	69.8	30.2	29.2	21.7	18.2	16.1	14.7
"Nasha Ukraiina", N=226	50.2	28.1	12.5	9.3	59.8	40.2	20.7	15.7	18.8	21.5	23.4
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, N=168	14.4	54.5	14.8	16.3	54.8	45.2	20.5	13.7	19.0	20.5	26.3
Other parties, N=549	17.5	29.5	30.4	22.6	71.6	28.4	21.9	15.5	16.1	21.6	25.0
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin, N=197	7.9	20.8	34.3	37.0	7.9.7	20.3	28.8	22.6	22.1	13.5	13.0
		Gender	PL L				Educa	Education level			
	Men	_	Women	_	Incomplete secondary		Complete secondary general		Complete secondary special	High incomple	Higher of incomplete higher
Party of Regions, N=5621	41.3	Ю	58.7		9.8		18.9		37.7	M	33.6
"Batkivshchyna", N=4716	42.5	5	57.5		7.7		17.7		35.0	Ň	39.6
"Vitalii Klychko's UDAR", N=2965	54.8	8	45.2		5.3		16.7		31.1	4	46.9
Communist party of Ukraine, N=2302	49.6	9	50.4		10.3		20.7		38.1	Ñ	30.9
"Svoboda", N=2350	54.4	4	45.6		3.4		12.2		30.2	Ú	54.1
Nataliia Korolevksa's Party "Ukraiina – Vpered!", N=326	39.2	2	60.8		5.5		24.3		31.1	Ñ	39.1
"Nasha Ukraiina", N=226	49.4	4	50.6		9.5		19.1		30.2	4	41.2
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, N=168	44.3	3	55.7		5.4		23.0		33.8	3	37.7
Other parties, N=549	48.5	5	51.5		11.9		16.7		26.8	4	44.6
Crossed out all candidates or spoiled a bulletin, N=197	54.3	24	45.7		3.8		18.3		31.7	4	46.2

Finally, we will have a look at level of participation of different socio-demographic groups. As evidenced by the results of previous exit polls conducted in Ukraine, significant differences in electoral turnout could be observed between representatives of different age groups.

Level of electoral turnout of different age groups can be revealed by comparing age structure of those people who were addressed by interviewers (including those who agreed to answer and those who disagreed) with age structure of adult population of Ukraine according to official state statistics.

Table 7.

Comparison of socio-demographic structure of adult population of Ukraine (according to official data) and structure of electorate (according to exit poll data), %

Socio-demographic characteristics	Official state statistics ⁴	Voters (exit poll sample) N=27515
Men	45.0	45.9
Women	55.0	54.1
18–29	22.2	16.4
30–39	17.9	17.2
40–49	16.7	18.9
50–59	17.5	21.8
60 and older	25.7	25.7
	Settlement type:	
City	69.3	66.3
Village	30.7	33.7
	Regions:	
West	22.5	23.6
Centre	29.6	31.4
South	26.7	25.0
East	21.3	19.9

* Number in bold differ from official data at the p<0.01 level. Other numbers don't differ from official statistics at the p<0.05 level.

** Numbers in age and gender segments in exit poll column are calculated as shares of those who indicated their age and gender during filling a questionnaire and those whose age and gender were indicated by interviewers in forms of refusal.

⁴ Data on age and gender population structure are given according to state statistics as of1 January 2012.

From Table 7, one can make a conclusion that rural population is more electorally active than urban population. Age differences in electoral activity remained similar to those at previous parliamentary elections, i.e. lower electoral activity of youth and higher electoral activity of people of 40-59 years old.

Table 7 also indicates that men participate in elections more actively than women. On regional level, voters from Western and Central regions were more active than voters from Eastern and Southern regions.

Iryna BEKESHKINA

Party elections in Ukraine: stability and changes

During the existence of Ukraine as an independent state Ukrainians have elected Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) six times, out of which five times according to party lists (in 2006 and 2007 – completely, and in 1998, 2002 and 2012 – half of deputies were elected according to party lists). It seemed that over 14 years the stable party structure should have jelled out of political forces that compete each other during elections. After preliminary Parliamentary elections of 2007 we've made a conclusion that «party-political structure in Ukraine gains stability». However, out of five winners of elections 2007 two political forces («Our Ukraine – People's Self-defense» and Volodymyr Lytvyn's Bloc) did not enter the new Verkhovna Rada, and two newcomers (created right before elections Party «UDAR» of Vitaly Klitchko and All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda» (Freedom), which, on the contrary, participated twice in previous elections, but with no success) entered the Parliament. Thus, the party-political landscape in the country again changed significantly.

In general the history of elections in Ukraine is a series of impossible for long-standing democracies ups and downs of political forces, when some parties rocket to the sky as comets and fall down with the same pace.

Truth be told, out of election winners in 1998 only the Communist Party entered the Parliament of 2012; out of election winners in 2002, besides Communist Party, «Batkivshchyna» Party is present in the Parliament of 2012 (which, though, was significantly transformed compared to the year 2002, absorbing «Front of Change» Party, which did not exist in 2002); out of election winners 2006 and 2007 the Party of Regions was added to the abovementioned. New political forces – «UDAR» of Vitaly Klitchko, which participated in elections for the first time, and «Svoboda», which, on the contrary, was the constant participant of elections, but in 2007 scored only 0.7% of the votes.

The Communist Party, which was present in Ukrainian Parliament all the time, but at the time having seemingly slim chances to overcoming 3% threshold in 5 years, surprisingly doubled its result in 2012 comparing to the previous elections. «Our Ukraine» Party, which triumphantly started its political career in 2002, having received 25.57% of the votes, was reduced almost to zero, gathering not more than 1% of votes in 10 years. It is obvious that former Parliament members - People's Party and Socialist Party - have also ended their active political life.

Thus, as we see, the political field is in constant fluctuation in Ukraine. This constant changeability of the Parliament members shows immature character of the party-political structure in Ukrainian society.

It is necessary to say that the concentration of voting is in process and the percentage of the «lost» votes (those that were given to parties that did not overcome the vote threshold) is decreasing.

30 Parties and Blocs participated in election of 1998, and 8 parties and blocs appeared at the Parliament having overcome the then threshold of 4%. These were: the Communist Party – 24.7%, People's Movement of Ukraine – 9.4%, Bloc of Socialist and Rural Parties – 8.6%, Green Party – 5.4%, People's-Democratic Party - 5%, Union «Gromada» (Community) – 4.7%, Progressive Socialist Party – 4%, Socialist-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) – 4%. 23.9% of the votes were wasted as they were given to parties and blocs that did not overcome 4% threshold and these votes were redistributed in favor of the winner of elections, the Communist Party, despite the fact that people who voted for these parties were far from the Communist ideology.

33 Parties and Blocs participated in the next Parliamentary election of 2002, and only 5 of them were the same that participated in 1998, while the rest 28 were either newcomers or blocs reformatted out of participants of previous elections. Out of winners of 1998 the following became the members of the new Parliament: the Communist Party – 19.98%, Socialist-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) – 6.27% and the Socialist Party (this party was participating in elections without its former partner Rural Party) – 6.87%. The winner of elections was the Bloc of Victor Yushchenko «Our Ukraine» (32.57%), which included former Parliamentary Party People's Movement of Ukraine and 9 more parties of national-democratic wing. Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc was a newcomer and gained 7.26%. Several pro-Presidential Parties have united in the Bloc «For United Ukraine!» that scored 11.77%. There were fewer wasted votes during elections of 2002 – only 14.7% of votes were given to parties and blocs that did not overcome 4% threshold and did not enter the Parliament. And again, redistribution of these votes added much to the Communist Party, despite the fact that people voted not for left-wing parties.

The Parliamentary election of 2006 was held on fully proportional basis, which led to the further reorganization of the political field. 45 Parties and Blocs participated in elections and only 10 of them took part in elections of 2002. There were more wasted votes during 2006 elections (20.5%), but at the same time there were significantly more participants of election process.

Out of 5 winners of election 2002, which participated in elections 2006, four political forces became winners: Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc – 22.29%, «Our Ukraine» Bloc – 13.94%, the Socialist Party – 5.67% and the Communist Party – 3.66%. Present in the previous Parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn Bloc and Socialist-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) did not overcome the election threshold. The Party of Regions, which participated in elections 2002 as one of the five parties which made up the Bloc «For United Ukraine», has obtained the first place (32.14%).

The Parliamentary elections of 2007 were snap elections and were conducted only one year after the elections of 2006; thus, it seemed that no significant changes would occur. However, among 20 parties and blocs that participated in elections 2007 only 10 competed in elections 2006. Significant part of those political forces, which stood up as independent entities and did not enter the Parliament, during elections of 2007 joined blocs, first of all Bloc «Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense». There were fewer wasted votes – 11.42%. However, on the contrary of the previous elections these «lost» votes

were redistributed among political forces that represent different political preferences of voters, mainly between the Party of Regions and Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, and to some extent to Bloc «Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense».

Out of five winners of 2006 elections four political forces became winners during elections-2007: the Party of Regions, Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, Bloc «Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense» (in some way it can be called the successor of «Our Ukraine» Bloc, even though the composition of the bloc was changed) and the Communist Party of Ukraine. The Bloc of Volodymyr Lytvyn, which did not overcome the 3% voting threshold at 2006 election, also joined election winners.

Considering the insufficient rotation as well as the moderate share of the wasted votes, after elections of 2007 we've made the conclusion that «the political structuring of the society and the formation of the political preferences is taking place in Ukraine»⁵.

However 5 years have passed and again the political landscape of the country has changed. It was mainly caused by the change of the electoral law, which did not allow blocs to participate in elections. Reformatting the political field was also explained by the political processes that took place in Ukraine after the Presidential elections of 2010: imprisonment of the «Batkivshchyna» leader Yulia Tymoshenko and appearance of new leaders that have founded their political parties (first of all «Front of Change» of Arseniy Yatseniuk and «UDAR» of Vitaly Klitchko).

33 political forces participated in elections of 2012, and only 7 of them were competitors. Moreover, parties «Batkivshchyna» and «Our Ukraine» underwent significant transformation: «Front of Change» has joined «Batkivshchyna», and «Our Ukraine» did not include «People's Self-Defense» or any other former participants. Due to the absence of the chance to cross the 5% threshold People's Party did not participate in elections, but its leader Volodymyr Lytvyn won in single-member district, and several deputies joined the list of the Party of Regions.

Despite significant changes in election list, the number of wasted votes was the lowest during the whole history of the Parliamentary elections: only 6.78% of votes were given to parties that did not overcome the threshold, and the difference between parties that were and were not elected to the Parliament was very substantial: All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda», which possessed the last, fifth place among the winners, received 10.44% of votes, and the next Party of Natalia Korolevska «Ukraine – Forward!» received only 1.68% of votes.

Of course, with the new political forces appearing in election competitions, the level of electoral volatility increased (table 1): 62% of voters responded that they were supporters of this party/bloc long before elections during election 2006, in 2007 – 69% of voters stated the same, and in 2012 only 56% gave this answer.

⁵ Iryna Bekeshkina. From election to election: stability and permanence of voters of leading political forces. – National exit-poll. Snap Parliamentary elections - 2007. – K., 2007, «Democratic Initiatives». p.99.

Table 1.

When have you decided on your vote? (%)

The time of voting decision-making	Exit-poll 1998	Exit-poll 2002	Exit-poll 2006	Exit-poll 2007	Exit-poll 2012
l was a supporter of this party/bloc long before elections	42	50	62	69	56
Earlier than a month before elections	23	24	21	16	21
During the last month before elections	11	11	6	4,5	6
During the last week before elections	11	7	4	3	5
During the last day before elections	5	3	2	2	4
Made the decision at the polling station	6	4	2	2,5	4
IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY/ I DON'T KNOW	2	1	2	3	4

In general such trend is fair: the electorate of parties presented in the Parliament is formed long before elections. Thus, prior to the 2012 election campaign the most electoral certainty was demonstrated by the voters of the Communist Party (59%), «Batkivshchyna» (67%) and the Party of Regions (67%). Significantly less determined were voters of «UDAR» of Vitaly Klitchko. The least determination was shown by the voters of parties that did not enter the Parliament, with their voters making the decision the day prior to elections or at the polling station.

Exit-polls provide the possibility to track the changes in electorate of different parties: what exactly was gained and lost. This information is especially important in regard to the political parties that achieved unexpected results – «Svoboda» and the Communist Party of Ukraine.

The Communist Party was the participant of all party elections that took place in Ukraine. However, in the first Parliamentary election of 1998 it was an undoubtful leader receiving 24.4% of votes (People's Movement was the second with the result of 9.4%). The result was almost the same in 2002 – 20.01%, which provided the Communist Party with the second result; in 2006 it barely overcame the threshold of 3% (3.66%) and slightly increased the result during election of 2007 (5.39%). However, the political future of this party was quite disputed as its main electorate was older than 50 years old. Nevertheless, during elections of 2012 the Communist Party experienced the real renaissance, receiving 13.18% of votes. As it is shown in the Table 2, the Communist Party managed to increase the number of voters in all demographic groups, especially among the youth and voters with higher education, who previously were «the weakest electoral link» of the Communist Party.

Table 2.

Dynamics of voting for the Communist Party of Ukraine during elections of 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007 and 2012 (%)

Social-demographic features of voters	Elections 1998	Elections 2002	Elections 2006	Elections 2007	Elections 2012	
		Gender				
Male	25.8	22.0	4.2	6.3	12.1	
Female	26.2	24.8	2.7	4.0	10.8	
		Age				
18–29 y.o.	14.3	8.5	0.9	1.8	5.7	
30–55 y.o.*	23.3	—	—			
56 y.o. and older	37.7	—	—			
30–39 y.o.	—	12.7	1.1	2.1	6.7	
40–49 y.o.	—	17.4	2.2	3.8	9.3	
50–59 y.o.		25.0	3.6	5.6	14.2	
60 y.o. and older		36.2	8.3	10.3	17.3	
		Education				
Incomplete secondary	35.8	33.2	6.5	5.2	15.0	
Complete secondary and vocational**	26.7	_	_			
Complete secondary	—	23.3	3.4	5.2	13.3	
Vocational	—	19.9	3.1	4.5	12.6	
Higher and incomplete higher	20.3	14.8	2.7	5.5	8.9	
Residence type						
City or town	26.8	23.3	3.2	5.3	14.0	
Village	24.6	17.4	3.8	4.4	8.6	

*Age intervals applied in the exit-poll of 1998 differ from those used in 2002, 2006 and 2007. As during all exit-polls the nominal scale was used, it is impossible to transform the data in a way, which would allow direct comparison. That is why the results of 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2007 are provided in different age intervals. ** In the exit-poll of 1998 the different scale of determination of the education level was used: secondary and vocational educations were lumped together.

Exit-poll did not include the question on voting motivation for certain political forces. However, the after-election survey conducted by Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with Kiev International Sociology Institute showed that the main reason for voting for the Communist Party was yearning for the former Soviet Union, which, in turn, was the consequence of the disappointment of the certain share of the Party of Regions voters in it and their voting for the Communist Party.

Now, let's see what changes occurred to the electorate of the Party of Regions, especially considering the fact that some of its voters chose the Communist Party.

The Party of Regions as an independent political force appeared during the Parliamentary election of 2006 (during election of 2002 it was one of the five members of the bloc «For United Ukraine!»). Having received 32.14% of the votes, the party became a leader of elections-2006, having achieved the big breakaway from its rivals, taking over the most part of the Communist Party voters. Its result was even better in 2007 election (34.37%), but a bit lower in 2012 election – 30.0%. Table 3 shows that it lost voters in all demographic groups, but mainly in two opposite age generations – among the youngest aged up to 30 years old (11.5% less) and the oldest aged over 60 years old (7% less), as well as among the voters with the higher education (7.5% less). As we can see these are the same groups, which were added to the electorate of the Communist Party.

Table 3.

Dynamics of voting for the Party of Regions during elections of 2006, 2007 and 2012 (%)

Social-demographic features of voters	Elections 2006	Elections 2007	Elections 2012			
Gender						
Male	25.8	22.0	4.2			
Female	26.2	24.8	2.7			
Age						
18–29 y.o.	31.9	35.4	23.9			
30–39 y.o.	27.5	30.9	26.6			
40–49 y.o.	27.7	32.8	28.8			
50–59 y.o.	31.6	35.5	28.5			
60 y.o. and older	33.8	38.8	32.1			
Education						
Incomplete secondary	32.1	38.9	35.7			
Complete secondary and vocational	32.1	37.6	30.3			
Complete secondary	33.3	36.0	31.1			
Vocational	26.5	31.5	24.0			
Higher and incomplete higher	20.3	14.8	2.7			
Residence type						
City or town	35.5	40.3	27.3			
Village	20.4	22.0	29.7			

Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, with its key component – «Batkivshchyna» Party, significantly improved its results at each election: 7.26% in 2002, 22.29% in 2006, and 30.71% in 2007. However, in 2012 election, when the party participated in elections without its irreplaceable leader Yulia Tymoshenko, the result was substantially lower – 25.54%. As it can be seen from the Table 4, the party lost voters among almost all segments of the electorate, except voters of the oldest age. The biggest losses were observed among the youngest, in groups of 18-29 and 30-39 years old (13.5% and 11.4% consequently), which were mainly voting for "UDAR" of Vitaly Klitchko.

Table 4.

Dynamics of voting for Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc/ Batkivshchyna Party during elections of 2002, 2006, 2007 and 2012 (%)

Social-demographic features of voters	Elections 2002	Elections 2006	Elections 2007	Elections 2012			
	Gender						
Male	8.3	24.2	30.9	22.2			
Female	8.0	24.7	32.4	26.3			
Age							
18–29 y.o.	10.1	25.1	34.8	21.3			
30–39 y.o.	9.5	26.2	35.0	23.6			
40–49 y.o.	9.4	27.9	34.5	25.1			
50–59 y.o.	8.3	25.8	32.5	25.9			
60 y.o. and older	4.9	18.8	24.2	25.0			
	Education						
Incomplete secondary	3.8	18.4	28.8	23.9			
Complete secondary	6.6	23.8	30.6	24.2			
Vocational	8.2	25.7	33.0	24.7			
Higher and incomplete higher	12.2	25.9	31.8	24.1			
Residence type							
City or town	8.6	24.1	28.7	22.5			
Village	7.0	25.2	38.8	28.6			

Unfortunately, we can not comprehensively analyze the changes in electorate of «Svoboda», as in previous elections, and consequently the exit-polls, it was too small, and the differences in various demographic groups in exit-polls are within the statistical error. As to «UDAR», its election dynamics has yet to occur.

Instead, the 2012 exit-poll gives us the possibility to track the history of the rocketing rise and the devastating fall of «Our Ukraine» Party. In fact, the best result was reached in 2002

when it has debuted in election. The party received 32.57% of the votes and obtained the first place in elections. During 2006 election it lost electoral support and received only 13.95% of the votes (the major part of the voters was taken over by Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko). In 2007 election Bloc «Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense» showed almost unchanged result – 14.15%, but in five years during election of 2012 «Our Ukraine»suffered a real disaster having lost almost all its voters and receiving only 1.11%. As it is shown by the data in Table 5, «Our Ukraine» Party was abandoned by voters from all electorate categories.

Table 5.

Dynamics of voting for Bloc/Party Our Ukraine during elections of 2002, 2006, 2007 and 2012 (%)

Social-demographic features of voters	Elections 2002	Elections 2006	Elections 2007	Elections 2012			
	Gender						
Male	26.1	15.7	14.7	1.2			
Female	24.8	15.5	12.7	1.0			
Age							
18–29 y.o.	26.4	14.1	11.3	1.2			
30–39 y.o.	26.9	17.6	15.1	1.0			
40–49 y.o.	25.5	16.1	13.5	1.2			
50–59 y.o.	23.1	15.2	13.5	1.1			
60 y.o. and older	25.2	15.2	14.7	1.0			
	Education						
Incomplete secondary	31.5	17.8	14.1	1.4			
Complete secondary	26.4	16.4	13.3	1.2			
Vocational	23.8	15.1	12.8	1.0			
Higher and incomplete higher	23.1	15.0	14.6	0.7			
Residence type							
City or town	20.5	12.6	10.8	1.0			
Village	35.3	22.2	20.5	1.4			

Examination of the dynamics of party voting during the Parliamentary elections in Ukraine shows that party-political structure of the Ukrainian society is far from stable and, thus, unexpected surprises are awaiting us, especially knowing that the next elections will take place in 2017 after the Presidential elections. As it is proved by the history, nobody can «settle for good» in the Parliament and voter can make corrections in all preliminary forecasts and calculations. However, this unexpectedness is a fundamental condition of the democracy, and exit-polls also belong to it as a reliable tool in the struggle for fair and transparent elections

Iryna BEKESHKINA

Elections-2012 in the mirror of sociology

Democratic Initiatives Foundation has conducted sociologic researches during all election campaigns that took place in Ukraine. This allows us to figure out some general conclusions in regard to the changes that happened during this time in the attitude of voters towards elections, voter participation in election, and in motives of voting for certain political forces.

1.Did election become a mechanism of influence on the life in the country for its citizens?

As it is shown by the data of sociologic polls, in general the attitude of voters towards elections is diverse. On the one hand, citizens of Ukraine are responsible voters. As it is shown in the Table 1, the understanding of the civil duty was the main factor that induced Ukrainian citizens to participate in all elections conducted in Ukraine.

Table 1.

Reasons for citizen participation in elections (% to those who participated in elections; there was a possibility to choose not more than 2 reasons)

Reasons for citizen participation in elections	April 1998	August 2002	June – July 2007	December 2012
Participation in election is a civil duty of the citizen	42	48	49	49
I got used to participating in elections	19	17	12	16
There were parties and blocs that I like	13	12	19	16
Participation in election is a possibility to influence the situation in Ukraine	30	20	25	23
l did not want my vote to be used by other person	31	31	35	23
It was interesting for me to participate in this "contest" – who wins?	7	4	5	2
Other	2	1	1	0.5
It is difficult to answer	1	1	1	0

At the same time it is significant that the second place among reasons is obtained by the negative motivation – the fear that someone else can use respondent's vote, i.e. simply speaking – the expectation of falsifications. It is notable that youth sometimes put this reason on the first place. As a rule, this reason is chosen by the people voting for oppositional political forces. It is also significant that the motive that ideally has to be the main one, i.e. the wish to vote for certain political force, is very weak.

Ukrainians are quite pessimistic in their attitudes towards the prospects of the improvement of the situation in Ukraine after the elections (table 2).

Table 2.

Expectations of the population that the election to Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) will allow improving the situation in Ukraine (%)

Expectations for election	April 1998	August 2002	October 2006	December 2012
Election will allow improving the situation	29	24	32	29
Election will not change anything	43	54	36	42
Election will make the situation even worse	6	5	8	6
It is difficult to say	20	17	24	22

Moreover, before the elections of 2012 Ukrainians disbelieved that election in Ukraine is a real mechanism of civil influence on the authorities (Table 3). Before all other previous elections the opinions of Ukrainians were more optimistic.

Table 3.

Do citizens agree that election in Ukraine is a real mechanism of civil influence on authorities? (%)

	April 2004	November 2005	June – July 2007	March 2012
Do not agree at all	21	22	16	21
Mainly disagree	20	22	21	25
Mainly agree	33	37	35	28
Completely agree	17	11	16	4
It is difficult to say	10	8	12	21

When the question «What prevents elections from becoming a mechanism of democratic participation of citizens in state affairs?» was asked, the answer was also stable after each election: failure of those elected to fulfill their electoral promises (table 4).

Table 4.

Public opinion on what prevents elections from becoming a mechanism of democratic participation of citizens in state affairs?

(there was a possibility to select as many factors as respondent wanted) % to respondents who disagree that election in Ukraine is the real mechanism of citizens' influence on authorities, or hesitated with the answer

	May 2004	October 2006	June - July 2007	March 2012
Failure to conduct election in compliance with democratic standards	18	15.5	18	30
Formation of the executive branch of power based not on the results of election	23	22	23	31
Failure to fulfill election promises by those who were elected	48	47	47	59
Absence of constant public control over the elected authorities	32	24	26	38
General character of election programs	18	12	16.5	23
Low quality of candidates – whoever will be chosen, there will be no better	_*	_*	_*	46
Low level of demand of citizens towards their delegates, passivity	29	17	22	29
Other	3	1	1	1
Nothing, election in Ukraine is a real mechanism of public participation in state affairs	5	6	4.5	2
It is difficult to say	17	14	16	7

* This variant was absent in the survey

The displeasure has grown not only in regard to politicians not fulfilling their promises, but also to the other dimensions of the election process. For the first time, voters have noticed non-compliance of elections with democratic standards even before the start of electoral campaign – this could be the result of the both local election of 2010 and general trend of democratic achievements rollback, that were observed before the beginning of the official election campaign. The population also started to perceive itself more critically, choosing such factors as absence of constant public control over the elected authorities and low level of citizens' demand towards their delegates.

Thus, we can identify general characteristics of public attitude towards elections, which were stable during all years of elections and electoral surveys. The voters, on the one

hand, treats election responsibly and considers it to be their duty to participate in them, both on verbal and practical levels. At the same time the population perceives the reality of elections in Ukraine in negative light. They are not satisfied with: 1) unfair character of elections; 2) that elections do not significantly influence the changes of life for better; 3) the fact that there are no political forces or individuals who would express and protect their interests; 4) the fact that political forces do not fulfill their promises.

2. Factors of voters' choice

We asked the question of motives for voting for certain party before each Parliamentary election and, as it is shown in table 5, during these years the main motivations were somewhat changed.

If during the first party election in 1998 the main reason for voting was that the party «expresses the interests of people like me», in four years such motivation decreased two times and continued to decrease later. Instead, the significance of «programs, ideas, offers» increased and almost the half of voters accepted this factor as the main. The highest importance of the party leader personality was recorded after the election of 2006, which was conditioned, in our opinion, first of all, by the fact that the personality of Yulia Tymoshenko was brightly shown during this election. In the motivation of the votes in 2007 the weight of such motive as «lesser evil» has drastically grown, which is connected with the disappointment in Verkhovna Rada that worked only for one year and was dismissed; thus there clearly was a higher percentage of those who voted the same as during previous elections that took place only a year ago.

Table 5. **Motivation of voting for political parties (blocs)** (there was a possibility to select not more than 2 answers) % to those, who would vote for certain party

Motives for voting for certain party	March 1998	August 2002	October 2006	June - July 2007	June 2012	December 2012**
l like its program, ideas, offers	35.2	43.1	50.8	41.4	40.8	50,0
l like its leaders	26.2	30.3	35.8	28.3	42.6	30.5
This party has good chances to win	9.6	8.5	10.9	12.8	12.3	12,8
There were candidates in the list of this party whom I like	-*	-*	-*	-*	-*	8,8
This party expresses interests of people like me	45.0	20.4	25.8	22.6	18.0	19.3
It is supported by people whom I respect	6.6	5.0	5.1	5.5	4.1	4,4
l voted for this party at the previous election	-*	13.6	12.5	19.6	15.1	6.7
At least this party is the "lesser evil" compared to other parties	-*	7.8	11.4	24.8	17.4	9.9
In general I voted for this party by accident	3.0	1.2	0.5	0.7	1.0	0.3
Other	3.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.4
It is difficult to say	2.8	5.0	7.8	0.4	1.3	0.6

* This question was not offered in the survey. ** The survey was conducted after the elections

During all elections political forces could be divided into two: those with prevailing orientation on program, ideas and offers and those with voter's orientation on leaders' personalities. During election of 2012 the motivation for voting for «UDAR» of Vitaly Klitchko was obviously of a leader type. It is interesting, that such diverse parties as Communist Party of Ukraine and «Svoboda» were alike in the motivation of voters. Voters of CPU liked their program (64%) and the fact that this party expressed their interests (50%). Voters of «Svoboda» were motivated by the same factors: program-oriented (64%) and the fact that party expresses their interests (35%). The motivation of choice of Batkivshchyna party has greatly changed during the election campaign. In June 2012, when the election lists were not formed yet and there were hopes that Yulia Tymoshenko will be at the top of the party list, the orientation on leader prevailed (51%). In August such motivation slightly dominated (38%) and in September only 12% of the voters of this political force were oriented on the leader, with the motivation of the program and offer taking the first place (34%) and on the fact that party expresses their interests (32%) – the second. The motivation of the Party of Regions voters differs from other parties: 46% of voters were oriented on the program and offers of this party; 25% voted for it because it has high chances of success; and 21% were ready to vote for it because they've voted for it during the previous Parliamentary election. It is interesting, that during the survey conducted in December 2012, i.e. one month after the election, voters' answers slightly changed: almost in all categories of electorate (except for the voters of the Communist Party) the motive of selecting party due to its ability to express one's interests has sharply decreased.

Of course, the biggest sensation of the election was the result achieved by «Svoboda» party. During election campaign there were doubts that this party would overcome the election threshold. Several weeks prior to the election day the majority of the sociologists thought that «Svoboda» will be represented in the Parliament, but no one expected the result of 10%. That is why post-election survey included the question on the motives of voting for this party – how would the population in general and its voters in particular explain its result?

As it can be seen from the table both the population in general and voters of «Svoboda» stated that the main motivation for voting for «Svoboda» was the protest against the authorities, as this party seemed the most radical in this regard.

During the election of 2012 as opposed to the previous Parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2007 the half of the deputies was elected in majority districts and this significantly influenced the structure of future Verkhovna Rada and the character of election campaign. For the first time in ten years, that passed since Parliamentary election of 2002 (when also half of the deputies were elected in majority districts), for wealthy people it was a real possibility to become a deputy, avoiding the party lists and the necessity to negotiate with party leaders. That is why the struggle in majority districts was very savage, often with fights, while the competition in party lists voting was quite restrained and fair.

Unpredictability of results was also explained by the fact that the part of the population was not aware that one half of the deputies will be chosen in majority districts – at the beginning of election campaign only 48% of population knew about this for sure, 29% more «have heard something about it», and 23% did not know anything about it. The

potential voters, those who expressed the readiness to participate in the elections were also not very aware: 52% of them knew about majority component of election, 29% «have heard something about it», and 19% did not know anything at all.

Table 6.

Why did voters vote to "Svoboda" party? (There was a possibility to choose not more then three possible reasons)

Possible reasons of voting	"Svoboda" voters	Population in general
It was the protest against the authorities and "Svoboda" seemed the most radical party	41.9	30.9
Voters shared nationalistic ideology of this party	23.7	12.9
"Svoboda" was close to the election threshold and if it wouldn't enter the Parliament the opposition could loose up to 5% of votes, that is why people voted for "Svoboda"	7.5	10.3
Voters were disappointed in available political forces and "Svoboda" never was in Verkhovna Rada	27.5	19.2
"Svoboda" gave a good account of itself in local authorities in the Western region, where is has the majority	31.2	15.6
Voters were sure that there will be no traitors among "Svoboda" deputies	20.6	10.9
Voters were attracted by the offers of this party	26.9	9.3
Because the national intolerance and aggression are growing in the society	9.4	9.9
Because voters wanted that there was a political force able to fight and conduct other forced actions in Verkhovna Rada	5.0	5.0
Voters were attracted by the candidates in the list of this party	5.6	3.7
Probably, it was a spontaneous choice	0.6	6.7
Other	1.8	1.1
It is difficult to say	0.6	18.4

Traditionally, as during the elections of 1998 and 2002, when half of the deputies were elected in majority districts, these candidates face different demands than deputies in party lists. In the structure of motives while electing deputies in majority districts the following were the main ones for the population: offers of the candidate on solving problems of their town (village) – 47%, possibility to solve problems of their district in future (36%), previous experience (32%) and honesty of the candidate (31%).

Return to the majority elections and candidates to the districts renewed former, inherent

to majority elections, practice of buying votes in the districts. This was observed in different forms: from intense urgent «assistance» in the districts (schools repair, children's playgrounds, etc.) to distribution of food packages and direct financial payments for voting.

Surveys showed quite contradictory attitude towards selling and buying votes during election. On one side, one month prior to election, in September, 82% of voters responded negatively on the question whether they were ready to sell their votes during elections. They said that their votes were not for sale, and it appeared that compared to the year 2010 the public opinion was even more negative (table 7).

Table 7.

Are you ready to sell your vote for money? (%)

	December 2009	October 2010	April 2012	September 2012
Of course, no	69.4	67.7	73.0	82.9
Of course, yes – I'd vote for anyone and for any money	2.0	2.9	1.7	1.5
Yes, only if the amount would satisfy me	7.5	9.7	8.2	5.2
Yes, if I was going to vote for this candidate (party) anyway	12.7	9.0	7.7	4.6
It is difficult to say	8.3	10.8	9.4	5.8

On the other side, the population treats those who votes for money quite indulgently: only the half clearly reprove, one third – understands, and 10% approves, and this breakdown of public opinion is quite stable (table 8).

Table 8.

As it is known sometimes during election voters are offered money for voting for certain candidate or party. What is your view of that? (%)

	December 2009	October 2010	April 2012	September 2012
Clearly reprove, one can not sell his vote	51.3	48.6	56.1	53.2
In general, treat negative, but with understanding – situations can differ	33.1	31.7	26.8	31.8
Treat positively, what's wrong with people making money?	9.6	9.5	10.6	10.3
It is difficult to say	6.1	7.0	6.6	4.7

At the same time Parliamentary elections 2012 showed that money are by no means omnipotent. Kyiv was a clear example, where the process of mass bribery of voters was especially brutal and unpunished. However, the candidates in majority districts, having invested huge amounts of money, lost to opposition candidates, even not very famous one. Indeed, Kyivans voted only for those who did not pay for their votes, but also went to protect their choice, which did not allow falsifying results. However, such things did not happen everywhere.

The majority component was the decisive factor in general result of the election, changing it in favor of the authorities. Although on party lists the majority of voters supported opposition forces, the motivation of voting for candidates in the majority districts did not bear the party character: as it is shown by the data of sociologic polls, the candidate was to protect interests of the exact district and assist to the voters in it. Thus, it is not surprising that voters in the districts elected those who could solve specific problems – to repair the school or provide support to people. These are, first of all, those candidates who have money or managerial positions. Actually, because of this the Law on Elections was changed, because if the Law was proportional, the majority in Verkhovna Rada would have been received by the opposition.

3. What divides electorate? Political and social structure of political parties' electorates

Altogether, as a rule, election campaigns in democratic countries are focused on the problems, which are the most important for citizens, and election battles are happening over these issues. In Ukraine constantly, before each election, sociologists state that the top ten of the most important problems include social-economic issues and are common for all regions of Ukraine and supporters of different political forces. These are usually unemployment; ensuring economic growth; increasing average level of salaries, pensions, stipends; decrease of prices on food products and basic commodities; improvement of medical care; social protection of the most vulnerable groups; fight against corruption; public utilities; fight against crime; land reform and agriculture. The issues of external orientation policy and language issues were placed in the end of the list of priorities in all regions of Ukraine, as well as problems of democracy and civic freedoms.

If election campaign is to be built according to the hierarchy of the most important issues for voters, obviously, it should focus on party offers of different ways of economic development of Ukraine and solution of the most acute social problems. Instead party proposals on economic issues are virtually the same and built over populist statements and unreal promises.

As opposed to the European parties, in Ukraine economic views are not the criteria for division of the political structure: the majority of voters of almost all political parties that are able to overcome the election threshold has a centrist thinking that there is a need to combine state regulation and market methods (table 10). Only the electorate of the Communist Party distinguish itself, its majority thinks that there is a need to return to planned state economy.

Table 9.

Which issues are the most important personally for you, the opinion of deputies on which problems you would like to hear? Please, read the list carefully and choose not more then 10 issues.

	October 2005	September 2007	June 2012
Overcoming unemployment	56.2	54.3	59.3
Overcoming economic crisis, growth of economy	56.8	56.1	51.8
Increasing the average level of salaries, pensions, stipends	58.7	54.4	51.5
Decrease of the prices on food products and essential commodities	43.0	45.5	43.3
Social protection of the needy	39.6	47.4	40.5
Improvement of the medical care	52.7	47.3	40.0
Fight against corruption	28.5	31.2	39.0
Decrease of communal payments	39.5	-	31.3
Fight against crime	36.3	38.2	30.9
Land reform, support of agriculture	29.5	24.7	29.1
Reform of pension provision	33.7	33.4	26.4
Decrease of the level of social stratification on poor and rich	20.5	26.8	25.3
Support of local manufacturers	23.0	20.3	24.8
Maternity and childhood care	19.5	22.4	18.7
Cessation of political repressions, freedom for opposition leaders (Yulia Tymoshenko, etc.)	-	-	18.6
Reform of law enforcement system, fair justice	-	-	17.0
Solution of ecologic problems, environmental protection	19.6	16.5	16.7
Overcoming moral crisis in society, fight against immorality	10.6	12.3	15.9
Fight against oligarchs	9.2	12.3	14.8
Democracy development in society, the possibility for people to influence authorities	8.4	5.8	13.2
Educational reform of basic and higher education	12.8	11.0	13.0
Improvement of tax system	17.5	18.1	12.8
Improvement of the government, administrative reform	-	-	11.9

	October 2005	September 2007	June 2012
Political system reform	8.1	7.4	11.4
Support of national culture and Ukrainian language	7.6	6.5	11.2
Rights and freedoms safeguards – freedom of speech, meetings, etc.	5.7	5.2	10.2
Ukraine joining the EU	4.0	5.6	9.7
Development of the physical culture and sports	5.7	3.3	8.0
Ukraine joining Common Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan	10.9	9.9	6.5
Providing regions, local authorities, with greater scope of powers	5.3	3.0	5.4
Status of Russian language in Ukraine	8.9	7.5	3.9
Overcoming conflict between religious confessions	2.8	2.4	3.1
Ukraine joining NATO	2.2	2.5	2.9
Other	1.2	1.3	1.5
Nothing of the listed above is interesting	-	-	2.3
It is difficult to answer	2.8	-	0.9

Table 10.

How should the state participate in economy management? (August 2012)

What should be the role of the government?	CPU	Party of Regions	Batkivshchyna	Svoboda	UDAR	Ukraine, general
There is a need to minimize the role of the government, everything should be regulated by the market	7.4	7.9	13.8	16.9	10.3	10.5
There us a need to combine state governance and market methods	31.1	59.0	49.3	43.1	49.5	49.2
Return to the planned economy based on the complete state accounting and control	46.7	23.6	17.6	23.1	18.1	22.0
It is difficult to answer and Not responded	14.8	9.5	19.3	16.9	22.1	18.3

The real lines of electorate stratification, as during the previous election, were foreign policy orientations of the population and the question of the status of the Russian language.

The data presented in Table 11 clearly indicate the separation of Ukrainian electorate into two parts: those having pro-European external political orientations (voters of «Svoboda», «Batkivshchyna», «UDAR»), and those having pro-Russian orientation (voters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine), who support joining the Custom Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and are mainly against joining the EU. At the same time the electorates of all parties are against Ukraine joining NATO, with voters of «Svoboda» and «Batkivshchyna» being more favorable towards it.

Table 11.

External political orientations of political parties' voters (August 2012, %)*

	Party of Regions	CPU	UDAR	Batkivshchyna	Svoboda	Ukraine, general		
Now do you regard Ukraine joining the EU?								
Positively	29,5	14,8	61,6	64,6	64,1	43,8		
Negatively	48,8	73,3	22,7	21,5	25,0	37,9		
It is difficult to answer	21,7	11,9	15,8	13,9	10,9	18,2		
Now do you regard Ukraine jo	ining the C	ustom Ur	nion with	Russia, Belarus	and Kazał	khstan?		
Positively	69,5	78,7	28,6	24,1	23,1	45,2		
Negatively	15,1	11,0	47,3	57,3	69,2	35,7		
It is difficult to answer	15,4	10,3	24,1	18,6	7,7	19,1		
Now	do you reg	ard Ukrai	ne joining	g NATO?				
Positively	6,4	3,0	17,2	23,2	35,9	13,3		
Negatively	77,5	83,7	49,0	55,0	42,2	64,9		
It is difficult to answer	18,3	13,3	33,8	21,8	21,9	21,8		

The electorate of political parties appeared to be the most divided on the issues of provision of the official status to the Russian language (table 12).

Table 12.

Attitude of political forces' voters towards the provision of the official status to the Russian language (August 2012, %)

Whether the provision of the official status to the Russian language is supported	Party of Regions	CPU	UDAR	Batkivshchyna	Svoboda	Ukraine, general
Yes	66.7	62	19	8.1	4.6	38.4
No	27.0	30	74	84.5	93.8	53.8
It is difficult to answer	6.4	8	7	7.4	1.5	7.8

The absolute majority of «Svoboda», «Batkivshchyna» and «UDAR» voters did not support the provision of the official status to the Russian language, and the majority of voters of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine supported it. One more clear line of division of voters of different political forces is attitude towards the impeachment of the President Victor Yanukovytch (table 13).

Table 13.

Attitude of voters of different political forces towards the impeachment of the **President Victor Yanukovytch** (August 2012, %)

Whether the offer of the impeachment of the President Victor Yanukovytch is supported	Party of Regions	CPU	UDAR	Batkivshchyna	Svoboda	Ukraine, general
Yes	2.0	26.8	46.9	72.2	73.7	34.1
No	92.4	53.0	30.6	14.3	12.1	47.3
It is difficult to answer	5.7	20.2	22.5	13.5	14.1	18.6

While deciding between the democracy and the authoritarianism as preferred type of the political system, all voters except for the Communist Party voters, have chosen democracy (table 14).

Table 14.

Views of voters of different political forces on the preferred type of political system in Ukraine (*August 2012, %*)

With which of the following statements do you agree more?	Party of Regions	CPU	UDAR	Batkivshchyna	Svoboda	Ukraine, forward!	Ukraine, genera
Democracy is the most desired type of political system for Ukraine	51.2	31.1	44.6	59.5	55.4	55.6	47.2
Under certain circumstances the authoritarian regime can be better than democratic	23.3	36.3	24.5	16.4	20.0	16.7	21.8
For a person like me there is no difference whether the regime is democratic or not	15.6	18.5	13.2	9.5	13.8	19.4	17.0
It is difficult to answer	9.9	14.1	17.6	14.5	10.8	8.3	14.0

So, let's make some conclusions regarding the party-political differentiation of the population of Ukraine before the Parliamentary elections of 2012. Compared to the situation that existed prior to the Parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2007, the political structuring of the voters did not change despite the fact that during six years the conglomerate of parties, which can be elected to Verkhovna Rada, have changed. As earlier, the cleavage lines relating to the implementation of economic policy generally accepted in the Western democracies (including the Eastern Europe and the Baltic States) do not work in Ukraine, but the division of electoral space over foreign policy orientations is stable, and especially – in relation to the language issues. Such structuring and its constant emphasis thereof during election campaigns could threaten the integrity of the state.

4. From Parliamentary election 2012 to Presidential election 2015. Problems and perspectives

Parliamentary election of 2012 has not become a turning point in the development of the country, having continued the trend of the gradual rollback of the democratic rights and freedoms. Mass bribery of voters, utilization of the administrative resources, abundance of political advertisement disguised as informational materials in the mass-media and the appearance of the falsified sociologic surveys – all these phenomena, which from time to time were observed during the previous elections, came to full charge. Falsifications of results in several majority districts became the «well-deserved» ending of elections-2012.

But the Rubicon, where democracy ends, was not crossed, and the civil sector having been very active during elections added a lot to it. Constant monitoring of the violations carried out by public organizations and publications in mass-media about these discreditable facts acted as a restraining factor for elections participants. The significant role in the fairness of the votes calculation was played by the local and international observers, and especially exit-polls. If there any were falsifications in the partly-list component of elections, they were not bigger than possible exit-poll margin of error. It allowed the opposition to win in the party-list component of the elections. There were a lot more possibilities to falsify results at the majority districts as no exit-polling was conducted there.

At the same time in several controversial majority districts public activists in cooperation with journalists and united opposition were able to stand up for fair election results or, at least, to successfully insist on unadmittance of falsified results. In order to mobilize the public and widely publicize falsifications, the new media, Facebook and Twitter, were actively used. It was even possible to broadcast online from these districts, which forced to repeal illegitimate decisions.

Civil society during 2012 elections proved that it can be strong and influential. Mass information campaign of Movement «Chesno!», which demanded openness and responsibility from politicians, finally forced newly elected MPs to vote personally in the Parliament, which seemed impossible during the previous 20 years of its existence. The important role in the democratization of the elections campaign was played by the sociologic surveys of public opinion, funded by international organizations and independent of any political force. These polls were not only focused on ratings, but covered wide circle of issues on election campaign and allowed civil society organizations to work more effectively.

Thus the election campaign proved that civil society is able to be successful when it is united, acts together with journalists and involves international organizations.

There are several lessons that should be learned based on the experience of 2012 elections. These lessons should be taken into consideration while preparing to the Presidential election of 2015.

1. Coalitions of public organizations, structurally organized, with wide regional representation, provide significant synergic effect and act more effectively than just the multitude of these organizations.

2. Close cooperation between civil sector and mass media during elections is crucial for the effectiveness of civil society. When central TV channels belong to the financial-economic groups depending on the authorities, there is a possibility of censorship growth (as happened in 2004 during the Presidential election). Thus it is necessary to plan ahead how to use alternative sources of the information, first of all those that can hardly be censored – Internet, and probably the dissemination of the leaflets and inserts into local newspapers.

3. Maximum involvement of the international community – journalists, public activists, politicians, observers is an important condition for the fair elections in Ukraine. Surveys show that western international observers have more credibility among Ukrainian citizens then local observers. Besides that, the close international attention towards the Presidential

elections in Ukraine can become a preventive measure and restrain the authorities from brutal violations.

4. The most successful direction of activities of the civil sector during the election of 2012 was the function of control, which, at the same time, is the most desired in the public conscience. However, during this election as well as all previous ones, the rational choice, the rational voting, which makes elections a democratic mechanism in the choice of the authorities, was not achieved. Think tanks and NGOs tried to analyze programs and proposals of parties and candidates, but there was a clear lack of data for analysis – just general statements and populist promises. That is why there is a need to ask clear questions to candidates and make them all answer these questions. Usually it is done based on the sociologic surveys, which provide the possibility to determine the most acute problems for the voters. Election campaign, focused on competing candidates trying to solve the most important social problems, which are common for all regions of Ukraine, will allow overcoming the common technology of splitting Ukraine into two parts using the language and foreign policy issues, which in reality occupy the last places in the hierarchy of priority issues for the citizens.

5. Independent sociologic researches should become the essential component of the public election campaign. They, on the one hand, will present the non-biased picture of the elections situation to the society, and on the other hand will allow civil organizations to build their work more effectively. On top of that, the falsified poll results usually appear even on TV during the election campaigns, which was once again proved by the election 2012, and they can only be resisted by the sociologic organizations with well-deserved reputation and financial support that is independent from the election participants.

6. Finally, there is a need to conduct independent exit poll, funded by international organizations. There is a danger that the phenomenon of the Presidential election of 2004 can be repeated, when under the strong pressure of the authorities some sociologic services have falsified the results of the first round of election (removing the significant part of the western regions voters from the sampling), while other announced that their exit-polls failed. Only two sociologic services, Razumkov's Centre and Kiev International Institute of Sociology, in cooperation with the Democratic Initiatives Foundation were courageous and professional enough to complete their job, earning the great reputation in the society.

There is a need to understand now that the Presidential election of 2015 will be crucial for the future of Ukraine, which after the election of 2012 appeared at the crossroads again: between the East and the West, between authoritarianism and democracy. And the civil sector should do its best so that the country made a right choice and this choice was defended.

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Conduction of the National Exit Poll-2012 by the Consortium which included the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives (DIF), the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), and the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Research named after Oleksandr Razumkov (Razumkov Centre) was of extreme importance, since it favored free and fair nature of election procedure.

DIF has coordinated and carried out financial and media management of the exit poll. KIIS and Razumkov Centre conducted voters' opinion poll, while scientific management, development of sample, and coordination of polling activities were done by KIIS.

The National Exit Poll-2012 project was financed by international organizations and foreign embassies, including the International Renaissance Foundation, MATRA program of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine, the National Endowment of Democracy (USA), UNITER project of Pact Inc. (USAID), and the European Union.

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The book contains results of survey of voters at exit from polling stations during the parliamentary elections which took place on October 28, 2012.

It should be of interest to sociologists, political scientists, politicians, journalists, and all those who deal with issues of research and conduction of elections as one of the main mechanisms of democratic system functioning.

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DIF coordinates activity of high profile experts on researching urgent issues of civil and political life of the country, helps to establish and maintain contacts between NGOs, organizes common public events, disseminates informational materials among political actors, state agencies, representative institutions, and informs wide public through mass media channels.

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Editor Iryna Bekeshkina Responsible for the issue Svitlana Barbeliuk Manager Svitlana Barbeliuk, Olha Bondarchuk Literary editing Iryna Filipchuk Vitalii Dovhych Secretary Liudmyla Kazanevska Computer makeup Oleksandr Boiarskyi Cover design Iurii Savinov

Contact information: PO Box B-271, Kyiv 01001, Ukraine; phone/fax (380 44) 581-3317; e-mail: dif@dif.org.ua; website: http://www.dif.org.ua

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